Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BRIGHTON MARINE PALACE AND PIER (FINANCE, &C.) BILL

Read the Third time, and passed.

EXETER CITY COUNCIL BILL [LORDS]

Amendments agreed to.

To he read the Third time.

Oral Answers to Questions — EMPLOYMENT

Enterprise Allowance

Mr. Stern: asked the Paymaster General if he has any plans to review the control and vetting procedures over applications for enterprise allowance and the subsequent use of funds granted under this scheme; and if he will make a statement.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. David Trippier): All aspects of the enterprise allowance scheme are kept under review. I am, however, satisfied that the present eligibility criteria and control and vetting procedures are appropriate. All businesses supported by the scheme are monitored twice during the year in which they receive the allowance to ensure that they continue to meet the eligibility criteria.

Mr. Stern: I thank my hon. Friend for his reply, which demonstrates the extent to which that popular scheme is being monitored. Does he agree that, although any monitoring must be kept under review, the success of the scheme under the present system is guaranteed?

Mr. Trippier: I certainly would be happy to give that guarantee. It is important to stress that we have changed the procedure as from 1 January this year, whereby the more effective monitoring procedure is put in place. We have also made awareness days compulsory for people who seek to apply for the EAS.

Mr. John Browne: Does my hon. Friend accept that the highest percentage of employment growth has been in the new and smaller business sector? Does that not illustrate well how important it is for schemes such as the enterprise allowance scheme to encourage people to start in business on their own?

Mr. Trippier: My hon. Friend is right. The enterprise allowance scheme has played a significant part in ensuring

that the number of self-employed people is the highest for 60 years. The net increase in small businesses on a weekly basis is the highest in recorded history.

Regional Tourism (Television)

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: asked the Paymaster General what information he has about the effect on regional tourism of television programmes depicting the English countryside, history and way of life.

Mr. Trippier: It is not possible to quantify the actual effect of television programmes on regional tourism, but many successful television productions have clearly resulted in substantial increases in the number of visitors to the areas in which they are located.

Mr. Bruinvels: Given that the BBC television series "Bergerac" has promoted jobs and tourism in Jersey, does my hon. Friend agree that many more regional companies should promote the areas in which their films are made? I refer to films such as "Connie", "Adrian Mole", and "Little Lord Fauntleroy", all of which were filmed in Leicestershire.

Mr. Trippier: Perhaps it is more appropriate for my hon. Friend to refer to "Little Lord Fauntleroy", than to "Bergerac". He is right. We should do more to encourage regional television companies to do more to increase awareness of the location of their film and television productions.

Mr. Madden: Does the Minister agree that any television programme showing the conditions on railway lines between Bradford and Leeds will greatly inhibit the efforts that Bradford is making to promote tourism? Therefore, will he make urgent inquiries to find out why British Rail is reluctant to electrify the line to provide clean, fast and comfortable trains, which would help tourism, promote local industry and help us to combat unemployment?

Mr. Trippier: The hon. Gentleman has something of a reputation for pushing the negative rather than the positive. I shall draw the point that he raised to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Transport. The area that he represents—the point has been dealt with in the substantive question on the Order Paper—has benefited considerably from the production, "Last of the Summer Wine", and the hon. Gentleman well knows that.

Mr. Bevan: Will my hon. Friend please have discussions with the television companies to see how the success of "Bergerac" and of "Little Lord Fauntleroy" may be developed and increased so that they can be sold abroad, and will he contemplate the development of a series on the railways so successfully based on Birmingham and the green county in their past development?

Mr. Trippier: I shall be very happy to comply with my hon. Friend's wishes.

Mr. Bill Walker: Does my hon. Friend agree that with about 1·5 million people working in tourism, it is one of our major areas of employment and future employment, and whereas the making of films is helpful and essential, it is only one part of that. However, there is nothing that I would like better than to see "Rob Roy" on the television screen.

Mr. Trippier: It is a long time since any of us saw "Rob Roy" on television. It had a good run for a time, but I am sure that the vast majority of people in Britain, and possibly abroad, could stand another showing of that excellent film.

Community Programme

Mr. Meadowcroft: asked the Paymaster General if he will make a statement on the number of places available on the community programme.

The Paymaster General and Minister for Employment (Mr. Kenneth Clarke): On 27 February 1987 there were 248,216 people employed on the programme. This is an increase of 56,338 filled places, since February 1986. In 1987–88 the programme will operate at an average level over the year of about 245,000 filled places which will provide opportunities for around 300,000 entrants, about the same number as in the current year.

Mr. Meadowcroft: Is the Paymaster General aware of the apparent capriciousness of the MSC and the place of the community programme, which means that in those areas where the programme has done well it will now be cut in order to favour those areas where it has done less well? Given that the community programme is a cost-effective scheme, would it not be worth while for the Government to increase rather than cut the number of places where the programme is doing well so that the total number of places has to increase if the Government's policy of assisting those areas that have done less well is to continue? Is the Paymaster General aware that Leeds city council has not taken up 500 places because the Government will not supplement them and, therefore, people who are unemployed in Leeds are caught between the MSC and the city council, which will not assist them in the community programme?

Mr. Clarke: We must look at the allocation of places, but we are guided by need. At the moment we are trying to concentrate on those parts of Britain where unemployment remains highest. We are also seeing how the community programme places fit alongside the new job training scheme, which will provide a better option for many of the under-25s.
Half the places in Leeds will still be taken up by the Leeds city council, but we want to see a diversity of suppliers. The overall effect in Yorkshire and Humberside is that the number of places next year will be exactly the same as this year.
I am delighted to hear that the hon. Gentleman is now urging us to support the community programme. I am told that long ago, when he was secretary of the council of voluntary services in Bradford, he was always opposed to it. Now that the Liberal party has come round and is seeking to imitate it, no doubt he has had a change of view.

Mr. Robert B. Jones: I assure my right hon. and learned Friend that many of us who represent areas with relatively low unemployment strongly support his policy of taking places from the community programme in the wealthier parts of the country and redistributing them to areas with higher unemployment. However, will he make sure that the baby is not thrown out with the bath water and that specialist schemes, such as that operated by the Elfrida Rathbone Society, catering for those who find it more difficult to obtain work, are not scrapped at the same time as other more widespread schemes?

Mr. Clarke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because it is sometimes difficult for those who provide worthwhile schemes to understand why they may be cut a little to allow more places to be provided in, say, depressed inner city areas. I certainly agree that we should have a look at specialist schemes and protect those, particularly that run by the excellent society to which he referred.

Ms. Clare Short: Will the Paymaster General now admit that on the figures that he has just given he has announced a cut of 10,000 places in the community programme and that the local cuts are greater than that because of the build up of some of the big national schemes, such as Branson? Will he admit that the reason is that he has found a better way to get people out of the unemployment figures, and that is called the job training scheme—work experience for benefit? Has he any plans to increase the allowance on the community programme? Will he admit that the net take-home pay on the community programme is £49 a week? If there is to be an increase, where will the money come from? Will it be from further cuts in the community programme?

Mr. Clarke: The Opposition object when we introduce new programmes, and also when we try to alter the balance between existing ones. They take an extremely negative view. The figures that I gave show that the community programme, which has just gone through a period of rapid expansion, is being maintained at about the same level as last year. However, we must look at the impact of the new job training scheme, which we hope will provide 110,000 places by September of this year, chiefly for those under 25. We must see how the community programme sits alongside that scheme, as well as altering the emphasis.
The present allowance is tied to the market rate of pay— particularly the rates paid to local government manual workers— and the figures that the hon. Lady cites are better understood when it is appreciated that they are usually for part-time work, not for a full working week.

Mr. Speaker: Mrs. Kellett-Bowman.

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I called the hon. Lady to ask a question.

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The amplifier is not working.

Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Lady wish to ask a question?

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: No.

Mr. Kenneth Carlisle: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that while the community programme is essential to help the long-term unemployed, if it is used with imagination, it can also bring great benefits to local communities? In Lincoln, for example, an excellent scheme to construct a delightful walkway along the River Witham is helping both the unemployed and the community. Does the community programme not also provide encouraging results, in that the number of long-term unemployed is now on the decline?

Mr. Clarke: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I am only sorry that his constituent, Mr. Peter Hodginkinson,


who had so much to do with that scheme, has not survived to see it being brought into effect. That is one of many examples of how giving valuable work experience to the long-term unemployed can also bring benefits to the local community. That is why we are so pleased with our achievements in crime prevention in the inner cities, the farm and countryside programme and many other worthwhile aims of Government policy.

Labour Statistics

Mr. Dubs: asked the Paymaster General how many people in inner London have been unemployed for over a year.

Mr. Clarke: rose—

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The amplifier is still not working.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that most of them are. Would the hon. Lady like to change her place?

Mr. Clarke: I am well known to be a soft-spoken man, but I shall raise my voice.
On 8 January 1987 the number of claimants in the boroughs that make up inner London who had been unemployed for over one year was 86,300.

Mr. Dubs: I put it to the Minister that every person who is long-term unemployed represents a human tragedy and that there is absolutely no hope for those people unless there is a change in Government policy. The waffle with which the Minister will answer my question is no response; he should be examining the long-term problems of those who have been unemployed for any length of time.

Mr. Clarke: I agree with the hon. Gentleman's first point. Each individual who has been out of work for more than 12 months usually represents a considerable personal tragedy. I am therefore glad that the number that I have given is smaller than that of 12 months ago. The unemployment rate has begun to come down, as long-term unemployment has begun to do in the country as a whole. The hon. Gentleman should not be so dismissive of the Government's economic policy and the achievement of their programmes. Last month saw the largest fall in unemployment in the country as a whole since records began.

Mr. Hickmet: Is unemployment not falling all over the country? Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that in my constituency it has fallen faster than in almost any other area? Does that not demonstrate the Government's commitment to steel-closure areas and other areas of high unemployment, and the fact that Government policy towards the north in relation to regional policy is highly commendable?

Mr. Speaker: Order. The question concerns London.

Mr. Clarke: My hon. Friend emphasised to me what was being achieved in his constituency when I last visited him and his constituents. That has lessons for inner London boroughs, because it shows that if a town such as Scunthorpe—which has been badly hit by necessary changes in the steel industry—can attract new industry and generate new types of employment, the same can be achieved in inner London boroughs. Indeed, it is being achieved, where local authorities co-operate with the sensible proposals that Government Departments have put forward to strengthen the economy.

Mr. Raynsford: Given the serious unemployment problem in inner London, does the Paymaster General accept that the further loss of long-standing industrial employment in the area is a potential disaster? Is he aware that British Gas plans to move nearly 700 staff out of the research station in Fulham? Will he make urgent representations to the chairman of British Gas that he should reconsider this proposal, which will have a devastating effect on the local economy and on local employment?

Mr. Clarke: Decisions about the location of British Gas staff are for British Gas to determine. If a decision is pending that is likely to have an effect on Fulham, I trust that everybody will respond by creating conditions that will enable new employers to be attracted to Fulham to provide work there. Many major companies are moving work out of Greater London to provide it elsewhere in the regions. That is not altogether bad. London does not have a great manufacturing tradition. It is particularly strong in providing service industries and self-employment, and it is showing very substantial growth in all those areas across the whole of London.

London Visitor and Convention Bureau

Mr. Alexander: asked the Paymaster General what information he has on the amount of income that has been generated by tourism in the London Visitor and Convention Bureau area in each year since 1978.

Mr. Trippier: Tourist spending in the London area increased from £1·8 billion in 1978 to over £3·9 billion in 1985. That is a rise of over 14 per cent. in real terms. A table giving full information has been placed in the Library.

Mr. Alexander: I thank my hon. Friend for his interesting reply. Does it not illustrate that there is considerable scope for getting tourists away from the golden triangle, of which London is the centre, and into areas such as historic Newark-upon-Trent and the east midlands? How would my hon. Friend propose to reverse that trend?

Mr. Trippier: The substantial increase in the section 4 grant expenditure under the Development of Tourism Act 1969 that was announced last year by the Government was principally to encourage the dispersal of tourists, particularly from the London area, into the regions. A very good example of that is the major tourist development that has been supported by the Government in the constituency adjoining that of my hon. Friend, which is known as Center Parcs.

Mr. Duffy: asked the Paymaster General whether he will state the figures for youth unemployment in 1979 and 1986 in the Sheffield travel-to-work area.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. John Lee): In 1986 the average number of unemployed claimants aged under 18 years of age in the Sheffield travel-to-work area was 3,980. Comparable figures for 1979 are not available because of changes in the way figures are collected. However, in 1979 the average number of unemployed registrants aged under 18 years in the Sheffield travel-to-work area, as defined in 1978, was 1,790.

Mr. Duffy: Given the decline in manufacturing employment in Sheffield, the continued inequalities in the


regional economies and the fact that the Budget is dependent upon a general upturn in the national economy, is the Minister aware that those figures are unlikely to be eased except by micro measures? Will he therefore look at Sheffield's employment plan, which can create 25,000 new jobs and training places and can therefore take more than 17,000 people off the unemployment register?

Mr. Lee: I accept that Sheffield has a difficult unemployment problem. There has been a slight but welcome fall in the overall level of unemployment in Sheffield over the last six months. We have a number of measures to tackle unemployment. Two job clubs are being opened today in Sheffield. They will bring the total number of job clubs in the Sheffield and Rotherham travel-to-work area to about 16. As for the Sheffield city council's plans, they are, in our view, very expensive, and their cost would have to be borne by ratepayers and taxpayers.

Mr. McLoughlin: Will my hon. Friend look at the figures and remind the House of the level of unemployment in the Sheffield area between 1974 and 1979? Will he tell us of any time when a Labour Government have brought about a reduction in unemployment? Is it not a fact that every Labour Government have gone into a general election campaign committing themselves to a reduction of unemployment and that while they have been in office every Labour Government have seen a rise in unemployment?

Mr. Lee: I believe that what my hon. Friend has said is correct.

Mr. Flannery: The Minister says that the plans of Sheffield city council are expensive. Does he not think that it is expensive for 600 more workers, who were laid off in my constituency just recently in one of the main steelworks in Sheffield, to be on the dole and to pay them money for doing nothing when all they want to do is work? What kind of plans do the Government have that are not expensive for working people?

Mr. Lee: We are proud of the fact that we are spending nationally about £3·5 billion on overall employment and training measures. We are spending a lot of money. All I am saying is that the plans of Sheffield city council would, over and above that, be particularly expensive and would be borne by ratepayers and taxpayers. That would involve further job losses and industrial closures in Sheffield.

Inner Cities

Mr. Thurnham: asked the Paymaster General what recent initiatives he has taken to promote employment in the inner cities.

Mr. Kenneth Clarke: We are now making very good progress in our eight inner city task force areas, with over 90 special projects and schemes already approved to encourage enterprise training and job creation for the residents of these areas. We have also concentrated more effectively the efforts and programmes of the Manpower Services Commission and other Government Departments on the same eight areas and their residents. As the various programmes are implemented, the benefits of the Government's task force approach will become steadily more apparent over the coming months to the people who live in the areas concerned.

Mr. Thurnham: Does my right hon. and learned Friend welcome the imaginative way in which employers and others such as the Home Office and the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders are co-operating with his Department? Does that not contrast strongly with the failure of those Labour-controlled local authorities which are not co-operating with the Manpower Services Commission and the inner city task force schemes?

Mr. Clarke: I agree with my hon. Friend about the contrast, and it is unfortunate. We are now doing very good work under the community programme in providing work experience to help people to protect themselves against crime in the inner cities. A number of major firms are interested in engaging in community programme projects in the inner cities, especially McAlpine, which has entered into agreements with us. There are still some Labour-controlled local authorities that are turning away training and work experience proposals from the Manpower Services Commission. In the task force areas we are trying to overcome the objections of people, like the Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen, who have tried to reject such proposals, so that residents may have the benefit of schemes which the Government want to finance in those areas.

Mr. Janner: While it is right to concentrate on the continuing misery of unemployment in the inner cities, does the Minister accept that there is also vast unemployment in outer areas? In my constituency most of the high unemployment is in areas in the outer city, such as Braunstone, New Parks, Mowmacre and Stocking Farm, where unemployment ranges between 30 and 60 per cent. What will the Paymaster General do that he has not done before to help people in those areas?

Mr. Clarke: I agree that it is not only in Leicester, but in cities such as Liverpool and Bristol, that as much deprivation is found on large estates on the edges of the cities as in inner city areas. However, the lessons that we are learning rapidly from places such as Highfields in Leicester can be extended through the urban programme and the Manpower Services Commission to other areas. We will take action as rapidly as Leicester city council and others help us to deliver the goods on the ground in the Highfields area in particular.

Mr. Ralph Howell: Has my right hon. and learned Friend seen the leading article in The Times regarding work, welfare and workfare? Has he noted the favourable replies given to me by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee yesterday? Will he now think again about introducing the comprehensive workfare system and giving it a fair wind?

Mr. Clarke: We have given a guarantee of training to everyone under the age of 18, so that no one under the age of 18 need be unemployed and drawing benefit. From tomorrow we are going national with the job training scheme and will be greatly expanding its availability. There will be 300,000 people going through the community programme. We are making a whole range of worthwhile activities available to people to reduce the need to remain idle. The rules remain that anyone who draws benefit in this country must demonstrate that he is available to work and is actively looking for it. While my hon. Friend knows that I still have considerable reservations about what is


known in America as "workfare", we are providing all the opportunities that people require, and we are entitled to expect people to take advantage of them where we provide them.

Mr. Litherland: Is the Minister aware that there is 46 per cent. male unemployment in the centre of Manchester in my constituency and that that figure is still rising? How can the right hon. and learned Gentleman come to the Dispatch Box with deceitful distortions of the real facts? When will we get real jobs, not cosmetics?

Mr. Clarke: I know that conditions are quite serious for many people in the middle of Manchester. That is why Moss Side is one of the places where we have an inner city task force operating. I know from my contacts with the city that quite a lot is happening there. It is a strong commercial and regional centre and the economy there seems to be reviving extremely well. The Government have done a great deal to help by financing such things as the G-Mex centre and, next door, the development at Salford Quays. Now that the national economy is reviving so strongly, I think that Manchester is one of those places where we have the greatest cause to be optimistic about the future.

Mr. Watts: What would be the effects on improving employment prospects in inner cities of a 1 per cent. tax on company turnover, as proposed by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott)?

Mr. Clarke: I am a little bewildered about where we are on the 1 per cent. levy. Recently, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) appeared to deny that he had guaranteed that a 1 per cent. tax on turnover would be charged. I had to look up the Official Report to confirm that the hon. Gentleman had, indeed, committed himself to such a levy. I am waiting to hear whether he will commit himself to it again. Perhaps urgent consultations are taking place in Dagenham about that matter.

Mr. Prescott: The Paymaster General will recall that last February, when he launched this scheme, he said that the task force was a bold experiment in creating real jobs. As he has not made any claim for real jobs in his statements since, can he now tell the House how many real jobs have been created by this scheme, or how many jobs he expects to create by this scheme? Is not the real truth that this is a propaganda hoax on people in the inner city areas? The right hon. and learned Gentleman is not creating real jobs. It would be much better if he gave the £20 billion that he robbed from local authorities back to them to create real jobs.

Mr. Clarke: Real jobs are being created all the time in the task force areas— in the work and training which Tarmac will provide on the Broughton road contract in Birmingham, in the training which we are providing for new jobs in the Copthorne hotel in Birmingham and in all the work which we are doing in Gloucester Grove. It is artificial to produce exact figures in response to the type of questions posed by the hon. Gentleman. I am horrified to hear that the hon. Gentleman has recommitted himself to putting money into the hands of the Left-wing local authorities. No doubt he is still committed to Southwark council's proposals for employment creation, hut, when he goes to Southwark, he will find that the council's activities

do a great deal of harm to employment and training in that borough and that our task force is providing some of the few signs of hope there.

Cumbria and the Northern Region

Mr. Campbell-Savours: asked the Paymaster General what effect he expects the Budget measures to have on employment in Cumbria and the northern region.

Mr. Kenneth Clarke: The Budget will help to sustain the pace of economic growth, enterprise and employment creation throughout the United Kingdom, including Cumbria.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Is the Paymaster General aware that in the northern region, in Cumbria, and in my constituency the general view right across the political spectrum is that, if the Government had the money to give away in the Budget, they should have spent it on supporting schemes, supporting public services and developing real jobs instead of throwing away taxpayers' money on imports? Why does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not understand that the majority of people believe that personal greed should come second to solving the problems of unemployment, especially in areas such as mine where people simply cannot find work?

Mr. Clarke: This year, because of the growth in the economy, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer was able to combine reductions in taxation with restraints in public borrowing and increases in public expenditure, particularly on education and health. My Department has had its biggest increase in public expenditure during this Government's period in office and more than £3 billion is now spent on employment and training. I am glad to say that unemployment is falling faster in the northern region than in almost any other region. The major threat to jobs in Cumbria, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, comes from the policies of the Labour and Liberal parties on nuclear power and Trident.

Mr. Maclean: When my right hon. and learned Friend visits Cumbria on Friday, and my constituency, he will see for himself that unemployment in Cumbria is falling faster than in any other part of the United Kingdom— as a result of former Budgets. Will he reflect on the disastrous consequences for jobs in Cumbria if our main industries are closed down— I refer to Sellafield and Trident at Barrow and Furness—and if agriculture is rated for tax as the Labour and Liberal parties propose?

Mr. Clarke: I am looking forward to being in Carlisle on Friday and to visiting Penrith and the Border and seeing what is being achieved there. I can only endorse my hon. Friend's remarks. There would not only be a direct effect on jobs in Cumbria. Many northern engineering firms with contracts under the defence, or the civil nuclear programmes, are threatened by the policies of the Labour and Liberal parties.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Is the Paymaster General aware that the collapse of the engineering industry in the northern region has left many people, who have worked in that industry throughout their lives and are now aged over 50, without any prospect of ever gaining employment again in their lives? What hope will any of those schemes give to those people?

Mr. Clarke: Of course, I appreciate that parts of the north-east have been especially badly hit by the rapid


changes that have taken place in steel, shipbuilding, to some extent coal, and heavy engineering in this country. That is why I take encouragement from the way in which new jobs are being created in the region, from the rapid increase in self-employment in that part of the country, and from all the attempts that are being made through enterprise zones and inner city task forces to stimulate new investment. Jobs are being created in retailing. For example, the biggest retailing development in this country is in the north-east.

Mr. Fallon: Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that about 6,000 new small businesses were set up in the northern region last year? Will he come up to the north-east and explain to my constituents the way in which the Labour party would help the unemployed by taxing them more heavily as soon as they found their first job?

Mr. Clarke: I remain bewildered by those proposals. I agree with my hon. Friend that, having passed through a difficult period, one can now find all the signs of a regeneration in industry and employment in the northern region, for which we have been waiting for some time, since we came out of the recession. I see no hope for employment in the north if we return to policies of higher taxation, borrowing and inflation, and measures such as the expensive training levy which would be imposed on the turnover of every firm in the region.

Job Training Scheme

Mr. Canavan: asked the Paymaster General what response he has had from local authorities to the job training scheme.

Mr. Kenneth Clarke: In general, there has been a good response from local authorities.

Mr. Canavan: Is the Paymaster General aware that some local authorities, especially Scottish local authorities, are reluctant to participate in that scheme, unless it is seen to involve real training for real jobs with realistic wage levels? Will he try to meet those objections because otherwise the job training scheme will be seen to be yet another Government trick to try to fiddle the unemployment figures by conscripting people from the dole queue into phoney jobs?

Mr. Clarke: I hope to assure local authorities and the hon. Gentleman that the training provided by the new JTS will be good quality training aimed at providing real jobs because it will involve work experience with employers. No local authorities have yet come forward to sign a contract, but many have put forward proposals, and I hope that we reach agreement with those in Scotland. I hope also that no local authorities or trade unions will be tempted into playing politics with the JTS or getting us bogged down in trade union arguments about rates of pay.

Mr. Rowe: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the Labour party's attitude to this imaginative scheme to introduce training to a substantial number of young people in particular, is similar to the attitude that it displayed to the youth training scheme in its earlier years? Can we look forward to a similar change in its attitude?

Mr. Clarke: I very much hope so. At present the Labour party does not really know its reaction to the JTS, having condemned it automatically when it was first

announced. The only comfort that I take from its latest so-called 1 million jobs package, which is comprised largely of the same old measures, is that a large part of it is a plain imitation of our JTS programme. It proposes to provide 300,000 training places, whereas it claims that the 120,000 training places for which we aim in the JTS are too many, too quickly.

Mr. Bruce: Will the Paymaster General confirm that only about 2,000 places have been achieved on the pilot schemes out of a target of about 5,000, that nearly half the people were over 25 and that there has been a high dropout rate? If that is the case, does it justify the Government's forced expansion of the schemes?

Mr. Clarke: I do not agree with all those criticisms, but I agree that the point of pilot schemes is to see how they go and to learn from any problems we encounter. On the whole the response from trainees, agents and work experience providers was extremely good. Probably too many of those taking part were over 25 and we intend to target the scheme largely on the under-25s. I do not agree that the drop-out rate was bad. Some people leave the scheme because they find a full-time job where they can get further training and we do not object to that.

Mr. Nicholas Baker: Will my right hon. and learned Friend warn young people who want proper training and a job that this is apparently yet another scheme which, according to the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley), a Labour Government would not contemplate?

Mr. Clarke: The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) is fond of criticising all our employment and training measures, yet it is clear from his comments that he has not even bothered to read about them or to visit them and that he does not know what he is talking about.
He does a great deal of harm to his constituents in Sparkbrook if he tries to persuade them to do nothing, to be unemployed and on the dole rather than to take advantage of the various training and other work experience measures that we are providing.

Ms. Clare Short: May I assure the Paymaster General that a Labour Government will introduce proper training programmes which develop skills in this skill-starved nation and that they will not be anything like the job training scheme? Will he confirm that he recently announced that the job training scheme is not to be designated as approved training, thus admitting that it is work experience? Does he understand that the major objection to it is that the money is too low and the benefits are not sufficient in return for the work? If local authorities propose to top up the allowance to a decent rate, will he permit that under the scheme?

Mr. Clarke: The hon. Lady must understand our scepticism: the Labour party has spent the past three or four years opposing every training measure that we have introduced and now she claims that Labour's training programmes will somehow be different. The only point that seems to concern the Labour party is how much trainees should be paid. If she concentrates merely on increasing pay for trainees, that will not improve training one iota. Nor will it reflect the worth to employers of


people who are beginning to acquire skills. Therefore, we do not contemplate topping up the rate under the new scheme; we contemplate good quality training being given.

Job Creation (Training)

Mr. Kirkwood: asked the Paymaster General what proposals he has to monitor the quality of the training element in the Government's present job creation measures.

Mr. Lee: The Manpower Services Commission has detailed monitoring arrangements for all its employment programmes to ensure they are meeting their objectives.

Mr. Kirkwood: Does the Minister accept that it is in everyone's interest to make the quality of training available to under 18-year-olds as high as possible? As the recent MSC report has suggested that up to 25 per cent. of new entrants to JTS are illiterate, instead of introducing consultants only to look at the cost-effectiveness of these schemes, is it not time to introduce consultants to look at the effectiveness of the training?

Mr. Lee: We are continually looking at the quality of our schemes. The whole emphasis is to improve the quality of our training and to reskill Britain.

Mr. Sackville: Is my hon. Friend aware of the appalling fact that Bolton council has said that it will have nothing to do with the job training schemes, for some absurd political reason? Does he agree that it is denying Bolton a valuable source of Government funds, denying education and training to the unemployed and proving once again that Labour puts politics before people?

Mr. Lee: I find the approach of Bolton and other local authorities which oppose JTS depressing and sad. It hurts young people, who desperately need to increase the quality of their training.

Mr. Prescott: Will the Minister accept that, instead of monitoring his schemes, his time would be better spent radically improving both the quality and quantity of skill training up to the level of our competitors, who spend up to 10 times as much, often financed by forms of levy, on training their people, as promised in Labour's "Plan for Training"?

Mr. Lee: The whole idea of a statutory levy for training purposes is totally unsatisfactory, and the additional cost to employers would result in further job losses.

Departmental Aid

Miss Fookes: asked the Paymaster General whether he will estimate the number of projects that will receive aid from his Department in this financial year; and if he will estimate how much additional private investment this aid is likely to generate.

Mr. Trippier: My Department funds a wide variety of schemes and projects to promote employment, enterprise, tourism and training. No overall estimate of the impact of this aid on future private investment is available.

Miss Fookes: I thank my hon. Friend for his reply, but may I ask him to be more specific about tourism? How effectively is public money used in promoting tourism projects, bearing in mind how important tourism is in the west country?

Mr. Trippier: It is possible to be more specific about tourism because, under section 4 of the Development of Tourism Act 1969, private sector support is approximately eight times the support that we give, which must be one of the highest ratios in the whole of the British economy.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Ql. Mr. Norman Atkinson: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 31 March.

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): I have been asked to reply.
My right hon. Friend is currently on a visit to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Atkinson: When Murdoch and company moved to Wapping, does my right hon. Friend recollect the bad jokes that referred to the Wapping big lies. Those lies are now a reality.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must relate his question to Government responsibility.

Mr. Atkinson: I shall certainly be doing that. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is now an orchestrated campaign to defame the Labour party to the extent that democracy is now threatened? Will he recall the Royal Commission on the press, which has not met for some 10 years?

Mr. Biffen: It has been the prerogative of politicians through the ages to believe that they are misrepresented by the press, and I have to tell the hon. Gentleman that I believe that the difficulties of the Labour party are mainly self-inflicted.

Mr. Ashby: Has my right hon. Friend been able to ascertain whether the Leader of the Opposition spent 20 or 28 minutes with the President of the Unied States, and how much of that time—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The same rule applies to both sides. Please relate the question to Government responsibility.

Mr. Ashby: Has the British ambassador informed my right hon. Friend, and has the British ambassador been able to say, how much of that time was spent in apologising to the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) for mistaking him for the British ambassador?

Mr. Biffen: I am in some difficulty, because I cannot believe that anybody could mistake the right hon. Member for Leeds, East—

Mr. Canavan: Unless they are senile.

Mr. Biffen: I did not catch what was intended to be a helpful sedentary interruption. I think that there will be an opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to make clear the nature of the success that he thought he secured in North America. All I can say is that I am sure it is not my responsibility.

Mr. Wallace: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 31 March.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Wallace: I am sure that the Leader of the House is well aware of the importance of the beef sector of the agriculture industry and, in particular, that Scottish beef production is of very high quality. Is he aware of the great concern over the EEC package in September, which is expected to knock £50 a head off the price of beef cattle, and does he appreciate that the farming industry is looking for an immediate and substantial devaluation of the green pound? Does he not think that, as Agriculture Ministers do not seem keen to take initiatives, when the Prime Minister returns there should be some push from the top for much-needed action?

Mr. Biffen: I understand all that the hon. Gentleman has said only too well, representing the district that I do. He knows that the United Kingdom is not sovereign in the prosecution of its agricultural policy within the European Community. He further knows that it is a very easygoing solution to suppose that all these matters can be contained within the question of the devaluation of the green pound without fully taking into account the other factors. I take note of what he said.

Sir Anthony Kershaw: Will my right hon. Friend do his best to persuade the Treasury to provide more money for trips abroad—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is in order so far.

Sir Anthony Kershaw: Has my right hon. Friend noticed that when the Leader of the Opposition and his side-kick are away the former spends his time abusing his own country and the latter spends his time abusing the host country? Ought we not to see more of this?

Mr. Biffen: I have to be as consensual as possible on this occasion and say to my hon. Friend that on the issue of trips abroad he speaks with great authority as Chairman of one of the major departmental Select Committees. The trips abroad essayed by them bring real value to this nation and to Parliament. Whether that can be said more widely, I leave for others to judge.

Mr. Pavitt: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 31 March.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Pavitt: Is the Leader of the House aware that tomorrow is the first day for the nurses' pay award, and the Prime Minister will be studying the review body's report? Will he use his influence to make sure that on this occasion, for the first time since the review body was established, the public are not deceived and the nurses cheated as they have been on each previous occasion, when the announcement has been that the Government will implement the report in full, but, by phasing it, they have ensured that they have not done so? For example, last year they gave only 75 per cent. of the review body's recommendation.

Mr. Biffen: I am sure that the review bodies have played and very important part in securing the improved wages of the nursing profession over the years. I understand that in all parts of the House there will be sympathy for the view that any recommendation by the review body should be implemented as speedily and fully as is possible. Doubtless it has been the extent that that has been secured by this Government that accounts for an increase in real

terms of nurses' pay of 23 per cent., in contrast with what happened under the Labour Government of 1974–79, when it fell by 21 per cent.

Mr. Andrew MacKay: Will my right hon. Friend take this opportunity, on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, to scotch a rumour that is going round the Palace of Westminster today that President Reagan let the cat out of the bag, and that after our victory in the next election my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be appointing the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) as our ambassador in Washington?

Mr. Biffen: Clearly, if the purpose of the visit was to secure widespread and continuing comment, it clearly was a success in those terms.

Mr. Ashdown: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 31 March.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Ashdown: Has the Leader of the House seen the compelling evidence now coming to light about the damage being done to children's education because of inadequate funding to prepare for the GCSE? Why will the Government not divert funds from education gimmicks such as city technology colleges— described today by Conservatives as being both irrelevant and likely to create ghettos— and put that money into preparing for the GCSE so that 600,000 14-year-olds are not at risk of having their future blighted?

Mr. Biffen: I think that the hon. Gentleman has a far greater role in public affairs than to be the foghorn of the Today newspaper. The Government are spending the £30 million in the current year on preparation for the GCSE, and next year that will rise to £115 million. Unless one is to be completely dismissive of the significance of public spending, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will join me in hoping that the money was well spent.

Mr. Marland: Did my right hon. Friend have the opportunity last night to watch a television programme based on Labour's rule in Brent, which beyond doubt is based on intimidation and fear? Does he agree that this clearly demonstrates the uncaring face of the Labour party?

Mr. Biffen: Yes, I do, and I believe that this is a development of municipal Socialism which must be abhorrent to those who hitherto have carried the standard for Labour in our great cities, people such as Herbert Morrison. It is that development of radical Socialism that is doing more damage to the Labour party than any other single issue.

Mr. Kinnock: While I am not being dismissive of the money used by the Government for the GCSE, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is aware that every teacher concerned in secondary education, and certainly all the parents who comment, agree with the NAS-UWT that the amount allocated is too little and too late? Is his attitude not typical of a Government who underfund this important examination reform, a Government the members of whom do not send their own children into state education?

Mr. Biffen: I can cheerfully share the experience of state education with the right hon. Gentleman. To answer the


wider issue, I accept, of course, that many in the teaching profession, and especially the leaders of teachers' trade unions, argue that the sums are inadequate. I do not think that that would necessarily come as a total surprise. But on any judgment of the prudent handling of public finances what is being made available is a very reasonable sum which I believe, if properly used, can help in the implementation of the examination.

Mr. Kinnock: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us, therefore, why it is that when next year double the number of youngsters will be undertaking the GCSE examinations the Government are to reduce the funding for that specific purpose by half?

Mr. Biffen: I have just given the right hon. Gentleman the figure of £115 million for next year.

Mr. Nicholls: In considering whether there is anything in the Opposition leader's attitude to foreign affairs that might usefully be recommended to our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, does my right hon. Friend—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman knows what I am going to say about the Minister's responsibilities.

Mr. Nicholls: Does my right hon. Friend reject the Opposition Leader's reported comment—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must relate his question to matters of the Government's responsibility.

Mr. Nicholls: When my right hon. Friend comes to discuss these matters with the Prime Minister, does he think that it would be a useful attitude for her to adopt in her conduct of foreign affairs to respond to a White House press spokesman by saying, "No, I bloody don't"? [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is unworthy of the hon. Gentleman. He must not use unparliamentary language by attributing it to someone else.

Mr. Nicholls: Does my right hon. Friend not agree that that sort of petulant vulgarity—[Interruption.]—should be rejected?

Mr. Biffen: I did not hear that.

Mr. Pendry: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 31 March 1987.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Pendry: Pursuant to the reply given by the Prime Minister to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, East (Mr. Hughes) last week on the question of Caspar Weinberger's statement to Congress about the modernisation of NATO's first-use nuclear weapons, why is it, if it was set out clearly at the Montebello meeting in 1983, that there was no reference to it in the 1984 Defence Estimates? Could it be that Caspar Weinberger was lying to Congress, or is it more likely that the Prime Minister and her Ministers have been miserly with the truth to the House of Commons and the British people?

Mr. Biffen: I take note of what the hon. Gentleman says and tell him at once that I am in no position to comment

authoritatively on what he says. What he says is a sufficiently grave allegation and I prefer to leave it to those who are able to answer so to do.

Mr. Bill Walker: When my right hon. Friend meets the Prime Minister, will he bring to her attention a radio programme that took place on Saturday morning last in Scotland in which the discussion was about the Government's policy on nuclear weapons and negotiations, and the Labour party's policy in the same areas, when 90 per cent. of the calls coming in from all over Scotland were supportive of the Government and 10 per cent. were supportive of the Labour party, which seems to be a reasonable picture of what is happening throughout the country?

Mr. Biffen: I was unaware of the programme, but I am not in the least surprised that it should reveal the balance of preference indicated by my hon. Friend. I will, of course, refer it to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who has made it clear to the nation that it is possible to be strongly in favour of balanced nuclear disarmament and still maintain an interest in national security, with the nuclear component that that requires.

Mr. Rooker: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 31 March.

Mr. Biffen: I have been asked to reply.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Rooker: In view of the undoubted damage done to the British economy, particularly over the past 20 years, in the uncertain period before general elections, does the Leader of the House not think that it would be a good idea to move to fixed-term Parliaments?

Mr. Biffen: I do not think that the uncertainty arid damage derive so much from the presence or absence of fixed-term Parliaments as from the uncertainty about who might win the election.

Mr. Baldry: Will my right hon. Friend draw the Prime Minister's attention to the business section of last week's Sunday Times on her return, which, in a special five-page supplement, proved beyond peradventure that order books are at their best level for 10 years, that business prospects are at their best levels for 20 years, that exports, investments and manufacturing output are all rising and, as the article said, the economy is now going through its best transformation at any time since the industrial revolution?

Mr. Biffen: I think that my hon. Friend alights upon one more piece of anecdotal evidence that reinforces the statistical indications that we now have a substantially expanding economy, which is at last resulting in a fall in unemployment. Nothing can be more discomforting to Opposition Members, not least the shadow Employment spokesman, to realise that we are now seeing a national recovery in output that is affecting unemployment.

Mr. Pavitt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I will take it in the usual place.

Turks and Caicos Islands

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Tim Eggar): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Last July I informed the House of the decision to amend the constitution, and to suspend ministerial government in the Turks and Caicos. This was an interim measure pending the outcome of a review of the islands' constitution.
A constitutional commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Roy Marshall. It consulted widely both in the territory and in the English-speaking Caribbean. We are grateful for the dedicated and painstaking way in which it carried out its task. We are also grateful to the leaders of Governments in the Caribbean for their wise contributions to our deliberations.
The commission's report has now been printed as a Command Paper. Copies have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses and will be available in the Vote Office shortly.
Our objectives have been to ensure: that past failures are rectified and the Turks and Caicos Islands receive a constitution which provides for responsible government; that we discharge our ultimate responsibility for good administration; and that the islands' future political, social and economic development is assured.
We have accepted the commission's central recommendation that there should be a return to ministerial government. This will be underpinned by a series of new constitutional provisions and other safeguards. It reflects our commitment to, and the islanders' desire for, democratic expression and responsible administration.
These safeguards, the implementation of which will he discussed with the legislature, are: larger multi-Member constituencies to prevent patronage; more regular Legislative Council sittings; the introduction of a committee system to provide greater ministerial accountability; administrative checks— including a public service commission, ombudsman and resident auditor to ensure an independent civil service and better financial discipline.
In addition, we propose to strengthen the commission's proposals in a number of ways. We agree with the commission's recommendations for a five-year disqualification period for convicted persons, but think that that may be too complex. We therefore propose a simpler alternative, which would apply to anyone convicted of a criminal offence carrying a sentence of 12 months or more by a court of law in any country.
We also propose that, after full consultation with the Chief Minister, the Governor should in future be able to decide whether certain ministerial responsibilities should be allocated to elected members of the Executive Council. Similarly, after consultation with the Chief Minister, he will be able to withdraw a responsibility from a Minister if he believes that that is necessary.
The commission was also concerned about the limitations of the present jury system. We agree that the right to trial by jury should be retained, while providing defendants with a right to opt for trial by judge alone. We propose that the majority of jurors in any particular case

should not be drawn from the island of origin or residence of the accused. The judicial system will also be strengthened by the appointment of a resident chief justice.
It will take time to prepare the necessary constitutional amendments and establish the supporting electoral and administrative measures. New elections will therefore be held in April or May 1988, when they are due under the present constitution. Until that time the territory will continue to be administered by the present interim Government.
We are giving priority to the commission's recommendation for a national development plan, co-ordinated under a central planning unit. We shall ensure that capital aid is used effectively.
The constitutional commission made it clear that patronage and malpractice had existed under recent Governments in the Turks and Caicos Islands. We are now providing the framework for fair and effective administration and the proper use of taxpayers' money. We expect the new measures to receive the support of the islanders, who were extensively consulted. We are confident that they will welcome the return of representative and responsible government.

Mr. George Foulkes: We are grateful to the Minister for making an oral statement on this matter. I wish to add the congratulations of the Opposition to Sir Roy Marshall and his colleagues on the painstaking work that they have done.
Will the Minister confirm that the report will also be published and made available to the islanders in the Turks and Caicos Islands as quickly as possible? Does he agree that it is necessary to get this matter right, not only to get the Turks and Caicos Islands back on the road to democracy, but because there are implications for all our dependent territories and for other small island states?
The Opposition welcome the bulk of Sir Roy Marshall's recommendations, and the Government's acceptance of them— on the increased role and responsibility for the elected legislature, on the appointment of an ombudsman and resident auditor, on the arrangements for disqualifying people from election if they have committed certain offences and on larger multi-Member constituencies. On jury selection, we recognise the need for some device to help to ensure a fair trial for all who are accused on the islands; given the problems that exist on small islands, the arrangement that has been proposed is certainly worth trying.
That brings me to the Opposition's reservations. Sir Roy Marshall and his commission recommended a return to ministerial government by the end of this year. I know that that is what is desired and what has been expected by the islanders. We recognise that there has been an understandable delay in the Government's consideration of the report since it was received at the end of December, but, on behalf of the Opposition, I strongly urge the Minister and the Government to examine again the practical problems of having elections this year. If that can be achieved, it would certainly be desirable. After all, in this country we receive only a few weeks' notice of an election. Surely elections could be held on the Turks and Caicos Islands by the end of December.
Our second reservation concerns the reserve powers of the Governor in relation to the appointment of Ministers— I understand that they were not among Sir Roy's recommendations. Given the recent history of the islands,


we understand why they are considered necessary, but could the Minister say in what circumstances he would envisage such powers being used? Would he accept that we strongly urge that they should not be a permanent feature of the constitution but merely a transitional measure?
If the Minister cannot give a positive response to those two points today, I hope that he will give further thought to them over the next few weeks. I hope that he and all hon. Members will agree that our aim should be to find a scheme to allow the Turks and Caicos to move towards accepting full and total responsibility for their own affairs in a democratic system as quickly as possible.

Mr. Eggar: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his very constructive comments and for the support that he has given, not only today but throughout the process of evaluation by the commission. I will certainly pass on his thanks and those of Opposition Members to the commission.
The report will be made extensively available in the islands. I hope that at least one copy will be available for each family. That comes to some 2,500 copies. As regards juries, I should remind the hon. Gentleman that the islanders will have the option of trial by judge alone. We recognise that there are practical difficulties in making up juries of members from different islands, but we think it the best way to proceed.
The hon. Gentleman also asked whether it would be possible to hold the election any earlier. I can assure him that we have looked at this in considerable detail. The administrative problems of getting the necessary back-up in place in time for an election by the end of this year are insuperable. We believe that we will be in tune with the present constitution, which requires an election in April or May next year, if we announce that elections will take place then.
Turning to the hon. Gentleman's comments on the use of the Governor's reserve powers, I am sure that he does not under-estimate the extent of the problem that has existed in the Turks and Caicos Islands, but the House might like to hear a quotation from the report prepared by Mr. Blom-Cooper:
I cannot simulate deafness to the voices of responsible people in the Islands who complain that there is pervasive corruption in government".
Against that background, we really had to consider very carefully whether it was not appropriate for the Governor to have reserve powers of the kind that I have outlined. We believe, somewhat reluctantly, that it is essential. Of course, those powers will be used only if required, as a last resort and after consultation with the Chief Minister.

Mr. Bowen Wells: Does my hon. Friend agree that this announcement will, generally speaking, be very welcome in the islands? When I visited the islands, the majority opinion among the islanders was for a swift return to ministerial government. Does he accept, however, that in the light of the history of the Turks and Caicos Islands, and of small territories generally, it is necessary to build in checks and balances against the overwhelming executive power which a ministerial system confers on a Government in those islands—and even in this country?
Would my hon. Friend make it clear that he will support the administration of those islands so that a just and equitable system can he set up which will act to some extent as a check against misuse of executive power? Will

he also make certain that he provides sufficient resources, not only for administration but for the economic development of the islands, so that we in this House can be proud of the job that we are doing for the Turks and Caicos islanders?

Mr. Eggar: I thank my hon. Friend for his support for our proposals. I am particularly grateful to him because I am aware of his great knowledge of the Caribbean in general and the Turks and Caicos Islands in particular. Of course, we will take steps to strengthen administration in the islands. We will be appointing a resident auditor and a resident chief justice, and will strengthen the administration in other areas as well.
As for sufficient resources, I would remind my hon. Friend that the islands receive over £5 million a year in budgetary assistance from the British taxpayer. Our major priority is to ensure that that aid is well and effectively spent.

Mr. Archy Kirkwood: May I confirm from these Benches the welcome that was given earlier by the Official Opposition to the work of the constitutional commission? It has done a commendable job and has made a constructive contribution to the discussion. We agree with the proposal with minor qualifications. Certainly we agree with the proportional representation scheme that is being set up for the islands. I hope that it can be used as a pilot for other places.
The key thing, as has been said, is that we strengthen public administration, that we get politicians who will work within the new constitutional framework and that we have a new chief justice who will oversee the legal process. Will the Minister consider carefully the need to have a Caribbean judge—I agree that it has to be a high quality lawyer— but may we have an indigenous chief justice to look after the legal system? Can the Minister say whether the Government have had a chance to consider the second commission report on the North Creek development project? Will he undertake that when they get it, the Government will be prepared to publish it?

Mr. Eggar: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his welcome to the statement on the commission's report. On his point about proportional representation, before he goes too far down that road may I suggest that he studies the report rather more carefully because I do not think that the parallel that he is trying to draw is brought out by its contents? The Government will bear in mind his comments on the background of a future chief justice. The most important thing is to get the right man for the job, whatever his background. I shall, of course, take into account the other points that the right hon. Gentleman made.

Sir Anthony Kershaw: Does my hon. Friend agree that this report is one of the many contributions which Sir Roy Marshall has made to the welfare of the Commonwealth and the Caribbean? Presumably the ombudsman will have the same powers as he has here—to recommend but not to enforce. Will the Governor's reserve powers cover the latter point? Will he be able to insist that the ombudsman"s recommendations will be accepted?

Mr. Eggar: On the latter point, the precise procedures for the role of the ombudsman still have to be worked out with the local legislature. The point clearly is that the


ombudsman will have a major and constructive role in ensuring good and effective administration within the Turks and Caicos islands. I agree entirely with my hon. Friend about the tremendous role that Sir Roy Marshall has played, not only with this commission but with his contribution to the Commonwealth.

Mr. James Lamond (Oldham, Central and Royton): Right at the end of his statement, the Minister mentioned that he would like a Government that was representative and responsible. Is not that an excessively patronising statement considering that in this country we are satisfied with a representative Government and do not require them to be responsible, as we have seen over the last seven years?

Mr. Eggar: The hon. Gentleman's parallel was not worthy even of him. Perhaps he should refer to the Blom-Cooper report, from which I shall quote directly:
The three Ministers"—
and he names them—
have been found by me to be guilty of unconstitutional behaviour and of ministerial malpractices. Such conduct renders them, in my view, unfit to exercise ministerial responsibilities … My finds of criminality against"—
and he names two people, the Opposition leaders—
call for more severe consequences. They are, in my view, unfit to hold public office.
That is the extent of the position in the Turks and Caicos islands.

Mr. Nicholas Soames (Crawley): Before going overboard about welcoming these proposals, may I ask my hon. Friend where the Turks and Caicos islands are? Secondly, will he agree that the new voting system which is being imposed on these poor islanders will not find great favour in the House?

Mr. Eggar: The Turks and Caicos islands, I am delighted to tell my hon. Friend, are in the Caribbean. I can recommend to him the Club Mediterranee, a development of one of the islands which, I believe, incorporates a health farm.

Mr. Mark Hughes (Durham): I have had the advantage of visiting the islands on a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association visit. Under the proposals, who will control the police, Customs and fire service? The Blom-Cooper report was uncertain about how the services had reacted to fire. Will the Minister accept that it is part of Her Majesty's Government's responsibility, in ensuring a real and clean democratic service, that the services of the Overseas Development Administration are available on such matters as hydrological surveys, the last one of which was in 1894? One of the major problems is the shortage of water, and that matter became politicised. Who will control the airports? They provide the route by which drugs move from southern America to Florida. Unless somebody in the House retains responsibility for preventing the drug trade, the matter will be a nonsense. The moneys involved are too great for local politicians to resist.

Mr. Eggar: I recognise the hon. Gentleman's great knowledge of events in the Turks and Caicos islands. My hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development has listened carefully to the points that he made about the role

of the ODA. I said that we would introduce a national development plan, and it will pick up many of the points that the hon. Gentleman made. It is not proposed to change that section of the constitution that deals with the position of the services. We are aiming, under the reserve powers and through other measures, through the public service commissioner and so on, to ensure that they are administered effectively.

Mr. Ian Gow: Will my hon. Friend explain to the House, with the lack of ambiguity that is characteristic of the Foreign Office, the presumed advantages of the multi-Member constituency over the single-Member constituency, of which most Conservative Members warmly approve? Will the example of close consultation with those who are to be governed differently be followed in future in Northern Ireland?

Mr. Eggar: I should not like to be drawn, even by my hon. Friend, down the latter path. One must remember that the number of electors in the average single-Member constituency in the Turks and Caicos islands varies between 120 and 630. Therefore, the commission felt that there was scope for corruption on behalf of Ministers and other elected representatives which would not be countenanced, and one way of getting around that was to move towards multi-Member constituencies.

Mr. Andrew MacKay: Does my hon. Friend agree that the unfortunate experience of the Turks and Caicos islands illustrates the folly of the recent fashion of granting independence to any territory, no matter what its size, which is most certainly not in the interests of most small islands?

Mr. Eggar: I note what my hon. Friend has said. I know that he takes great interest in the matter. As I told him, we are looking at the role of dependent territories and our future policy towards them. I should not like to go any further on that matter this afternoon.

Mr. Jonathan Aitken: Is my hon. Friend confident that a small island with a population of around 8,000 needs the extravagant Foreign Office solution consisting of a governor, an ombudsman, a chief justice, a full ministerial Government and civil service to go with it, and an auditor-general as well? In view of the Wild West lawlessness that has prevailed on the islands for some time, would they not be better off with a good sheriff?

Mr. Eggar: If the Commission had known that my hon. Friend was volunteering, I am sure that it would have considered that option.

BILL PRESENTED

LICENSING (RETAIL SALES)

Mr. George Gardiner, supported by Mr. Michael Colvin and Mr. John Cartwright presented a Bill to amend the definition of 'sale by retail' in section 201 of the Licensing Act 1964; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 8 May and to be printed [Bill 127.]

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Mr. David Sumberg: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to give the police power of entry where a case of cruelty against an animal is suspected; to give the courts the power to ban people convicted of cruelty from keeping any type of animal; and to change the definition in law of captive animals to include wild animals that are unable to escape.
Britain is rightly known throughout the world as a nation of animal lovers. Nothing is more calculated to appear on our television screens or in our press than a picture with a animal and a happy ending. Our postbags groan daily with letters from constituents complaining about medical experimentation on animals and cases of animal cruelty. But beneath those Nets there is something less reassuring. Behind that traditional view of Britain there is an unattractive basis. There lurks beneath the gloss an ominous set of statistics. Cruelty to animals is a growth industry.
The 1986 figures from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, to which I pay tribute for its valiant work in this area, prove beyond doubt that animal cruelty in Britain is worse than ever before. In every region of England and Wales, the RSPCA has had to deal with more complaints this year than in previous years.
In the south-east region, the cautions and convictions for animal cruelty are up by nearly three times the previous year's figures. The north-west of England, which includes my constituency, has the dubious distinction of having the second highest cruelty rating in England and Wales. Cautions and convictions are up by nearly 50 per cent. and complaints are up by nearly 30 per cent. Behind those cold, though shocking, statistics are the real sufferers—starving and neglected dogs, pets who are tortured and beaten to death, animals impaled on spears and shot at with bows and airguns.
You may say, Mr. Speaker, that those actions are surely against the law. In some cases they are, but the extraordinary fact is that sometimes they are not. Equally extraodinary is the fact that sometimes the law is not strong enough to prevent animal cruelty.
The RSPCA and other similar agencies are doing a fine job, but the law on which they have to rely to do that job—the tool of their trade, as it were—is 76 years old. The Protection of Animals Act was passed in 1911 and times have changed since then. When I read of some of the cases that I have been given by the RSPCA, I sometimes wonder whether they have changed for the better.
It is time that Parliament played a further part in trying to prevent animals from suffering. That is what my Bill does. It is not a piece of major reform; it is limited in scope and has some modest objectives. However, it is an important and valuable measure which will help organisations, such as the RSPCA and many others, in their battle. My Bill has all-party support and I make no pretence about its being modelled closely on early-day motion 706, which has been signed by 106 right hon. and hon. Members from both sides of the House.
The Bill will tackle three glaring anomalies in the law. First, in some cases of suspected animal cruelty agencies such as the RSPCA are powerless to pursue their investigations. Under the existing law, where there is an instance or suspected instance of animal cruelty, the police are completely dependent on the suspected person

allowing the police access to the premises where the incidents may be occurring. If that suspected person declines to allow the police to come in, it is difficult for inquiries to be pursued. My Bill would simply allow the police to apply to the courts for a search warrant for such premises and then to go in to see for themselves.
Right hon. and hon. Members are always concerned at any extension of police powers, but let me assure them that in this intance all the formalities, safeguards and procedures which apply to search warrants in other criminal matters would apply equally to cases of suspected animal cruelty. The Bill would simply give the police, and through them the RSPCA and similar bodies, the power to investigate and to do their job that much more effectively.
That anomaly is not the only aspect of the law that I consider weak, and that is therefore failing to stop cases of cruelty to animals. In a recent appalling case, the rotting remains of 31 dead cats were found in a house, and many more cats had to be destroyed because of the extent of their suffering. Incredibly—despite behaviour that can only be described as unspeakable—the owners could riot be banned from keeping any more cats, because the present law provides that a person must be convicted twice before he or she can be disqualified by the courts from keeping an animal.
If those 31 cats had been 31 dogs, however, such a requirement would not have applied. The first conviction for cruelty to a dog can result in a disqualification from keeping any more dogs. Where is the sense and logic in that? Why should one animal be treated differently from another? Surely, a person who has been convicted of cruelty to any animal must be prevented from repeating the offence, if that is a suitable punishment—it is a discretionary power for the courts. My Bill would rectify the present seemingly incomprehensible and inconsistent approach.
The law is also outdated when it comes to dealing with wild animals. Much publicity was given not long ago to the harrowing story of a hedgehog that was beaten to death by a young man, "just for fun". Yet that person's so-called "fun" was found by the court to be within the law, and he was acquitted of the charge.
The reason for his acquittal was quite simple: the hedgehog was not regarded as a captive animal within the meaning given to that phrase by the 1911 Act, and thus was not protected by the law. That is another example of a 76 year-old piece of legislation that is not relevant to our modern times. My Bill would widen the definition of a captive animal, and would thus bring more animals within the protection of the law.
This is the first time since I was elected to the House that I have had the good fortune to secure parliamentary time to promote a Bill. I am very pleased that my luck has coincided with the opportunity to change a law that has proved inadequate to protect animals from—in some instances—unspeakable cruelty. I feel that the day is long overdue for such a reform, and I hope that the House will show by its support for the Bill that the time has come to do something about it.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. David Sumberg, Miss Janet Fookes, Mr. Alistair Burt, Mr. Jeremy Hanley, Mr. Geoffrey Lawler, Mr. Tony Favell, Sir Bernard


Braine, Mr. Cecil Franks, Mr. Terry Lewis, Mr. Bob Litherland, Mr. Harry Greenway and Mr. Ian Wrigglesworth.

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

Mr. David Sumberg accordingly presented a Bill to give the police power of entry where a case of cruelty against an animal is suspected; to give the courts the power to ban people convicted of cruelty from keeping any type of animal; and to change the definition in law of captive animals to include wild animals that are unable to escape: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 1 May 1987 and to be printed. [Bill 128.]

Orders of the Day — Criminal Justice Bill

As amended, (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You were good enough to have put up in the No lobby your provisional selection of amendments to the Bill. Numerous and generous as your selection has been, may I appeal to you to look favourably upon new clause 20? Much has happened since the Bill received its Second Reading, and even since it was in Committee. Those events have generated a groundswell of opinion throughout the country that the Court of Appeal should have power, in cases of gross under-sentencing, to review the sentences upwards on the application of the Crown. You would be doing the House and the country a great service, Mr. Speaker, if you allowed new clause 20— in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind)— to be debated and divided upon, although before those recent events it was debated in Committee.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. If one issue above all others has attracted the attention of lawyers—judges, solicitors, barristers and all those responsible for the administration of the courts and the law—it is clause 29. As it stands, the clause provides for a quite absurd reference to the Court of Appeal to consider a matter about which it has no power to do anything. The feeling among lawyers has been so strong that it would simply not be understood if, when the Bill was on Report, the House was given no opportunity to debate the issue.
The matter arises not only in relation to new clause 20, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) referred, but, more essentially, in relation to amendment No. 60. That amendment calls for the deletion of clause 29, and is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) and myself.
Amendment No. 61, on which my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) can speak for himself, falls into the same blatant error as new clause 20. Error or no error, it is a matter of such substantial importance to those who will have to administer the law that—in my respectful submission—it is unthinkable that the House should not be given an opportunity to consider the good sense of clause 29 and what, if anything, should be done about it. I support the application made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Let me underline what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) has said, although with a different interpretation. Amendment No. 61 would give the Court of Appeal the opportunity to review sentences that were considered excessively lenient. Clause 29 has caused great concern outside the House, because there appears to have been some misunderstanding. It seems to have been thought that, when a case was reviewed, that might change the sentence given. It will not do that; it will merely establish a precedent.
The amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) and me would give the opportunity to review the actual sentence, and overturn it if it were considered excessively lenient. There is concern outside the House, and I urge you, Mr. Speaker, to give further consideration to the matter and select the amendment.

Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) is right: there is concern among lawyers. However, there are considerably more non-lawyers than lawyers in the country, and they too are extremely concerned. They feel strongly that we should have a chance to consider whether sentences should be increased. I respectfully ask you, Mr. Speaker, to allow us to debate the matter today.

Mr. Speaker: When I made my selection this morning, I considered this matter very carefully. For the benefit of those outside Parliament, it should be said that this matter was debated exhaustively in Standing Committee. In view of the representations that have been made to me, I shall of course consider the points that have been made and will let the House know my decision.

Mr. Lawrence: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sorry to trespass further on your time, but if clause 29 is important, barely of less importance is clause 30. It increases the sentence for firearm offences from the present maximum of 14 years to life imprisonment. It formed the subject of a number of speeches on Second Reading. If life imprisonment is to be the sentence for the mere possession of firearms, there will be no difference between the sentence for possessing the firearm and that for killing somebody. The police made strong representations that there would be an incentive to kill if somebody could face life imprisonment merely for possessing a firearm and not using it.

Mr. Speaker: I wonder whether the hon. and learned Gentleman will help me by drawing my attention to the amendment that I imagine he is saying has not been selected?

Mr. Lawrence: I tabled amendment No. 157 to leave out clause 30. I readily admit that it is a starred amendment and that it was easily within your sphere of responsibility not to call it. Nevertheless, this is an important matter, not just to me or to lawyers, but to the police, who have to rely upon the statute. The matter ought to be ventilated in this House before the Bill goes to another place. I urge you, Sir, to consider selecting this amendment when it is no longer starred, so that the House will have an opportunity to consider whether it would do more harm than good to raise the sentence for a substantially less serious offence than murder.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. and learned Gentleman is correct when he says that this is a starred amendment. I remind him that the Bill left the Standing Committee on 17 March and that he has therefore had a number of weeks in which to put down this amendment. I shall certainly consider what he has said, and if the matter is not reached today, it may be unstarred tomorrow.

Mr. Alex Carlile: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I refer to new clause 23, which stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends. It has not been selected for debate and it is to he found on page 495. New

clause 23 deals with the criminal liability of persons acting under duress, necessity or coercion. The reason for putting down new clause 23 is that about a fortnight ago there was a very important decision in the House of Lords in a murder case, the case of Howe. That case has changed views as to the efficacy of the defence of duress in certain cases. The matter could not have been considered properly in Committee, because at that stage the Howe case had not been decided.
Recommendations were made by the Law Commission in 1977 about the defence of duress and other defences, which have been incorporated in the new clause. There is a good deal of uncertainty now. I respectfully ask you to consider allowing a debate on this issue, as this appears to be the only clear opportunity in the near future for the matter to be considered by the House and the Government.

Mr. Speaker: I have looked carefully at that new clause, but it is outside the scope of the Bill. Therefore, I cannot give the hon. and learned Gentleman any guarantee that I shall allow it to be debated today.

New clause 16

POWER TO PETITION FOR WINDING UP ETC. ON INFORMATION OBTAINED UNDER SECTION 2

The words "or section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987" shall be inserted—

(a)—in section 440 of the Companies Act 1985, after the words "that Act";
(b)—in section 8(1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, after the words "the Financial Services Act 1986", in the second place where they occur; and
(c)—in Article 433 of the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, after the words "that Act".'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Douglas Hogg): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 16 amends section 440 of the Companies Act 1985 to allow public interest petitions based on o information obtained under clause 2 of the Bill to be used for the winding up of a company. A little amplification is necessary.
Section 440 of the Companies Act 1985, as subsequently amended by the Financial Services Act 1986, allows public interest petitions based on Companies Act and Financial Services Act information to be used for winding up a company. The new clause further amends section 440 so as to allow public interest petitions based on information obtained from the serious fraud office to be used in the same way. The serious fraud office will not itself wind up companies. That will remain a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New clause 25

REMANDS IN CUSTODY FOR MORE THAN EIGHT DAYS

'.—(1) The following section shall be inserted after section 128 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980—


Remands in custody for more than eight days.

128A.—(1) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument provide that this section shall have effect—

(a) in an area specified in the order; or
(b) in proceedings of a description so specified, in relation to any accused person ("the accused") who has attained the age of 17.

(2) A magistrates' court may remand the accused in custody for a period exceeding 8 clear days if—

(a) it has previously remanded him in custody for the same offence; and
(b) he is before the court;

but only if, after affording the parties an opportunity to make representations, it has formed a view as to the minimum period likely to elapse before the next stage in the proceedings other than a hearing relating to a further remand in custody or on bail and only for a period not exceeding—

(i) that period; or
(ii) 28 clear days,

whichever is the less.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the right of the accused to apply for bail during the period of the remand.

(4) After paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 there shall be inserted—

"Cases under section 128A of Magistrates' Courts Act 1980

10. Where the court is considering excercising the power conferred by section 128A of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (power to remand in custody for more than 8 clear days), it shall have regard to the total length of time which the accused would spend in custody if it were to exercise the power".

(5) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and been approved by a resolution of each House.".'.— [Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. David Mellor): I beg to move, That the clause be oread a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 107.

Mr. Mellor: New clause 25 deals with matters that we said in Committee we would bring forward on Report. The new clause deals with remands in custody, a matter that is of considerable significance to the criminal justice system.
We shall have the opportunity to consider later the present arrangements for the granting or refusal of bail. The new clause deals with a different but important aspect: the basis on which a court should remand a defendant in custody.
At present, a person may not be on remand and in custody for more than eight days. A consultative document that was issued a few months ago by the Home Office made it clear that a number of magistrates courts hearings are purely formal and that a defendant may have to be brought a very considerable distance from prison to appear in court. Prison officers are required to escort the prisoner, often to the detriment of the prison regime. Court time is taken up by remands, during which nothing of substance can be achieved, thereby causing delay to the hearing of other cases, in which substantial progress might be made.
Consultations were therefore held on the proposal that courts should be permitted to remand for up to 28 days. We suggested that that would be a legitimate extension of the arrangements that were introduced under the 1982

Act, whereby defendants who are remanded in custody can agree that they do not wish to appear in court. Research shows that between a third and a half of those who are eligible to say that they do not wish to appear have chosen not to do so. A number of the organisations that dissented from this proposition said that the only consequence would be an extension of the period in custody that would be imposed on a number of remand prisoners.
This decision has to be taken against the background of the remand population having grown substantially in recent years—from about 4,000 in 1979 to about 8,500 today. Therefore, the new clause represents a modest step forward. We believe that it would provide an opportunity to find out, from practical experience, which of the various contending opinions that have been advanced in response to our document is correct.
The proposal is that the first remand should be for a period of eight days, but thereafter the court should be able to remand for up to 28 days in the event that it was determined that substantive progress with the case would not be possible until the expiry of a period greater than eight days. The new clause is subject to a number of safeguards. For instance, the accused will be allowed to apply for bail during the period of remand if it is suggested that circumstances have changed. No one will be kept in custody for a substantial period who has grounds to mount a bail application.
There is also a modification in the new clause to the Nottingham justices case which, as the House will recall, deals with the question when a bail application may properly be made and restricts a fresh bail application to occasions when there are fresh circumstances. That allows the court to have regard to how long an individual will spend in custody when deciding whether to consider bail once again. That is provided for in subsection (4) of new clause 25, which states:
Where the court is considering exercising the power conferred by section 128A of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 … it shall have regard to the total length of time which the accused would spend in custody if it were to exercise the power.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the Minister ensure that he is not misunderstood? Is he saying that a fresh bail application can be made when the only thing that has changed is the length of time spent by the accused in custody?

Mr. Mellor: It means that the fresh application can be made if the period spent in custody is longer than was envisaged at the outset. It would mean, I would have thought, for the most part, that a fresh application could be made at each stage of an extended period of remand in custody. To that extent, it loosens the rules. Of course, the question of the proper construction will be a matter for the courts.
The background against which we have taken the decisions lies in research carried out last year, which showed that, of an average of eight hearings that took place in the magistrates court prior to committal for trial in the cases sampled, five of the hearings were purely formal occasions and nothing of substance occurred. It is scarcely surprising when dealing with a number of major cases that it is not possible to progress speedily to committal.
The argument that has been put forward in favour of making the change rests on the clear basis that all those who play their part within the system will get on with the


job—that the prosecution will always state the earliest time when it can be ready and that the court will look critically at applications for remands and will not allow remands for extended periods to take place without good reason. It would be devastating to the system if the ability of the courts to remand for periods of up to 28 days were to become a general habit to remand for 28 days. That objection has been raised by many organisations.
In tabling the new clause, the Government are well aware of those objections and accept their force, not as something that is bound to happen, but as something that is sufficiently likely to happen that we should not proceed with an across-the-board reform without taking the opportunity to see whether in practice things work out in the way that we would wish or whether the scepticism that has been expressed about the manner in which the courts would discharge the functions can be justified.
I hope that the new clause is not controversial. The proposal sets a period within which an experiment will take place. This has happened before with regard to tape recording and time limits and is a well-trodden path. We should be able to designate a number of areas in due course and a number of offences which would be the subject of an experiment to allow remands of this kind to take place. We have in mind a number of different areas of the country drawn to reflect different court conditions and the offences would, of course, be those that were likely to be committed for trial. There would then be an experimental period and, as subsection (5) makes clear, we can only bring the proposal into force if there is an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The matter will be fully considered by Parliament and if matters proceeded in a way that seemed to clear some unnecessary hearings from the court without unduly prolonging remands in custody, I feel sure the House would wish to see the proposal introduced more widely.
However, if we were to find that unnecessarily long adjournments and remands in custody were being granted without good justification, we would be able to leave the position as it is at present without any damage being done to the system. I hope that the new clause will establish that we have listened to those people whom we consulted and that we have recognised that it is in the interest of justice for the courts to be freed from unnecessary hearings. It is also in the interests of justice that people should not be locked up in prison on remand for longer than absolutely necessary. The experiment gives us a chance to find out which of those contending priorities should in the end be favoured by the full-scale change that could lie at the end of the experimental period.

Mr. Clive Soley: I do not want to delay the House for very long because we debated the matter fully in Committee. However, the Minister will be aware that we have some reservations and he already referred to one of our main reservations, the possibility that there may be an extended remand period. For that reason, we welcome the fact that the Government are introducing this provision as an experiment to see how it works.
We expressed concern in Committee—and I restate our concern now—that some people might not be well enough represented or, in some cases may be unrepresented, and therefore have difficulty in bringing to the attention of the court the fact that their circumstances have changed. Theoretically, there should be no difficulty. Theoretically, all they need do is to inform their solicitor

or inform the clerk of the court through the prison authorities. However, in a number of cases, especially those involving less articulate and less well represented defendants, there may be periods when we remand in custody people who, had the changed circumstances been put before the court, could have been released on bail. I urge the Minister, when he carries out the experiment, to ensure that that aspect is checked carefully.
We need to understand that the reason why the proposal is being introduced is not that we believe that it is right in justice—none of us would argue that—but that we are taking this action because of the pressure on the courts and the prison system. At the end of the day, that is not the best of reasons for legislating in this way.

Mr. Alex Carlile: We should all be grateful to the Minister for avoiding being too dogmatic about this matter. The pilot experiment, or experiments, will be welcome. Will the Minister assure the House that the monitoring of the experiment will be carried out carefully and independently? I urge him to consider that the magistrates courts that are asked to deal with the hearings should not be the bodies to undertake the research. If they were, I fear that the research would be somewhat subjective. I should be grateful if the Minister would tell the House what arrangements he has in mind for the research that will be necessary to discover whether the experiment works. I ask the Minister to consider whether the pilot projects might not be carried out in the same areas, and at the same time, as pilot projects, to limit the delay between arrest, committal and trial.
As the Minister knows, in Committee I expressed the view that there were other hearings in the magistrates courts with which we could dispense, particularly the formal committal proceedings which take place in most cases, although not in every case. I ask the Minister to consider not only my view but the strongly expressed private view of the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department— the hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg)—who, I think, agreed with me in Committee, speaking not as a Minister but as an individual Member. Will the Minister consider, if these experiments are successful, a possible pilot project to deal with committal proceedings in a similar way?

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to hon. Members for the manner in which they have received the new clause. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) was right to say that this decision is being taken for severely practical reasons. One cannot run a system as complicated as the criminal justice system without having severely practical considerations always in the forefront of our minds. There is nothing magic about eight days. It just happens to be the figure that was determined by previous legislation. We are anxious to be businesslike and to strike a fair balance. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) for recognising that we have here an opportunity, as they say, to suck it and see. I hope that we can explore the results in a way that will enable all of us to reach the appropriate conclusions.
That leads me to what the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery said about the manner in which this experiment will be monitored. We have not reached any settled conclusions on that. If the hon. and learned


Gentleman would like to write in a little more detail about what he has in mind, we would be delighted to hear from him. Obviously, we want the research process to take proper account of the views of those who will have an influence over the final shape of these matters.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery referred to formal committals, or the section 1 committals, as they were known in my prehistoric days of practising at the Bar. Inevitably, a spotlight is shone on the committal arrangements. We have reached no concluded view on the future of committal proceedings, but the hon. and learned Gentleman well knows that these are matters that fall to be examined. I dare say that, in due course, a Minister will come to the Dispatch Box to talk more about that. It is certainly not an item on our present agenda.
I should like to clarify a point where I might not have been at my most clear. It concerns the impact of proposed subsection (4), which amends section 128A of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 and what it means. We are saying in that proposed subsection that the decision to remand must take account of the time in custody. It does not of itself make the lapse of time a new factor for bail applications, but, read in conjunction with the Nottingham justices case, it will make a material difference. That case suggests that a lapse of time might in some cases count as one already. Each court's decision on what difference that makes will determine whether it will hear an application. In fairness, it places squarely before the court a major issue that must be in its mind— the length of time that a person will remain in custody as a consequence of a particular decision. I hope that that makes the position clearer.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 27

ENFORCEMENT OF COMPENSATION ORDERS

(1) The following subsections shall be substituted for section 36(1) and (2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (suspension of compensation orders pending appeal)—
(1) A person shall not be entitled to receive any payment due to him under a compensation order—

(a) In any case until the expiry of the period prescribed by law for the giving of notice of appeal against the decision of the court by which the order has been made; and
(b) where notice of appeal is given within the period so prescribed, until the determination of the appeal.

(2) Where a compensation order has been made against any person in respect of an offence of which he has been convicted, the order shall cease to have effect if he successfully appeals against this conviction of the offence."

(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (3) of that section—
(4) Rules under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 may make provision regarding the way in which the magistrates' court for the time being having functions in relation to the enforcement of a compensation order is to deal with money paid in satisfaction of the order in the event that the order subsequently ceases to have effect.".'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Brought up and read the First time.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 110 to 112 and Government amendment No. 114.

Mr. Hogg: The purpose of new clause 27 and the amendments grouped with it is to change the procedure governing the enforcement of compensation orders. At present, the operation of compensation orders is suspended until the time during which an appeal may be made has elapsed or until any appeal which is made has been resolved. New clause 27 provides that, although payment may not be made to the victim during that period, enforcement against the offender is not specifically prohibited. We envisage that, as is the case with fines now, enforcement would not normally be pursued while the question of an appeal remained, but the unqualified total suspension pending appeal, which is unique to compensation orders, allows the defendant to avoid payment for a long time, and that is undesirable where large sums may be involved. It has been suggested that in some cases the system has been abused.
The enforcing court would hold any money collected from the offender until an appeal, or the possibility of one, had been resolved, or had elapsed. It will then be paid over to the victim, if the appeal was unsuccessful, or to the offender, if the appeal was successful.
The amendments which are grouped with the new clause are consequential and perhaps require no further amplification.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

REVIEW OF POSTPONEMENT OF WARRANT OF COMMITMENT

"The following section shall be inserted after section 77 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980—
Review of postponement of issue of warrant of commitment.

77A— (1) If on an application by a person in respect of whom issue of a warrant has been postponed under section 77(2) above it appears to a justice of the peace acting for the petty sessions area in which the warrant would have been issued that a variation of any condition on which the warrant was postponed or a remission of all or part of the sum outstanding is justified, he shall refer the application to the court.
(2) Where such an application is referred to the court, the justices' clerk shall give the applicant notice of the time and place of the hearing.
(3) Where such a notice has been given and the applicant does not appear at the time and place specified in the notice, the court may proceed with theconsideration of the application in his absence.
(4) At the hearing the court shall have power, if it thinks fit, to vary the terms on which issue of the warrant was postponed or wholly or partly to remit the sum outstanding.
(5) If a warrant under section 77(2) above has been issued before the hearing of the application, the court shall have power, subject to subsection (6) below, to order—

(a) that the warrant shall cease to have effect; and
(b) that the applicant shall be released.

(6) The court may not make an order under subsection
(5) above unless it is satisfied that the change of circumstances on which the applicant relies was not put before the court issuing the warrant.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 154 to 156 and Government amendments Nos. 149 to 153.

Mr. Mellor: The new clause and the consequential amendments respond to Opposition concern expressed in Committee about the provision in clause 40 that notice shall be deemed to be served if sent by registered post or recorded delivery to a defaulter's last-known address. That concern centred on the possibility of deserving cases—for example, hospitalisation— where that provision might lead to the warrant's being issued without the court being aware of the circumstances. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) suggested then that the solution might be to allow the officer enforcing the warrant a discretion not to do so in such cases. We considered that seriously but did not feel that it was desirable to undermine the authority and finality of the order in that way because it might put the enforcing officer in an invidious position, second-guessing the court.
We have come up with an alternative, of which I hope the hon. Member for Hammersmith will approve—to follow the present arrangements for the enforcement of maintenance in the courts. This will allow the defendant to apply to the court, at any time, for the case to be reviewed in the light of circumstances arising since the court decided to issue the postponed warrant. In the cases identified by the hon. Member for Hammersmith, enforcing officers could advise defaulters of the possibility of applying for a review and could delay acting on the warrant. That is common practice already, and it could continue under what is proposed.
It is, of course, important that this new proposal should not be a pretext for deliberate abuse and delay in unmeritorious cases— hence the clear provision in amendment No. 153 that the court's original decision on the terms of postponement and any subsequent decision to activate the warrant may be reviewed only on the basis of information not before that court. It is right also that the onus should be on defaulters to notify the court of any adverse change in their circumstances and, in the context of the "deeming" of notices to be served, of any change of address. This new right for the defendant to apply for a further hearing is additional to, and independent of, the court's power, as specified by clause 40, to hold a further hearing to consider activating a postponed warrant in the event of further default. I hope that that shows that we have done some constructive thinking since Committee stage and that these measures will be acceptable to the House.

Mr. Soley: I am grateful to the Minister. This is a difficult area in which we do not wish to undermine the court's authority. However, the Minister recognised in Committee that there had been occasions when a warrant might not have been served effectively because of reasons that were outside the control of the person who was to receive the warrant—for example, if that person was working away from home or in hospital. As this measure has been designed to meet such special cases, I accept the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

RESTRICTIONS ON THE IMPOSITION OF CUSTODIAL SENTENCES ON OFFENDERS UNDER 21

(1) The following subsection shall be substituted for section 1(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982—
(4) Where a person under 21 years of age is convicted or found guilty of an offence, the court may not—

(a) make a detention centre order in respect of him under section 4 below;
(b) pass a youth custody sentence on him under section 6 below; or
(c) pass a sentence of custody for life on him under section 8(2) below;

unless it is satisfied that the circumstances, including the nature and gravity of the offence, are such that if the offender were aged 21 or over the court would pass a sentence of imprisonment and that no other method of dealing with hirn is appropriate because—

(i) he has a history of failure to respond to non-custodial penalties and the court ls satisfied that he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties: or
(ii) no other sentence would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm; or
(iii) the offence was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified".

(2) The following subsection shall be substituted for section 2(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982—
(4) Where a court deals with a person under 21 years of age by a method whose use in the case of such a person is restricted by section 1(4) above, it shall state in open court the reasons why, having taken account of those restrictions, it is satisfied that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate".'.—[Mr. Clive Soley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Soley: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause is designed to consider the problem of locking up young people. We know that in this country we lock up more young people than any other comparable country in the Western world. We also know that the failure rate—the number of people who are reconvicted within two years of release— is incredibly high, far higher than that for almost any other form of disposal. The failure rate varies between 70 per cent. and 80 per cent., although occasionally it falls a little below 70 per cent. Therefore, by any standard, it is a pretty disastrous form of treatment for young people which does little other than to teach them to live in an institution, and perhaps make it that much easier for them to return.
It is in all our interests to reduce the number of young people in custody and to use other sentences wherever possible. That is not to avoid the obvious problem that some young people, like some older people, can be a danger to society. If that is the case, they must be locked up. However, from all the evidence from the Home Office and elsewhere, we know that we lock up far too many people. Successive attempts have been made to tighten up this issue. The new clause tightens up the guidelines that a court must apply before imposing a custodial sentence on a young person under 21 years of age.
I expect that the entire House, including Ministers, will join me in thanking the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group which is behind the thinking on this. I should like to thank also Mr. Paul Cavadino, who has done work of a high standard for that Committee. I understand that that does not always receive the recognition that it deserves.
The new clause spells out—as has been spelt out on other occasions— that a young person should not be locked up unless

"(i) he has a history of failure to respond to non-custodial penalties and the court is satisfied that he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties; or
(ii) no other sentence would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm; or
(iii) the offence was so serious that a noncustodial sentence cannot be justified."

The new clause continues by adding to existing Acts of
Parliament. It states:
(4) Where a court deals with a person under 21 years of age by a method whose use in the case of such a person is restricted by section 1(4) above, it shall state in open court the reasons why, having taken account of those restrictions, it is satisfied that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
As I have already stated, the new clause clarifies the statutory guidance currently governing the use of custody for young offenders, contained in section 1(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982. In practice, the criteria contained in that section of the 1982 Act have been of some use in guiding the courts. However, many courts have applied them loosely and that has considerably reduced their usefulness. Most magistrates and justices' clerks appear to welcome the idea of more detailed statutory reasons for custody. A research study by Elizabeth Burney, conducted in 12 magistrates courts, concluded that the principle of giving statutory reasons in court was
on the whole welcomed, especially by the justices' clerks. It was felt that, as guidelines, they set the right tone, encouraged the right approach and (taken together with rules about legal aids and social inquiry reports) provided a series of hoops through which sentencers must pass before they could take the dire step of depriving a young person of his liberty.
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As I have already stated, it is not just a question of the dire step of depriving a young person of his or her liberty, but a recognition that that is often one of the least effective ways of dealing with a young person, if our interest is in preventing that person from re-offending— which I assume is the case for us all.
Elizabeth Burney's study continues:
The process 'concentrates the mind and stresses accountability' in the words of one justices' clerk; and a chairman added that it could also be a useful check on 'the odd wayward magistrate' who would otherwise want custody regardless of finer points".
However, other research has shown that the three criteria that I quoted from section 1(4) of the 1982 Act are interpreted differently by different courts, and often much more widely than was intended. In the first instance—that is to say,
because it appears to the court that he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties"—
it has been suggested that, although there was a good deal of agreement between those interviewed about how that criterion might apply, on detailed interpretation there was considerable scope for individual differences in sentencing.
A study by Frances Reynolds, of juveniles sentenced in a Northamptonshire juvenile court in 1984, included a case in which the magistrates justified custody on that criterion because
other disposals such as cautions or conditional discharges have not been successful".

We are attempting to deal with such issues in these provisions.
A study of a juvenile court in the north-east of England stated that some magistrates used the phrase "unable or
unwilling"
to send a juvenile into custody when his only previous disposal was a conditional discharge … another juvenile had previously had an attendance centre order and the report was recommending either a community service order or supervision as the means of disposal for the current offences".
No-one who supported the 1982 Act could have conceived that a custodial sentence could be justified on the ground that an offender has re-offended if his only previous disposals had been cautions, a conditional discharge, or an attendance centre order.
Turning to the second criterion mentioned in the 1982 Act—
because a custodial sentence is necessary for the protection of the public"—
the phrase "protection of the public" is open to wide interpretations. Elizabeth Burney commented:
Some defined it narrowly as relating strictly to the dangerousness of the individual offender in terms of physical harm threatened to another, or else to the public at large on account of pathological behaviour … some sentencers preferred to ascribe 'protection' to the supposed deterrent effect on the individual of receiving a custodial sentence.
That is a different interpretation from what is normally
meant, either in this place or in the higher courts when they are considering the protection of the public. Elizabeth Burney continued:
In other courts however—and one in particular-there was a very definite view that 'protection of the public' embraced general deterrence.
In other words, the courts considered the deterrent effect on other people. Therefore, those provisions have proved ambiguous.
The third criterion in the new clause is:
because the offence was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified".
Different definitions of seriousness were used by magistrates. For some offences, for which custodial sentences were justified on "seriousness", the grounds were not nearly as serious as many committed by numerous recidivists in the sample by Frances Reynolds who were given non-custodial sentences. Therefore, the Act as it now stands has been widely interpreted.
One way of improving matters would be for the Court of Appeal to step in and lay down guidelines on the way in which the courts should interpret section 1(4). Indeed, following the research studies to which I have referred, in a series of judgments the Court of Appeal has begun to lay down guidance on the "seriousness of the offence" criterion—for example, for offences of violence, arson, robbery and burglary which do or do not satisfy the criterion. However, few cases so far have shed any light on the "protection of the public" or the "unable or unwilling" to comply criteria.
The parliamentary all-party penal affairs group had hoped that the process of judicial guidance would continue. I think that we would all join in that hope, as it would increase the effectiveness of section 1(4). However, some of the other suggestions of this new clause would also help.
The new clause makes the following principal changes in the three criteria contained in section 1(4) of the 1982 Act. First, on the criterion
because it appears to the court that he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties",


the new clause specifies that the need for circumstances
such that if the offender were aged 21 or over the court would pass a sentence of imprisonment
should be an additional requirement for that and the other criteria. That is designed to met one of the earlier points that I raised—that, as presently formulated, it has been stated that the criterion
can suggest, at least to a bench of magistrates insufficiently advised, that the fact that other non-custodial dispositions have already been tried and 'failed' is a sufficient reason to resort to a custodial sentence regardless of the seriousness of the present offence.
We believe that that will meet the problem.
Secondly, a requirement of
a history of failure to respond to non-custodial penalties
has been added to the above. The word "history" is used in other parts of the 1982 Act and it cannot reasonably be interpreted as a failure to respond to a single conditional discharge, for example, as the present criterion has been interpreted in some cases.
To the second requirement, that a custodial sentence is necessary for the protection of the public, we have again added the phrase "serious harm" which has been used in mental health legislation and is interpreted as relating to serious offences against the person. It would prevent courts from using this criterion to justify custody for such offences as shoplifting, as has happened on some occasions.
The third requirement, that
the offence was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot he justified",
has been left unaltered, because the Court of Appeal has already begun the process of usefully clarifying this criterion and will no doubt continue the process in future judgments. The all-party group favours this approach as a way of reinforcing and building on the criteria established in 1982 which the Court of Appeal has begun to refine and to which its judgments have increasingly drawn the attention of the lower courts.
Finally, the new clause requires that courts shall state in open court, having taken into account all those restrictions, the reason why it is satisfied that no other method of dealing with the offender is appropriate. I hope that that will meet many of the problems that courts have found in interpreting the Act. I hope that it will lead not only to a reduced use of custodial sentences for young people when they are inappropriate and counterproductive but to a more consistent form of sentencing for young people.

Mr. Mellor: As the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) has made clear, the new clause is the work of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. It seeks to replace part of the 1982 Act, which was brought about by that same group winning a vote against the Government during consideration of the legislation in the other place. At that time, the Government were doubtful whether statutory restrictions of this type were effective, and we are still somewhat sceptical. However, we see no objection to these proposals being accepted as a refinement of the thinking behind the 1982 Act. I shall recommend to the House that it accepts the new clause.
The 1982 Act simplified and rationalised the structure of sentencing for juveniles and young offenders, in effect replacing the mish-mash of custodial sentences, many of which were indeterminate, with two sentences, youth custody and detention centre, while creating a framework in which alternatives to custody could continue to be

developed. Community service was extended to 16-yearolds and some 2,000 orders were made in 1985, showing it to be a useful extension of the courts' powers; and the courts' power to make supervision orders were strengthened. The Government have lent their support to the growth in the use of caution. The number of young offenders cautioned for indictable offences increased from 98,000 in 1982 to 122,000 in 1985.
The hon. Gentleman argued that the 1982 Act has led to an increase in the use of custody, but I am not sure whether that is the case. In 1982, the last year of the old arrangements, some 7,100 juveniles went into custody, which represented 7·5 per cent. of all sentences and cautions. In 1985, 5,900 juveniles went into custody, which represented 6·1 per cent. of all sentences and cautions, and therefore a decrease. He is on superficially stronger ground in the case of young adults. In 1982, 22,100 young adults went into custody, which represented 17·9 per cent. of all sentences and cautions. In 1985, 24,400 young adults went into custody which represented 20·1 per cent. of all sentences and cautions.
It is worth bearing in mind that the 1982 Act abolished suspended sentences and imprisonment, so we must add to the 1982 figure the 5,500 suspended sentences of imprisonment imposed on young adults, many of which undoubtedly would have been imposed as imprisonment as a result of further offending. The picture is by no means as clear-cut as the hon. Gentleman asserted. There is plenty of evidence that the 1982 Act has worked well overall. I have not the slightest objection to changing the criteria. The PAPPAG has had second thoughts and we are happy to endorse them, if the House is.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Before we move to the next proposed new clause I have a brief statement to make. Mr. Speaker has asked me to inform the House that he has reconsidered his selection of amendments and has decided to add new clause 20. That new clause will now be called immediately after new clause 19 and grouped for debate with it are amendments Nos. 60, 61 and Government amendment No. 62.

New Clause 3

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

'(1) Any person who shall—

(a) unlawfully assault or beat any other person;
(b) make use of provoking language or behaviour tending to a breach of the peace;Or
(c) commit an act of criminal damage shall be liable on summary conviction in addition to, or instead of, current penalties, if the offender is a male child or male young person, to be whipped.

(2) The expression "child" and "young person" mean respectively an individual of or over the age of 10 and under 14 and an individual of or over the age of 14 and under 18.

(3) The instrument used shall, in the case of a child, be a cane, and in any other case shall be a birch rod.

(4) The court in its sentence shall specify the number of strokes to be inflicted, being in the case of a child not more than six strokes, and in the case of any other person not more than 12 stokes.

(5) The whipping shall be inflicted privately as soon as practicable after sentence.

(6) The whipping shall be inflicted by a constable in the presence of an inspector or other officer of police of higher rank than a constable or by some other person appointed by


the Court, and, in the case of a child or young person also in the presence if he desires to be present of the parent or guardian of the child or young person.

(7) The instrument to be used shall be—

(a) in the case of a male child who is under the age of 14 years a light cane not exceeding four feet in length and not exceeding half an inch in diameter;
(b) in the case of a male person who is over the age of 14 a birch rod of the following dimensions:

Weight not exceeding
9 ounces


Length from end of handle to tip of spray
40 inches


Length of handle
15 inches


Circumference of spray at centre
6 inches


Circumference of handle at top of binding
3½ inches


Circumference of handle 6 inches from end
3¼ inches

(8) In all cases where a court is empowered to impose a sentence of whipping a medical report as to whether the offender is fit to receive the punishment will be made available to the Magistrates before they consider sentence.

(9) The whipping shall be inflicted on the posterior over the child's ordinary cloth trousers.

(10) A medical practitioner shall be present during a birching and may at his discretion order the stopping of the punishment at any time.

(11) Where a birching has been stopped on medical grounds a report of the facts shall be forwarded immediately to the Home Secretary.'.—[Mr. Hawksley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Warren Hawksley: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause provides the House with an opportunity to debate corporal punishment and it is desirable that we should do so. In both the 1979 and 1983 general elections the Government were elected on a policy of law and order and our electors were looking for great things. They have seen an increase in expenditure of 40 per cent. on law and order, and 14,500 extra policemen, many of whom have been taken out of their panda cars and put on the beat, yet the crime figures tell a sad story.
The latest figures show a tragic national picture. In my constituency they show a 10 per cent. increase in crime last year. I know that the Opposition led the criticism of those figures, and it is right that our constituents should call for action. If we have not seen the due results from the increases in expenditure and extra police, we are entitled to ask what has gone wrong. We should consider deterrent sentences with encouragement and enthusiasm.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I should like to ask the hon. Gentleman a question so that we can consider his speech in the context of his answer. Is it his view that the United Kingdom should cease to be a signatory to the European convention on human rights?

Mr. Hawksley: The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) should wait and listen, because I shall come to that matter in a moment.

Mr. Carlile: Answer yes or no.

Mr. Hawksley: I shall deal shortly with the judgment of that court.
Some people may be slightly confused about where I chose the details of new clause 3. Unlike the hon. and learned Gentleman, I am no lawyer and I have no experience in drafting, so I used the wording of legislation that has been applicable in the Isle of Man for many years,

namely, the Petty Sessions and Summary Jurisdiction Act 1927, which has stood the test of time and has been of benefit by being on the statute book.
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On my last visit to the Isle of Man to see how they tackled law and order, I heard from the chief of police on the island that many visitors, even after the birch was no longer used, when they arrived at Douglas would ask the first policeman they saw whether use of the birch was still permitted by statute, and when the policeman said yes, the visitors invariably said, "Do not worry, we will not cause any trouble." I think that that indicates the success of a deterrent. This provision would be a deterrent. It worked on the Isle of Man and it would work here.
If the new clause is accepted by the House in principle, I would be only too happy to see the details amended in another place to bring it into line with other legislation, rather than have what is applicable in the Isle of Man.
If increased expenditure and more policemen have failed to defeat crime, and if the number of assaults is rising, what will solve the problem? Deterrent sentences work, and corporal punishment should be used as a deterrent.
When I first raised this issue in Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill in 1982, the debate took place over one day and my speech proposing the amendment took one hour to make with comments from the Opposition. I have no intention of speaking for that length of time now, as this issue can be dealt with quickly.
When corporal punishment was considered in 1948, crimes of violence against the person were running at 5,183 a year. By 1981 that figure had gone up to 100,000. Since 1981 it has risen to 125,500, an increase of 25 per cent. Those are the latest figures, which were published the other day. Action is needed, and I believe that the public support action. The last public opinion poll that I saw suggested that about 70 per cent. wanted both capital and corporal punishment. Letters that I have received over the last two weeks have shown support for my proposal.
The clause offers, not a finite sentence, but punishment that would be available in appropriate cases to our courts to be used in addition to the remedies that are already available. I believe that most criminals who commit offences at football matches, or who mug the elderly, often for only a few pounds, are basically cowards and would be worried and frightened by the thought of corporal punishment.

Ms. Clare Short: Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that those who commit horrible offences of violence will be worried if they think that they will be caught and sentenced to custody? The problem is that the people who commit such offences are rarely caught. Does the hon. Gentleman think that his proposal would change that at all?

Mr. Hawksley: I agree that it is important that criminals are apprehended, and I welcome the 14,500 extra policemen that have been provided by the Government.
When the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) had responsibility for law and order, he succeeded in getting the police into their panda cars. I welcome the Government's action, because it will ensure that more football hooligans and muggers are caught. Since 1948 we have failed to make any inroads into the


fight against crime and criminals. I suggest that this deterrent sentence should be placed in the armoury of the courts.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery started to shout foul and said that the European Court of Human Rights has said that this cannot be done. I would lose no sleep if we left the European Court of Human Rights. Some of its decisions are most extraordinary. The Tyrer case rested on article 3 of the convention, which says that no one shall be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The court cleared us—although the charge concerned the Isle of Man—on the question of torture or inhuman treatment, and ruled against us only on the question whether it was degrading.
The British judge in that case, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, not only ruled in our favour, but denied that corporal punishment was degrading. I believe that we should pursue that argument in that court. Is it really degrading to birch a youngster who is prepared to commit horrific crimes at football matches and to mug elderly ladies? I say no. If anything is degrading, it is the treatment that those criminals give to their victims.
I hope that the House and the Minister will accept the arguments that we put forward on the new clause. If not, I ask that consideration be given to setting up an independent inquiry, such as the 1968 Barry inquiry, into whether the reintroduction of corporal punishment would be a deterrent. It is now time—20 years after that 1968 inquiry—to have another inquiry and to argue the case if necessary before the European Court of Human Rights. I would welcome such a report, and would look forward to it with interest. I believe that the public are asking for action now. By virtue of the new clause, the House has the opportunity of so acting. I hope that the House and the Minister will accept my new clause.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I believe that the new clause is repugnant, regressive and thoroughly reprehensible. The hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) asks not only that this House turn back the clock, but that the clock he turned back to a time that never was, a time when he imagines that public lust for punishment was gratified by corporal punishment. Where does the hon. Gentleman get this nonsense about successful deterrence by the judicial flogging of youngsters?
The hon. Gentleman, in putting forward the view that these sentences would have some real deterrent value, is tearing up all the criminological research, including very detailed research that has been carried out by the Home Office under the successive Governments on punishment of young offenders. He is tearing up all the judgments as to how best to deal with young offenders. In addition, he is tearing up what is known of the experience of many schools, especially schools in the private sector, in which corporal punishment has been widely used over a long period. [Interruption.]
I hear an interruption from a sedentary position from the hon. Member for Luton, North (Mr. Carlisle), who suggests that it was used successfully. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman went to a public school, but my recollection, having been to one, is that corporal punishment had little, if any, deterrent value. Few boys felt in any way deterred by the fear of the cane.

Mr. Joseph Ashton: Some even like it.

Mr. Carlile: I am reminded that there have been those who have come to like it. Leaving that aside, my view and that of many in education who have been able to judge these things over many years is that corporal punishment in schools never acted as a serious deterrent to anybody for anything to any significant extent.
Furthermore, the clause is absolute nonsense. It seeks to introduce into our law a new crime, that of provoking language. I have been subjected to provoking language for the past five minutes from the other side of the Chamber. Is the hon. Member for The Wrekin really asking magistrates courts in his constituency or anywhere else to decide what is provoking language? There is also
behaviour tending to a breach of the peace".
What behaviour provokes such a breach? [Interruption.] I wish that Conservative Members would listen. Their pleasure in this new clause is all too worrying. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that behaviour tending to, but not causing, a breach of the peace should justify judicial flogging?
Another part of the clause requires whipping, as they are pleased to call it, to be
inflicted privately as soon as practicable after sentence.
Those hon. Members who support this new clause wish to deprive young people of their right of appeal, as is clear from that part of the clause.

Mr. John Carlisle: The hon. and learned Gentleman will recall from his public school days, as I do, that part of the punishment was the length of time between committing the crime and the punishment being inflicted. The clause says that that time should be lessened. The punishment always waits for the crime. The hon. and learned Gentleman is saying that there should be a great length of time between the time of the offence and the time of the punishment. That is worse than what the clause is proposing.

Mr. Carlile: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, what he is suggesting is more worthy of South Africa than of the United Kingdom. Next, we shall have the hon. Gentleman, whose views on South Africa are well known, introducing an amendment that includes rhino whips. He is saying that he and his colleagues in favour of this new clause want to get rid of the right of appeal. At least we now have it from the mouth of one of the sponsors of the new clause.

Mr. Hawksley: rose—

Mr. Carlile: No, I shall not give way, because we have other new clauses to debate.
In addition, we have heard—at least he put it, as one would expect, frankly—from the hon. Member for The Wrekin that he believes that the 40 years that we have spent as signatories to the European convention on human rights should be thrown away, so that we can have judicial flogging. He also believes that all the advantages that we have had from the convention and the advantages that we have had from ensuring that other signatories adhere to the convention should be thrown away to enable judicial flogging.

Mr. John Carlisle: Name one advantage.

Mr. Carlile: With pleasure. The Interception of Communications Act was promoted by the hon. Gentleman's Government during this Parliament, and most of its provisions were supported by hon. Members


on both sides of the House. That is one occasion when this Government have taken advantage of the European convention, but there are many others.
Do the supporters of this new clause really believe that medical practitioners, as required by the new clause, and police officers, as required by the new clause, are prepared to take part in judicial flogging? What a lot of nonsense.
The answer to crime among young people is not flogging them. It is better education, which includes some understanding of the role and activities of the police. It is better policing, which places more police officers on the beat so that young people know who they are and expect them to be within the community. It is better sentencing provisions, non-custodial as well as custodial. The real punishment for a child or a young person who commits an offence is when a police officer, almost invariably politely and fairly, comes to that young person, tells him that he has been caught, takes him to the police station, interviews him, and ensures that, if necessary, he is brought up before the court, and when that young person feels the whole panoply of sanctions of the law brought down on him. This new clause is certainly not the way.

Mr. John Carlisle: I support my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley). I deplore the words of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), who obviously has not learnt from the experiences that he, among many on both sides of the House, has had of suffering this form of punishment.
The new clause is introduced on the basis of the further deterrent that should be available to the courts in language that the sort of people who perpetrate such crimes for which this punishment is available would understand. The House is right to say to those who physically abuse others, as they do, without thought of property or person, should receive exactly the same treatment at the hands of the courts.
In any society, the courts have every right to punish such people in the way that they have punished their victims. This is the type of language that they will appreciate. The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery talked about delay, but it is the very swiftness of punishment that the deterrent would give that is part of what makes it so attrative. I suggest to him that it is attractive because it is swift and has an immediate effect, rather than keeping those offenders— many of whom will be young—of both sexes waiting for some judgment, with the delay that inevitably occurs after these incidents.
We have suffered physical crimes in recent times. That is one reason why my hon. Friends are bringing forward tomorrow night the clause on capital punishment that I shall support. One of the reasons why we should inflict this type of punishment on these young offenders is that they so readily inflict it on others. I support the new clause. My hon. Friend for The Wrekin is absolutely right. I supported such a move in 1982 and I hope that the House sees fit to pass the new clause tonight.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I am completely agnostic on the principle that lies behind this proposed new clause, but with some reluctance I have to say to my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr.

Hawksley) that I shall not be able to support him. I accept that he is addressing two genuine matters. First, there can be no doubt that large numbers—I am not sure whether it is a majority—of our fellow citizens believe that there is a place for corporal punishment. They tell us that in our constituencies every week. Secondly, it is a fact that among our society today is a significant and growing number of vicious young beasts who, in my judgment, could well be more responsive to corporal punishment than they are to the range of punishments that are generally available through the courts.
It was the common parlance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, when you and I were first elected to this House, that there was no such thing as a depraved child, only a deprived child, and that sociological dictum informed a good deal of our criminal justice and sentencing policy for some years. From experience, I have to say that that is not the case. It is a fact that perhaps the most serious crimes are committed now by youngsters between the ages of about 12 and 15, demonstrating, among other things, that whatever else the reason for their crimes, unemployment is not the main one.
Much extremely brutal and violent crime is committed by young males between those ages. I shall detain the House merely to give one illustration. Not long ago, an elderly widow in her 80s was imprisoned in the airing cupboard of her council house. She was kept there for many weeks. When her body was eventually taken out, her weight had fallen to four and a half stone. She had lived in darkness amid the bodily juices that had accumulated during the period of her confinement and torture. She was kept there by three youngsters who had stolen her pension book and gone to the post office each week to obtain her pension by forgery. The old lady was about 84, and the youngsters who tortured and killed her were aged 14, 12 and 11. respectively.
It is the common experience of the police that many extremely violent crimes are perpetrated by very young people. However, the new clause suggests—

Mr. Alex Carlile: What were the sentences?

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I am afraid that I cannot help the hon. and learned Gentleman, but the sentence was certainly not physical chastisement.
The issue before us is whether—

Ms. Clare Short: The hon. Gentleman has told us of an awful crime, although one such story does not prove that young people are more violent than older people. He said that the old lady died. If that is so, I presume that the offenders are now detained during Her Majesty's pleasure. One whipping would not be adequate to punish such a crime. How can he call that example into play to justify the new clause?

Sir Eldon Griffiths: The hon. Lady should listen more carefully. I said at the outset that I could not support the new clause. However, I was saying, and I repeat, that my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin is addressing a genuine problem, first because, whether we like it or not, many of our constituents believe that corporal punishment has a role to play, and, secondly, because it is a fact that there is in our society a significant and growing number of young beasts who inflict the most appalling physical tortures upon the elderly people whom they abuse.
The question is whether the new clause would play a useful part in deterring such conduct, and my difficulties


with that are twofold. First, there is no way that, in practice, we could achieve the intention of the clause, that whippings should be administered as soon as practicable after sentencing. There would be bound to be all kinds of prospects of appeal. The whippings would need to take place in the presence not only of parents or guardians, but of a medical practitioner. In some circumstances, it might be necessary for another party— for example, a social worker—to he present. The whippings could not take place in private; they would become a quasi-public exhibition. Inevitably, and rightly, the press would be interested, so the whipping would become a rather macabre and dismaying semi-public event.
Secondly. subsection (6) states:
The whipping shall he inflicted by a constable"—
presumably a police constable—
in the presence of an inspector or other officer of police of higher rank".
I cannot believe that my hon. Friends—whose purpose I respect—can have consulted the police service before drafting that proposal. I have not consulted the police on the matter, but I am sure that the Police Federation of England and Wales, the Scottish Police Federation or the Police Federation for Northern Ireland would unanimously resist the proposal, for several reasons.
First, a very large number of youngsters could fall to be whipped, and a police officer in a Bridewell—in this case a police station— might thus be required over a period of time to administer whippings to a great many youngsters. Any police officer who did that would become a pariah in the local community. Neither he nor his family could possibly live in the community if it became known that he was regularly administering whippings.
Secondly, the overwhelming majority of police officers go into the service for a purpose entirely different from the administration of punishment. Their purpose is to prevent breaches of the criminal law and to uphold the Queen's peace. To turn them into surrogate whippers on behalf of the law would be to go against the whole purpose of the police service. Any police officer who was willing to undertake that duty, week in, week out, would not be the kind of man I would wish to have in the police service.
Therefore, while I have a good deal of respect for my hon. Friend's purpose in the new clause, I do not think that, in choosing the police, he has chosen the right instrument. The whippings could not be achieved in the speedy fashion that he describes and, on balance, I do not believe that the new clause would fulfil my hon. Friend's purpose.

Mr. Lawrence: I did not intend to speak in the debate. I have not put my name to the clause and I shall not support it in the Lobby because it is impracticable. However, the arrant nonsense talked by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) should not be allowed to pass without the injection of at least some common sense into the debate.
A large proportion of my constituents deplore the appalling level of violent lawlessness in our society. However, whatever resources are made available and whatever action is taken by the Government to promote law and order—and I would be the first to praise the Government in that respect—still the violence increases and the peak age for offenders is 15. None of the 15-year-olds can be affected by economic punishment and, under article 3 of the European convention on human rights,

none of them can apparently suffer physical pain, mental pain or anything degrading or humiliating. What then is left of punishment?
When I go to Uttoxeter market or to the market place at Burton, people ask me, "What are you doing about law and order? What are you doing about our schools, which are churning out not only truants but young vandals and muggers who have not the slightest respect for others in society?" That is a matter for concern, which was not nearly as prevalent 20 or 30 years ago, before the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) and other hon. Members—mostly, although not exclusively, from the Labour Benches— decided that what was needed to deal with criminality was the soft, gentle, kind, caring, helpful and non-violent approach. It has been an absolute disaster.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery and other hon. Gentlemen laugh when my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) puts forward an alternative proposal, which at least makes some kind of attempt to respond to the wishes and demands of the people whom we represent. Those who support the gently, gently, softly, softly, kindly, kindly approach, which has utterly and completely failed, ought to be quiet and not laugh.

Mr. Ashton: The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned his constituency. Is it not a fact that the BBC programme "The Monocled Mutineer" featured a man called Percy Toplis who I think came from the hon. Gentleman's constituency, or from next door. The programme revealed that he was birched at the age of 11, and he finally finished up a few years later shooting a policeman after he had deserted from the Army. What good did the birching do him?

Mr. Lawrence: That is very interesting, but I doubt whether such a confused individual could have come from my constituency. Of course it is possible to point to examples, perhaps many or them, of how corporal punishment at school has had a counter-productive effect and not produced successful results. I am not talking about that. I am saying that hon. Members should not laugh when I and my hon. Friends are expressing the genuine concerns, worries and fears of people who do not accept that corporal punishment in the home or in the school has to be thrown out of the window. The way to control youngsters in their early stages is to use a firm hand, if necessary. We have sold the pass, but if our schools had managed to control youngsters through the use of corporal punishment there would be less truancy, vandalism and violence among the 15, 16 and 17-year-olds in our society.
I am sorry that in a matter of this kind, in which I think that the spirit is not only right but is a response to the proper demands of the people in our society, time has passed us by and it is no longer a practical proposal. There are too many obstacles and it is not something that the Government can countenance. I speak because I do not think that hon. Members should laugh at the kind of feeling that is enshrined in this clause.

Mr. Bill Walker: I rise to support my hon. Friend. My name is on the new clause— not because I get any pleasure from the thought that evil


young people will end up being birched, but because constituents— [Interruption.] Hon. Gentlemen never listen to arguments; that is one reason for the situation that we are in today. The logic of the argument for the retention of corporal punishment was not listened to in the halcyon days when the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins) was Home Secretary, when he talked about the kind of civilised society that he was creating, from which we are now suffering. The right hon. Gentleman obviously does not have the same concerns as his constituents and those of other hon. Members who live on the council estates and have to tolerate the awful, vicious, nasty youngsters that are running around those estates.
I grew up on a council estate when youngsters like that did not exist. One of the reasons was that at that time the law had a much more effective way of dealing with those who transgressed. It is true that some may have graduated to much more vicious and evil crimes; I do not doubt that at all. But there were many more who were deterred, and it is the absence of adequate deterrents today that worries our constituents; it is the absence of what they see as adequate deterrents. It is quite right that this matter should be properly debated. Are we going to say in the House today that there is nothing effective that we can do about the growing number of young people who initially are basically nasty and who, if they are not deterred, can become evil and terribly vicious?
It is a sad fact that those who get away with these basically nasty activities move on to more nasty, vicious actions. That is why we get increasing numbers of offenders. That is why 15 is the age of the majority of them.
Is it not terribly sad that, when we have raised the school-leaving age to 16 as a statutory requirement, we should get this problem? The statutory age when I was at school was 14, but there were certainly no 15-year-olds at that time running around council estates causing mayhem and frightening old ladies, pensioners and others. That is the situation that exists on many of our large council estates, and it is quite wrong. I would have thought that Opposition Members, who often represent parts of the country where these large estates exist, would certainly have been much more concerned.
This is not an occasion for personal abuse; it is not a matter on which we should attack each other or each other's integrity. That is what I find so disturbing—that if one wants to deter, one's integrity is attacked. I cannot understand that kind of logic.

Mr. Alex Carlile: indicated dissent.

Mr. Walker: The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery is shaking his head. Perhaps when he reads his speech tomorrow he will realise how offensive he was and indeed how he suggested that there was no integrity among those who put their names to this new clause.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. Gentleman give chapter and verse of the evidence which justifies this absurd claim that what is proposed in the clause would have any real deterrent value at all? I believe that there is no such evidence, that the hon. Gentleman cannot point to any and that that is why we have heard nothing about any. I regret to put it this way, but in my view it is just their bigoted opinion.

Mr. Walker: The hon. and learned Gentleman has again adopted the tactics of the clever lawyer, but he is not clever enough, because there is substantial evidence. The evidence that I gave was that when I was a schoolboy, when I was growing up on a fairly rough and tough council estate there were not the numbers of youngsters indulging in vicious crimes that there are today. That is a statement which the hon. and learned Gentleman cannot refute, because the facts are all there for anyone to examine. If one examines the figures for immediately before, during and after the war, one sees that there was nothing like the number of youngsters involved in those vicious, hideous nasty crimes that there is today, because deterrence was available.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Why?

Mr. Walker: I sometimes wonder where the hon. and learned Gentleman and other hon. Gentlemen like him grew up, because I remember very well what the circumstances were. That is all I can say to hon. Gentlemen who attack the integrity of those who believe that we must look for and try to find alternatives.
I take the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that, sadly, we have moved into an era, as a result of the signing of the European convention on human rights and of other factors, in which Governments now find themselves boxed in. But the right place to debate these matters is in this House, so that the country knows that we care. At some future date, we may wish to repudiate agreements that have been entered into internationally, as indeed has happened before. We may wish to opt out at some future date. It is right that we should always put forward the views of our constituents so that they are on the record and at some future date may be acted upon. That is why I support this new clause.

Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse: The hon. Gentleman is talking about council estates. Does he not think that prior to 1979 many of the kids he refers to, certainly in the mining communities, would have gone to work at 4.30 in the morning? Does he realise that of the 750 kids who left school in my constituency at the last school-leaving period, only 11 have found work? Those kids would normally go to the pits. Work is the deterrent for the youngsters.

Mr. Walker: Without realising it, the hon. Gentleman has made my argument. If he reads carefully what he has just said, he will see that what he said in effect is that youngsters of 14 and over would be going to work. He has to realise that over 50 per cent. of those who commit crimes are under 15.

Mr. Lofthouse: We were at work at 14.

Mr. Walker: Yes, but today over 50 per cent. of the youngsters who find themselves in trouble are under 14. That is what the hon. Gentleman has to realise. That was not changed by the alteration in the school-leaving age, it was the fact—

Mr. Lofthouse: rose—

Mr. Walker: The hon. Gentleman should listen to what I have to say, as I listened to him. Youngsters between the ages of 10 and 14 are appearing in our courts today. Things would be no different during the period he was talking about because they would still have been at school


and would have been subjected to the disciplines of the school at that time, which included the use of corporal punishment and all the other deterrents I have mentioned. The hon. Gentleman has got it all wrong. Unfortunately, he does not want to face the facts.

Ms. Clare Short: Like other hon. Members, I did not intend to speak in the debate. However, if such crude and silly things can be said in the Chamber, they need to be challenged, and we cannot let them go unchallenged.
The Government are trying to support a myth and avoid the link that is known and proven whereby in any developed society, when unemployment rises, crime rises. The Prime Minister has falsely asserted that that is not proven but research evidence is absolutely clear. The Prime Minister has denied that twice from the Dispatch Box and she is wrong. The research evidence shows otherwise. The excuse she used—it has been used again today—is to suggest that no one over the school-leaving age commits crime. That is nonsense. We know that some crimes are committed by young people under the school-leaving age but masses of crimes are committed by young people over the school-leaving age and under 25. Conservative Members know that, but they just want to distort the facts and fabricate the evidence to justify their own ignorance and prejudice.
Conservative Members have called in aid their own constituencies. In my constituency, there is an enormous problem of rising crime and a terrible problem of burglary, which means that most people are living with the fear of burglary all the time. It has risen rapidly in recent years There is an enormous fear of street attacks and all sorts of other crimes. However, none of my constituents has ever said that the answer is corporal punishment. It is obvious that my constituents have a great deal more wisdom, intelligence and understanding of the nature of the world and the nature of the problem than Conservative Members.
Conservative Members have been exchanging views about where they grew up. I grew up in my constituency, and there was not that sort of fear and crime. I remember when we used to hear horror stories about the United States of America. We used to hear how everyone feared burglary, had alarms on their houses and used to take loose change in their pockets to give to the muggers. That was the society they lived in. We could not believe that, and we never thought that it would be like that here, but now it is getting like that. We must ask why. The answer is that society is more divided, bitter and nasty than it ever was in my youth and than I ever expected to see in my lifetime. It is creating a nasty, brutalised atmosphere, a lack of morality and a lack of sharing and concern for each other. This new clause would be a further brutalisation.
5.45 pm
What respect would we have for our criminal justice system if it took in young people and beat them when they committed crimes? More and more people would feel antagonistic to the system, they would reject it and lose their respect for it. That is what would come about. Conservative Members are not seeking to solve the problems of crime to make a safer and better society, but are seeking further brutalisation, and they would create nastier and nastier crimes.
The extremely important question is, what evidence do they have that beating and whipping would reduce the rate of crime? On one occasion at my junior school, when I was

about six, I was hit by a nun with a pointer. I still remember that, and I still have a sense of hatred towards her in my heart. She hit me twice on the hand. I also remember at my school many young lads who used to say, "I can take it." There were those tough kids who were always in trouble and who gloried in being able to be beaten and not mind. They were brutalised by the system and they had less and less respect for the school that hit them in that way.
There is no evidence that it would deter crime. Conservative Members should not just keep asserting that it will because there is no evidence. I feel confident that we have not yet reached the stage where this society has so little civilisation that people would seriously recommend corporal punishment. However, if we ever reached that stage it would be just a further twist in the bitterness" division, polarisation, violent and nasty crime and the lack of respect for our criminal justice system.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I support the basic contention of my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) that corporal punishment should be available once more. It is a fact of life that we have some very nasty youngsters who just do not respect law and order. They have grown up in a permissive society under the poor parentage of people who do not believe in the punishment fitting the crime. These youngsters need quick and severe discipline as a way of correcting them and making them distinguish the difference between right and wrong.
I have always believed that discipline breeds respect, and the new clause would certainly bring about some additional respect, just as we once had in the Isle of Man. I can give an example of the "baby squad" in Leicester, which went out of its way to be nasty, to intimidate elderly people and to break into elderly people's houses. Instead of receiving instant and proper discipline when the members of the squad were caught, they effectively got away with it. We have had football hooligans charging into Leicester City football club. They should have been birched. If the clause were to be passed, I believe that they would be birched, and that would be good. We need to correct the anti-social, criminal miscreants who are to be seen wandering on our streets today, within a mile of the House of Commons, and certainly in the Brixtons and Islingtons and many other places of high inner-city deprivation.

Ms. Clare Short: What about Leicester?

Mr. Bruinvels: Yes, even in some parts of Leicester.
The fault must lie with the permissive society as advocated by softie Labour Home Secretaries, such as the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins). I want to see the punishment fitting the crime. The birch would certainly be an effective punishment. We must realise that many of our youngsters are potential law breakers. What punishment is available now? What sanctions are available to the courts today?
It is all very well for Opposition Members to laugh and think that we are being nasty and enjoying speaking in this way, but I can tell them that the majority of parents want to see discipline brought back into society. They do not always discipline their children quickly enough. They believe, wrongly, that the schools will bring about the discipline, but the schools are now precluded from using the cane, which is a great tragedy.
The one disadvantage of the royal wedding of the Duke and Duchess of York was that on the eve of that wedding we had our important debate on corporal punishment. I was a teller for the Ayes in support of bringing back corporal punishment in the schools, but, because of the crowds outside in Parliament square, a number of hon. Members—12, I am told—were prevented from getting into the House to ensure that corporal punishment was still available in our schools. I think that it is a great tragedy that we do not have it.
The sanctions that exist in schools— lines, cold showers, a cold bath, detention—are no deterrent. How would they correct anything? The short sharp shock that was advocated by the deputy Prime Minister—now the Leader of the House of Lords—was considerably more effective. So it would have been with the cane. It could have been used as instant or belated punishment. Other hon. Members might have had to wait outside the headmaster's door— as I did— to receive a good whacking. It was a nerve-wracking experience waiting to see if he would really cane me. Opposition Members might have a few laughs about the length and weight of the cane, but it is the most effective punishment that is available.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Bruinvels: The European Court of Human Rights has no right to interfere in our society. We did not ask it to tell us how to chastise our children. We did not ask it to interfere in the issue of wearing seat belts, either. Slowly, day by day, our rights are being eroded.
Parents want the new clause to be accepted. It may not be perfect, but it is right to protect our young people from themselves and to give the courts the power to order a caning. I do not believe that no policeman wants to mete out some sort of punishment. In the old days, when a policeman caught a young lad scrumping apples, he would have clipped him round the ear or taken him home to his parents for instant discipline. Now, they probably say that the apples are on the other side of the fence and that the lad can get away with what he has done, that he must have gone to the wrong kind of school, or that his dad is, perhaps, unemployed.
There is no excuse for ever breaking the law. The new clause would bring back a corrective balance and stop the rot. Tomorrow's parents are today's children. Those children are getting away with their crimes. Their parents want better from all of us, and only Conservative Members can bring about what those parents want.

Mr. Ashton: Slum childhoods are often a matter for hilarity in the House. We have heard about a slum childhood in Lancashire. I grew up on a slum in Sheffield, and there were two murders in the back yard of the house in which I lived before I reached the age of seven. Then, Adolf Hitler flattened the area in the blitz. There may have been more murders since then, but it was a rough neighbourhood. One of the two people was murdered by strangling, and the other was stabbed at a party by someone who had jumped off the toilet roof. It was the type of neighbourhood about which people do not brag when they are older, but they have an expert knowledge of crime and criminals.
I knew a man who had been birched as a boy. He lived in the next yard, and received 12 strokes of the birch for

stealing half a hundredweight of coal. Another acquaintance got six strokes of the birch for stealing the co-op milkman's horse and running away with it. He looked after it very well at the local recreation ground for three days, and the judge said that he would have let him off if he had not stolen the money as well.
It is funny to look back at such events 40 years on, but the man who stole the coal and was birched for it brought up five sons to be the biggest villains and criminals that the city had ever known.—[HoN. MEMBERS: "Name them."] I could name them. Three of them later deserted from the Army and finished up in the glasshouse, which did not do them any good, either. They may be getting on in years now, or they may have faded away altogether. I have lost touch with the area.
The other week the BBC televised a classic case of what I am talking about. Percy Toplis was birched at the age of 11, and finished up leading a mutiny in the Army and shooting at policemen when he emerged from it.
Caning is no deterrent. It hammers revenge into men's bodies and burning iron into their souls. They want to make society pay for the indignity and humiliation that is meted out to them.

Mr. Hawksley: Will the hon. Gentleman concentrate on the figures from the Isle of Man, which are relevant? Corporal punishment is used there, and those caned up to 1982 show a recidivist rate of 28 per cent. In this country, the rate is 75 per cent. Why?

Mr. Ashton: The hon. Gentleman is talking about an isolated place that does not suffer from the problems of our inner cities—problems such as homelessness and the absence of a stepladder to better things. Crime went down in the 1950s and 1960s. The incidents that I have described occurred before the war—I was only seven at the time of the blitz. Now, as in the 1930s, people at the bottom are becoming full of despair. There is no stepladder, no hope and no future. People do not expect to jump to the top of the stepladder, but a big strong lad bursting with muscles wants to use his strength in a job.
There was no crime in 1950s and 1960s— [HoN. MEMBERS: "None?"] Practically none, because lads left school and went down the pit, into the steelworks or the shipyards, or down to the docks—to Bermondsey—to unload sacks of potatoes for £100 a week. When they came home they were too tired to do anything but have three pints in the pub and go to bed. There was no football hooliganism then, because there were other outlets for their energy—conscription, for example. People played more organised sport and the jobs were physically demanding.
Many of us who worked on the shop floor or in the pits can tell Conservative Members that we went home, had our tea and fell asleep on the settee. We were so tired that we slept for an hour before having a couple of pints. We started work at 6 am and were too tired to go out at 11 pm to a disco to play reggae music and keep the street awake until all hours of the morning.

Mr. John Carlisle: Will the hon. Gentleman please address himself to what is indisputably the major problem of crime in this country—those who are under 15 years old? How will he deal with them? Does he not think that this type of punishment will make them understand that the physical pain that is inflicted on them corresponds to the physical pain that they have given others?

Mr. Ashton: I accept the hon. Gentleman's statistics, but he is discussing petty crime—stealing milk money.

Mr. John Carlisle: Come on!

Mr. Ashton: The hon. Gentleman is referring to children who go to supermarkets, grab something and run out— [HON. MEMBERS: "What about mugging?"] A youngster of 14 is not big enough to mug someone. It is a matter of petty theft. Children on their way to a football match run into a supermarket and pinch a bottle of sherry. They drink two mouthfuls of it and start acting like hooligans. That is not the sort of heavy crime that we are discussing.
The whole history of punishment, going back to the mutiny on the Bounty, on which vessel British seamen were flogged and mistreated, shows that the worse criminals are treated physically, the worse they will react. Hon. Members should consider what happens when children are battered. They will invariably find that those children's parents were battered themselves. In every case involving battered children, the parents' history shows that they were battered as kids. Often their grandparents, and their parents before them, were battered, too. That is the result of physical punishment, handed down from generation to generation. It does not eradicate, prevent or stop anything. It puts physical violence into a person, and that must come out somewhere else.

Mr. John Carlisle: Fear. That is the deterrent.

Mr. Ashton: It is not fear. The deterrent is being caught. Any criminal who knows that it is a cast-iron certainty that he will be caught will not commit the crime. Paying the rates is a perfect example of that. People do not dodge them, because they will be caught. If they do not pay them, they will end up in court. They cannot shift the house and run away, so they pay.
With rape it is different. Only one in three rapes ever gets reported. The criminal sees from the papers that women are scared and do not want to go through the hassle. They do not report the rape, so the rapist reckons that there is a two in three chance that the rape will not be reported, and he takes the risk. The deterrent is the absolute certainty of being caught. That is why the number of bank robberies went down in recent years.

Mr. Lawrence: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will say what on earth is the deterrent for a young person who is caught if, having been caught, he is not to be punished.

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Mr. Ashton: There is a punishment, a great deal of punishment, for young people, and it is not to make them heroes. All too often they would wear these stripes while strutting around with their mates. We have seen them at football matches, as we saw it on the picket lines and everywhere else. If there is a television camera, it enhances the status of the idiot who runs on the field, or takes a punch at someone, or knocks a bobby's helmet off. This sort of punishment would give him a status too. He would parade his stripes to the rest of the kids and he would be the macho hero who took the knocks, the lumps and the stripes awarded to him. The punishment would do the reverse of what hon. Members intend.

Mr. Soley: I do not believe that anyone of a mature and balanced disposition and who has read the wording of this new clause would vote for it. It talks of people who

make use of provoking language or behaviour tending to a breach of the peace".
If they are under 10 they will be caned—"whipped" is the word, "with a cane"—and if they are 14 they will be whipped with a birch. I put it to Government Members who have been talking about this that they would not do it to their own children. If they tried to do it to their own children, their own children would be likely to be taken into care because they would have failed as parents—and every one of us knows this.
These hon. Members do not support the new clause with any intention of voting for it. They are doing so, knowing that they are going to withdraw it, because they want to get their names in their local papers and pretend that they are getting tough on crime. I challenge any Government Member. They can prove me wrong by calling for a vote and putting the tellers in. I will wait until the time comes to see if they do.
One thing that a number of my hon. Friends have made clear—some Government Members believe this too—is that violence begets violence. I have worked with an awful lot of very violent people in my time—

Mr. Bruinvels: Labour voters.

Mr. Soley: If I had to break down how they voted, I would have to say that a goodly number of them voted for extreme Right-wing parties like the Conservatives and the National Front.
One thing that I can say with absolute certainty is that of all those people only a tiny handful did not have violence used against them as children. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) is absolutely right to talk about the parents of battered children, because we usually find that one parent or both have also been battered.
The only bit of hope that the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) could bring up was the experience of the Isle of Man. We all know that crime is low in the Isle of Man because it does riot have, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) said, that splintered, disintegrated community that we have in most of Britain but primarily in the inner cities. This is what has driven up the crime rate. The reason why the crime rate has risen faster under this Government than under any previous one is precisely because they have done more to rip apart the fabric of society and undermine family relationships than any previous Government by means of the general pressure that they put on people, particularly those on a low income. It is no wonder that the crime rate is going up in those families and communities which have collapsed.
The hon. Gentleman quoted figures for the Isle of Man. He forgets to say that many people birched and caned there did not come from the Isle of Man. The figures are not comparable. It is no good using the absurd argument that they do not go back, because research shows that such offenders would not necessarily have gone back anyway, if given another type of sentence. Those who are fined, for example, in the Isle of Man do not particularly go back either. So the recidivism rate in the Isle of Man tells us nothing.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw said with clarity and force, the thing that deters crime is the chance of being convicted. What we are talking about in this new clause is things like criminal damage. Children are going to be whipped for criminal damage, for scrawling a slogan


on a wall. That is what we are talking about. We are actually talking about a clear-up rate which is tiny, because the vast majority of people who commit such offences are not caught. So to talk about any type of sentence as a deterrent is absolute nonsense.

Mr. Lawrence: rose—

Mr. Soley: Government Members should remember something else. Not only would they not do it to their own children, but they must ask why it is that a normal healthy adult wants to do this only to a child. Hon. Members will see that adult males are not included, so this will be done only to children. Interestingly, it will not be done to women—it has to be a male child. That tells us a great deal about the psychology of those who wrote this clause, with its careful definition of the length of cane:
Length from end of handle to tip of spray 40 inches … Length of handle 15 inches … Circumference of spray at centre 6 inches".
Who on earth worked this out? It is a sign of people who have not come to terms with their own problems. They need to think about that very carefully if they are to pursue the matter further.
I have already said that Government Members will not push this new clause to a vote. If they do, it will be for one reason—to be able to stand up in their own areas and say that they voted for toughness. Of course, the message that their Government were elected on has failed. Their tough law and order policies have not worked because they have destroyed the very fabric of the communities, the family structures and links within families that prevent crime. In so doing, they and they alone bear the responsibility for the most dramatic increase in crime of all time.

Mr. Geoffrey Dickens: We on the Government Benches have endeavoured for many years to correct this trouble with law and order.

Mr. Lofthouse: It is getting worse.

Mr. Dickens: Yes, it is getting worse. We wish to see a country in which women can walk freely without the fear of being molested or raped. We wish to see a country where the elderly can feel safe inside their own homes and out after dark. We also want to see a country where our children can play safely without fear of being abused or killed. That is the sort of vision that we have. This is the sort of thing that we have worked towards.
The provisions of this new clause have no great appeal for me, but I must say that Opposition Members have been most unhelpful about other forms of correction that we have put forward, in terms of sentencing powers and provisions under the law. Many of our judges, too, live in a different world. Parliament sets the sentences, but the judges often fail to award them. By the time our judges have read medical reports, psychiatric reports, social reports, probation reports, they look at them and, like the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton), they say, "Poor devils, never had a chance in life." They do not think about the victim and the victim's family.
This is what we are ignoring. It is very hard for a political party which believes in law and order, which fixes the tariff for sentences and the rest, to be undermined in

many ways not only by the judiciary but also on many occasions by Opposition Members who do not seem to vote for things that we would wish to put in place to correct the law and order situation. Time and time again we are frustrated.
If the new clause were put to the vote, I would not vote for it. As it happens, I am not one of the "hang 'em, flog' em, whip 'em" brigade, but tomorrow I shall be voting for the reintroduction of capital punishment. Let me explain.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think it might be for the convenience of the House if the hon. Gentleman sought to do that tomorrow.

Mr. Dickens: Let me explain about the matter that we are discussing at the moment. What are we talking about? We are talking about deterrents.

Ms. Clare Short: Beating is not a deterrent.

Mr. Dickens: Beating is a deterrent.

Ms. Clare Short: How does the hon. Member know?

Mr. Dickens: If I had a whip, I would show the hon. Lady. I am sorry, Mr. Speaker; we are digressing.
I think deeply and sincerely about the protection of the citizen. It is the state's duty to protect its citizens. We are not protecting the citizen sufficiently. The proposed new clause is a typical example of the feeling that we have not come to grips with the problem of law and order. People want extreme measures because they are frightened. We are not winning the war on law and order. Try as we will, we are not, and we are getting precious little help, or none at all, from the Opposition.
We must work towards stability on law and order. We must not let the criminal get on top of us. We must think more about the victims and the relatives of victims than about the defendant standing in the dock. We must apply the strength of law and order to the criminal as we do in defence. We say that we must be strong on defence. The balance of terror is the strength in defence that has kept peace for 40 years. We must show the same strength and the same tenacity when we deal with criminals otherwise there will be extremisms.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: The House is grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) for allowing us to debate a matter which has proved to be of considerable interest. Despite the fact that he made a speech which was both eloquent and persuasive and the fact that he was supported by many of my hon. Friends, I cannot commend the new clause to the House. When I adopt that position, I do so both on general grounds of principle and on grounds of detail.
I should like first to deal with the general grounds, which are grounds of principle. We must understand the scope of what is proposed in the new clause. It proposes that all courts, including magistrates courts, should, in respect of offenders between the ages 10 and 18, have the power to impose a birching order for a wide range of offences. Leaving aside assault, for which there is a possible argument, the offences are making use
of provoking language or behaviour tending to a breach of the peace".
Should those offences attract a birching order?
Not since 1847 have justices had the power to impose a birching order in respect of persons over 14; not since 1861 has a higher court had the power to impose a bitching order for offences of the kind now defined in respect of


persons under the age of 14. I am very sceptical about a proposal which is designed to reinstate a legal system which went out of fashion in the days of Lord Palmerston, 150 years ago. That is the premise from which I start—extreme scepticism.
6.15 pm
Now we come to the question of deterrence. It was right that my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North (Mr. Carlisle) and my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin should concentrate on deterrence. I must tell my hon. Friends that all the examination into this matter that has been undertaken does not disclose any evidence of deterrence; indeed, quite the reverse. For example, the matter was examined by the Cadogan committee in 1938. I quote a summary of that:
They"—
that is, the Cadogan committee—
examined the records of 440 men convicted between 1921 and 1930 of robbery with violence, and compared the subsequent records of those who were flogged with the records of those who were not. They concluded that sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude without flogging were no less effective in deterring offenders from subsequent offences of robbery with violence than sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude with flogging. As regards subsequent crimes other than robbery with violence, they found that those who had been flogged, including those without previous convictions of serious crime, had worse subsequent records than those not flogged.
Just in case someone thinks that there was something peculiar about the period between 1921 and 1930, let me tell the House of a further analysis that was undertaken in respect of the period between 1941 and 1948. The whole question was considered again in 1960 by the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders. It considered the subsequent convictions of men under 21 who had been convicted between 1941 and 1948 of robbery with violence, armed robbery or robbery in company. Of 704 offenders in this group, 125, or 18 per cent., received corporal punishment; 579, or 82 per cent., did not. The proportion convicted of further offences of violence was 18·4 per cent. for those who had been flogged and 12·4 per cent. for those who had not been flogged.

Mr. John Carlisle: The statistics that my hon. Friend has given related to men under 21. Can he enlighten us on whether there are figures for those under 15? Half the crimes that we have been talking about have been committed by children of that age. My hon. Friend is talking about mature adults. He is also talking about a report relating to the period before 1960. Does he agree that since 1960 the rise in crime has been horrific and that the crimes committed, particularly by youngsters under 15, have been equally horrific?

Mr. Hogg: No. My hon. Friend is over-refining the matter. I have quoted from two authoritative reports made to the House. I say to my hon. Friends, who have spoken about the Isle of Man that during the whole of the 1970s only five juveniles and six adults were flogged there. Between 1973 and 1978 no juvenile was flogged. To try to extrapolate lessons from that is simply not a helpful exercise.
I say with no apology that all the evidence shows unequivocally that flogging is not a deterrent for any offence. It would constitute a breach of article 3 of the European convention, and I do not choose to commit a breach of that convention. Furthermore, it would

constitute a breach of article 7 of the United Nation: covenant on civil and political rights. Again, I do not cart to advocate such a breach.
One thing we must understand on this matter of principle is that people in this country and in this House feel a deep revulsion against the proposal. If we introduce it, I fear that it will bring the whole corpus of criminal law into disrepute.
Those are matters of principle, but I have not finished yet as there are matters of detail to consider.

Mr. John Home Robertson: They are all behind the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Hogg: I am delighted to hear that all my hon. Friends are behind me.
I was about to consider the detail, because we cannot ignore detail on such an issue. The idea that there can be a rapid penalty swiftly following the commission of an offence, is an absurdity. Anyone who knows anything about criminal courts will know that weeks, if not months, pass between the commission of the offence and the imposition of a penalty.
My hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin requires in his new clause the presence of a doctor. That understandable, but the entire British Medical Association is against it. In all probability, it would be unethical for a doctor to attend the carrying out of such a penalty.
Then there is the question of the police officer. My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths) made an important and telling point when ht said that a police officer would not choose to be in any way tarnished with the imposition of such an act. My hon. Friend is right because, as a matter of principle and for long past, the House has been clear about the role of a police officer, who is not involved in the imposition of a penalty. It would be intolerable for the police to have to play such a role in our criminal system.
Despite the eloquence of my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin and of those who have supported him—and I speak quite as passionately as them—I am against the new clause and I hope that it will not receive a Second reading.

Mr. Hawksley: I wish to reply to a few of the points made in the debate. It has been a good debate and I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing it to take place.
As I said earlier, I believe that new clause 3 is desirable, although I was interested to hear the comments from the Opposition which I did not find so surprising. However, I wish to pick up one point made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) who mentioned "The Monocled Mutineer". I received a report that the author admitted on a BBC Radio 4 programme that the story had been created from his imagination and that it was in the interests of pacifism. That suggests that the evidence from the Opposition is not very strong.
The main argument against the new clause has been its wording. I stressed at the start that I drew my wording entirely from the Isle of Man legislation. I accept that if the new clause were accepted in principle it would need amending in another place. The problem raised by my hon. Friend the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths), concerning police officers and doctors could be corrected. After we discussed


the matter, when the BMA made it clear that it would not support such a proposal, I received a string of letters from doctors offering to officiate at such occasions.
The important point that we have missed is the matter of principle—whether corporal punishment would be a deterrent. Earlier, I quoted the figures relating to the recidivist rate on the Isle of Man. I believe they confirm that corporal punishment would be a deterrent. I believe that the electorate are looking to us to introduce such a deterrent. They believe that we should think about the victim more than the person who has committed the crime. For that reason, I leave it to the House to decide whether it wishes to agree to the new clause.

Mr. Speaker: The question is, That the clause be read a Second time. As many as are of that opinion say Aye.

Hon. Members: Aye.

Mr. Speaker: Of the contrary No.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Speaker: I think that the Noes have it.

Question accordingly negatived

Mr. Soley: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am not sure whether the new clause is being forced to a Division.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman knows that I have collected the voices, and my judgment was not challenged in that respect.

New Clause 5

DIRECTOR'S POWERS (INSIDER DEALING)

'(1) The powers of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office under section 2 of this Act shall be exercisable in any case in which it appears to him that there is good reason to do so for the purpose of investigating the affairs or any aspect of the affairs of the futures market.

(2) For the purposes of this section "Futures Market" means any market, the prices of which are published, enabling persons or undertakings to make forward dealings in physical or financial commodities, assets, or currencies.'.— [Mr. Soley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Soley: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We have now reached a serious part of the Bill that deals with fraud. The new clause seeks to deal with insider dealing on the futures market. We hope to close some of the opportunities for fraud that are available in the City of London and other areas of the country.
The Bill introduces a new concept—a concept that is welcomed on both sides of the House—of the serious fraud office. A number of Acts designed to deal with insider dealing have not been as effective as they should have been. The Companies Securities (Insider Dealings) Act 1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 have not dealt fully with insider dealings. A strong view is still held in society that it is easy to get away with major fraud and that, somehow or another, it is allowed to happen and not too much effort is being made to prevent it.
The Government have taken a significant step in the right direction by establishing the serious fraud office. However, having listened to the previous debate, I should have thought that every member of the Tory party would support not only the deterrent aspect of punishment for

fraud but, more important, the introduction of a major new measure to catch fraudsters, to ensure that they do not get away with what are often millions of pounds worth of money which belong to other people. As has often been said, fraud has become a regressive tax on society, and it takes money out of the pockets of particular individuals and groups.
We must consider double standards in this connection. In 1986 there were no fewer than 138,000 prosecutions for fraud against people on supplementary benefit, yet in the City of London in 1984 there were only 77 arrests and only 18 prosecutions. It seems that far greater resources are used to catch people who defraud social security, when a far smaller amount of money is involved, than are used to catch major fraud when the amounts are much greater—running into thousands or millions of pounds on some occasions.
There is also some evidence of friction between the police and the Department of Trade and Industry in investigations. I hope that the establishment of the serious fraud office will eventually help to reduce that.
We also acknowledge that, in Committee, the Government increased the sentence for fraud from two years to seven years. But an increase in sentence is not a deterrent unless one is caught. Conservative Members mistakenly believe that one can deal with crime by increasing the length of sentences. That is dependent not only on the state of desperation of people who commit crime but on the chances of getting away with crime. The chances of getting away with major fraud crimes are considerable. The Securities and Investments Board and DTI figures show that since 1980 only 110 cases were reported, and of those only nine were prosecuted. They were largely small-fry cases.
The purpose of the new clause is to incorporate the futures market. The example that I am about to describe is the one about which I have most evidence, although there are other cases in which there may be similar problems.
6.30 pm
The potato futures market is a fairly recent operation. It commenced trading in 1980. It was modelled on the Dutch example. There is a significant and vital difference between the British and Dutch potato futures markets. The Dutch futures market involves totally free enterprise industries whose futures react to natural fluctuations of supply and demand, and they have no central system of state aid affecting trade. But in the United Kingdom potato production is controlled by the potato marketing scheme and the Potato Marketing Board. In effect, the Potato Marketing Board moves on market support, quotas, grading and other matters of that nature. That produces an immediate effect on the futures market. The Potato Marketing Board's process of continually collating statistics from growers, customers, and Customs and Excise and releasing monthly forecasts provides the information on which people can base insider trading.
Prior to the monthly information releases, Potato Marketing Board members and staff are in a privileged position. As they prepare the forecasts, they can at once predict how the potato futures market will react, and trade accordingly either on their own accounts or through friends or relatives. On various occasions, there have been


press reports of dips or rises in prices immediately prior to the board's monthly statistical releases. The problem is a real one.
I shall quote from an article in the 16 September 1982 issue of Big Farm Weekly. That may sound an unlikely name in a Home Affairs debate—it might sound more at home in an agriculture debate—but it underlines the important and serious point. It states:
Potato Marketing Board members have been accused by traders of insider trading on the potato futures market—which, though not actually illegal in commodity markets, is regarded in commercial circles as a heinous offence.
The simple fact is that Potato Marketing Board members and staff often have access to figures on plantings, supplies and yields well before that information is released to the general public. Obviously it is possible to trade on the basis of this information.
Of all the soft commodity markets operating in this country the potato futures market is unique in that it is the only one where one organisation has a virtual monopoly on supply information.
Insider trading is now illegal in stocks and shares as well as being banned under the Stock Exchange regulations. At the same time all futures market traders have a clause written into their contracts of employment forbidding them to trade for themselves. However, no such restrictions apply to individuals—whether they be in a position of privilege or not—in trading on either the physical commodity or the futures markets.
Futures traders see this lack of constraint—particularly in the potato market— as iniquitous. As one trader succinctly put: 'If I tried trading off my own account and was caught at it I wouldn't even touch the sides of the door on my way out, and I wouldn't be able to get a job with any of the other companies.'
For their part, the traders fear that the market will lose credibility if insider trading becomes rife, and public knowledge. and they therefore lose business.
In 1982, an editorial in the Farmers Weekly stated:
The potatoe futures market is a well established institution. It is widely used by merchants, processors and farmers to hedge against market movements and, as such, provides extra confidence to those who need to operate long-term contracts. It must, therefore, retain a spotless reputation.
In 1982, there was an awareness in agricultural markets and circles that insider trading on futures of this type was a problem. The rumours suggested behaviour which could be construed as illegal, and would certainly have been construed as unacceptable. The editorial in the Farmers Weekly continued:
The hoard's prompt rejection of the current crop of rumours is timely. It will ease minds and cement confidence.
But perhaps a change in the law, with the extension of the ban on insider trading to include futures markets as well as the stock market, would be the best way to stop rumour mongers in their tracks.
Clearly, at that stage, the Farmers Weekly took the view that, although it was a rumour, the rumour, rather than the issue, was the problem. We now have further evidence that it is more serious than that.
Two years later, on 17 February 1984, Farmers Weekly published a news item headed:
Hunt for 'mole' at Potato Board HQ.
That is a suitable title, one might think, in the circumstances. The article states:
A telephone call to Farmers Weekly from a since-untraceable potato merchant claiming to have the figures and asking whether the board had issued a comment on them, alerted us to the fact that the figures were in someone's hands.
An inquiry into the futures market proved that at least one floor trader also had the figures and had traded on them.
That floor trader claimed his client had the information by Wednesday morning direct from an inside PMB source.
While refusing to disclose the name of the client, the futures floor trader said he was a farmer in the Sussex-Hampstead area.

Even though so-called insider trading is not actually illegal in the commodities market, the leaking of confidential information of that type is regarded by board chiefs as an abuse of a privileged position. Although it might seem unusual, in referring to the futures market in potatoes, we need to recognise that we are talking about a large and lucrative market in which price fluctuations can lead to large gains if one is able effectively to predict prices, in exactly the same way as applies to stocks and shares.
The argument that we put to the Government is that insider dealing on the futures market is as important in principle and probably, in certain cases, as important as the amount of money involved, as insider dealing in stocks and shares. That is why we put forward new clause 5 as an important new step in the Bill.
An article in the 27 January 1984 issue of Farming News states:
The announcement, made by telex
that is, dealing with the prices and the consumption rate between June and November—
detailed a sharp fall in stocks and a rise in consumption, trends which were likely to lead to a rise in the price of potato futures.
Anyone in possession of such price-sensitive information ahead of the official announcement would be in a good position to trade profitably.
And this, in fact, is what would seem to have happened.
The official announcement, made after the close of business the next day, Tuesday January 17, showed an 899,000-tonne fall in stocks and a 20,000-tonne increase in consumption over the same month a year earlier.
The following morning, the market reacted to the announcement. Prices soared by more than £9 a tonne and 575 lots totalling 23,000 tonnes of potatoes were traded.
That is evidence of a serious abuse of privileged information which could lead to people making significant sums of money in a way which is unacceptable in the normal behaviour of the futures market and those legally involved in it, and, as I have said already, it would be illegal in dealings in stocks and shares on the stock market.
The same magazine has a section called "Big Farm Diary", which says:
Potato Board chairman Geoffrey Grantham and his colleagues refuse to be impressed by the argument that they ought to be debarred from trading on the London futures market because their inside knowledge gives them an unfair advantage over others. They challenged critics to produce firm evidence of 'insider' trading by Board members.
That is a fair point. The article went on:
Meanwhile, the Board is sticking to its policy of releasing market-sensitive information to all concerned as soon as it comes to hand—so that Board members can't be accused of taking advantage of prior knowledge. Mr. Grantham and his colleagues appear to be satisfied that this is a sufficient answer. At a very friendly PMB lunch for journalists in London last week, some of us among the guests ungraciously raised this sensitive point over the brandy. The urbane Mr. Grantham was no more put out by this than he is by rebellious interventions at this AGM. As he sees it, the Board members who are using the futures market are the ones who have got their buttons on—so why bring in a ruling which would deprive producers of their valuable services?
Again, Mr. Speaker, I remind you that this is a matter of considerable sums of money involving acts which would be illegal if carried out on the stock exchange in any way.
The wording of the new clause will allow the new serious fraud office to investigate on its own initiative. It is a way of legislating to make sure that the futures market,


not just in potatoes but in a number of cereals and other areas as well, could be brought under the auspices of the SFO.
If the Government are serious in their intentions, as I know they are, to do something about fraud, I hope that they will accept the new clause. It makes no major difference to the Bill's thrust. I have not created a new offence because to do so would have produced problems of bringing it into line with the way in which the Bill is presently worded.
The new clause simply makes clear that the SFO can and should investigate such matters because the evidence is that insider trading is taking place on the futures market. That is not just a persistent rumour, which, as I have demonstrated, has been around since 1982, but a considerable suggestion that that activity is not only known about but frowned upon by many people who are themselves involved and do not like such activities. But, more importantly, it is, as I have already said, a criminal offence if carried out in stocks and shares on the stock exchange. It is unacceptable that we should make insider dealing in stocks and shares an illegal, criminal offence of fraud without involving the futures market.

Mr. Mellor: I have listened with great interest to the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley). I think he readily understands that the difficulty that lies in the way of our accepting the new clause is precisely, as he said towards the end of his speech, why he is not making insider dealing on the futures market a criminal offence. At the moment, other than securities, the futures market will be regulated when the Financial Services Act 1986 comes into force, but insider dealing is not at this stage a criminal offence.
The position of the serious fraud office on the sort of issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned can be summed up by saying that if they involve serious fraud, the director of the SFO will be able to instigate an investigation, but not otherwise. It is perfectly proper that that should be so, and if the new clause were to be accepted he would be investigating matters that might not be a criminal offence.
Obviously, I cannot help the hon. Gentleman with the particular case that he raised, nor would he expect me to, but I understand that the Association of Future Brokers and Dealers hopes to become the recognised self-regulating organisation for investment business in futures and options under the Financial Services Act. Whether insider dealing in other items traded on the futures market should be made a criminal offence is kept under review, but the Department of Trade and Industry considers that the futures market falls more properly within the framework of regulation than the criminal process.
It is the key aim of the Financial Services Act to establish a regulatory regime to cover those dealings in futures which are made for investment services purposes or traded on an investment exchange recognised under the Act. The Secretary of State has powers to investigate investment businesses under the Act, and those powers will be brought into force later this year. Therefore, as the hon. Gentleman concedes, we are set on a major effort against fraud. The creation of the SFO and the powers that it has been given under the Bill will be major step forward in that respect.
6.45 pm
The hon. Gentleman has created a one-winged aircraft with the new clause. There is no proposal, nor at this stage should there be, to widen the scope of the insider dealing offence to cover the areas that he has in mind. That being so, the director of the SFO would not be serving any useful purpose in mounting an investigation that was not related to a serious or complex fraud, but if a serious or complex fraud were to arise it would be within the powers of the SFO to mount that investigation. However, as I say, these matters are kept under review and there will no doubt be an opportunity to return to them.

Mr. William Cash: If fraud were involved, there could be a prosecution under an applicable provision of the criminal law. The Opposition's point is rather foolish, because there is no specific need to have an SFO to deal with frauds which happen to occur in the context which the Opposition put forward. I was a member of the Financial Services Bill Committee, and although I am sure that all that will be helpful in due course, it does not mean that without it people cannot be prosecuted for fraud.

Mr. Mellor: I hope that I made that point abundantly clear. If there is serious fraud in the futures market, as in any other market, the SFO can investigate. The new clause appears to invite an investigation unrelated to an existing criminal offence. Where there is a criminal offence, as my hon. Friend says, if the director of the SFO considers it to be a serious and complex fraud, he can investigate it.
I hope that the hon. Member for Hammersmith does not think that I am giving him the brush-off. I certainly do not intend to do that. However, the only way in which the new clause would work is if a decision were taken to make insider dealing in commodities a criminal offence. As the hon. Gentleman knows, at the moment it is a criminal offence only in relation to company securities under the Company Securities (Insider Dealings) Act 1985. Any further action will have to wait on the need, which does not yet arise, to make a wider provision. At the moment, I would prefer to place my trust in the arrangements that have been entered into under the Financial Services Act. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Gentleman, having given his new clause a considerable airing, will see fit to withdraw it.

Mr. Soley: I am far from happy to hear the Minister say that he recognises the need for internal regulation but not the need to create a criminal offence. That is undesirable, particularly in view of the evidence that I have produced of a continuing concern within the particular market to which I have been referring over a number of years—five years at least.
I recognise that the drafting of the new clause is not perfect, but I would have been much happier if the Minister had said that this is a serious matter, that the Government regard fraud on the stock exchange as a serious matter and that, therefore, insider dealing of this type should also he a serious criminal offence.
I come back to what I said in my opening comments about the dangers of the double standards which the Government impose in investigating fraud of one type as compared with another. We know that major efforts are made, and virtually no public expense is spared, to catch those who defraud on supplementary benefit. I make no complaint about the need to deal with such fraud, but it is a gross double standard to put enormous resources into


doing that and then to rely on internal regulation to deal with offences which, if committed with stocks and shares, could lead to up to seven years imprisonment under the Bill as it is now drafted and two years under the Bill in its previous form.
We should not encourage such a double standard. If we do not vote on the new clause, we shall be sending out a message to the country that, although we consider fraud in relation to such matters as supplementary benefit serious enough to imprison many people for it, we regard this type of fraud—which may involve many thousands, or, in the case of the stock exchange, millions of pounds—as far less serious. We have not thought through the consequences of the legislation to include such matters as the futures market.
Unless the Minister is prepared to tell me that he will consider the new clause and come back with a provision in the Bill to make such fraud an offence, we shall ask for a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 170, Noes 245.

Division No. 129]
[6.55 pm


AYES


Adams, Allen (Paisley N)
Duffy, A. E, P.


Alton, David
Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Eadie, Alex


Ashdown, Paddy
Eastham. Ken


Ashton, Joe
Edwards, Bob (W'h'mpt'n SE)


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Fatchett, Derek


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Faulds, Andrew


Barnes, Mrs Rosemary
Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Fisher, Mark


Beith, A. J.
Flannery, Martin


Bell, Stuart
Foot, Rt Hon Michael


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
Forrester, John


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Foster, Derek


Bidwell, Sydney
Foulkes, George


Blair, Anthony
Fraser, J. (Norwood)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Freud, Clement


Boyes, Roland
Garrett, W. E.


Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)
George, Bruce


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Godman, Dr Norman


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
Golding, Mrs Llin


Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)
Gould, Bryan


Bruce, Malcolm
Gourlay, Harry


Buchan, Norman
Hamilton, James (M'well N)


Caborn, Richard
Hamilton, W. W. (Fife Central)


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)
Hardy, Peter


Campbell, Ian
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
Haynes, Frank


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Healey, Rt Hon Denis


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Heffer, Eric S.


Clarke, Thomas
Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)


Clay, Robert
Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)


Clelland, David Gordon
Home Robertson, John


Clwyd, Mrs Ann
Howarth, George (Knowsley, N)


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S)
Hoyle, Douglas


Conlan, Bernard
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Cook, Frank (Stockton North)
Hughes, Roy (Newport East)


Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)
Hughes, Simon (Southwark)


Corbett, Robin
Hume, John


Corbyn, Jeremy
Janner, Hon Greville


Craigen, J. M.
Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Hillh'd)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald


Deakins, Eric
Kennedy, Charles


Dewar, Donald
Kirkwood, Archy


Dixon, Donald
Lambie, David


Dobson, Frank
Lamond, James


Dormand, Jack
Leadbitter, Ted


Douglas, Dick
Lewis, Terence .(Worsley)


Dubs, Alfred
Litherland, Robert





Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Rooker, J. W.


Loyden, Edward
Rowlands, Ted


McCartney, Hugh
Sedgemore, Brian


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Sheerman, Barry


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Shields, Mrs Elizabeth


McTaggart, Robert
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


McWilliam, John
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


Madden, Max
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


Mallon, Seamus
Skinner, Dennis


Marek, Dr John
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Marshall, David (Shettleston)
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'ds E)


Martin, Michael
Snape, Peter


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Soley, Clive


Maynard, Miss Joan
Spearing, Nigel


Meacher, Michael
Stott, Roger


Meadowcroft, Michael
Straw, Jack


Michie, William
Taylor, Matthew


Mikardo, Ian
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Nellist, David
Tinn, James


Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Torney, Tom


O'Brien, William
Wainwright, R.


Park, George
Wallace, James


Pendry, Tom
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Pike, Peter
Wareing, Robert


Prescott, John
Weetch, Ken


Radice, Giles
White, James


Raynsford, Nick
Winnick, David


Redmond, Martin
Woodall, Alec


Rees, Rt Hon M. (Leeds S)
Young, David (Bolton SE)


Richardson, Ms Jo



Robertson, George
Tellers for the Ayes:


Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)
Mr. Ron Davies and


Rogers, Allan
Mr. Sean Hughes.




NOES


Aitken, Jonathan
Cash, William


Alexander, Richard
Chalker, Mrs Lynda


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Channon, Rt Hon Paul


Ancram, Michael
Chapman, Sydney


Arnold, Tom
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Ashby, David
Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)


Aspinwall, Jack
Cockeram, Eric


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Colvin, Michael


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Coombs, Simon


Baker, Nicholas (Dorset N)
Cope, John


Batiste, Spencer
Couchman, James


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Cranborne, Viscount


Bendall, Vivian
Crouch, David


Benyon, William
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Bevan, David Gilroy
Dickens, Geoffrey


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Dorrell, Stephen


Blackburn, John
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Dover, Den


Body, Sir Richard
du Cann, Rt Hon Sir Edward


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Dunn, Robert


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Durant, Tony


Bottomley, Peter
Dykes, Hugh


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Eggar, Tim


Bowden, A. (Brighton K'to'n)
Emery, Sir Peter


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Evennett, David


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Fairbairn, Nicholas


Bright, Graham
Fallon, Michael


Brinton, Tim
Farr, Sir John


Browne, John
Favell, Anthony


Bruinvels, Peter
Fookes, Miss Janet


Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon A.
Forman, Nigel


Buck, Sir Antony
Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)


Budgen, Nick
Fox, Sir Marcus


Butcher, John
Franks, Cecil


Butler, Rt Hon Sir Adam
Fraser, Peter (Angus East)


Butterfill, John
Freeman, Roger


Carlisle, John (Luton N)
Fry, Peter


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Gardner, Sir Edward (Fylde)


Carttiss, Michael
Garel-Jones, Tristan






Glyn, Dr Alan
McQuarrie, Albert


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Madel, David


Goodlad, Alastair
Major, John


Gorst, John
Malone, Gerald


Gow, Ian
Marland, Paul


Gower, Sir Raymond
Mather, Sir Carol


Grant, Sir Anthony
Maude, Hon Francis


Greenway, Harry
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Gregory, Conal
Mayhew, Sir Patrick


Griffiths, Sir Eldon
Mellor, David


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Merchant, Piers


Grist, Ian
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Ground, Patrick
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Grylls, Michael
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)


Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Miscampbell, Norman


Hampson, Dr Keith
Moate, Roger


Hanley, Jeremy
Monro, Sir Hector


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Montgomery, Sir Fergus


Harvey, Robert
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Haselhurst, Alan
Moynihan, Hon C.


Hawkins, Sir Paul (N'folk SW)
Mudd, David


Hawksley, Warren
Neale, Gerrard


Hayes, J.
Nelson, Anthony


Hayhoe, Rt Hon Sir Barney
Nicholls, Patrick


Hayward, Robert
Norris, Steven


Heathcoat-Amory, David
Onslow, Cranley


Heddle, John
Oppenheim, Phillip


Henderson, Barry
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.


Hickmet, Richard
Osborn, Sir John


Hicks, Robert
Ottaway, Richard


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Hill, James
Pawsey, James


Hind, Kenneth
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


Hirst, Michael
Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Porter, Barry


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Portillo, Michael


Holt, Richard
Powell, William (Corby)


Hordern, Sir Peter
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Howard, Michael
Price, Sir David


Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)
Proctor, K. Harvey


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Raffan, Keith


Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N)
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Hubbard-Miles, Peter
Rathbone, Tim


Hunter, Andrew
Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Renton, Tim


Irving, Charles
Rhodes James, Robert


Jessel, Toby
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)
Roe, Mrs Marion


Jones, Robert (Herts W)
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Rost, Peter


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Ryder, Richard


Key, Robert
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


King, Roger (B'ham N'field)
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Knight, Greg (Derby N)
Shersby, Michael


Knox, David
Silvester, Fred


Lamont, Rt Hon Norman
Sims, Roger


Lang, Ian
Skeet, Sir Trevor


Latham, Michael
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Lawler, Geoffrey
Speed, Keith


Lawrence, Ivan
Spencer, Derek


Lee, John (Pendle)
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Lester, Jim
Stokes, John


Lilley, Peter
Tapsell, Sir Peter


Lloyd, Sir Ian (Havant)
Temple-Morris, Peter


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Lord, Michael
Thurnham, Peter


Luce, Rt Hon Richard
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Lyell, Nicholas
Trotter, Neville


McCrindle, Robert
Viggers, Peter


McCurley, Mrs Anna
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Macfarlane, Neil
Walker, Bill (T'side N)


MacGregor, Rt Hon John
Waller, Gary


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Watson, John


MacKay, John (Argyll &amp; Bute)
Watts, John


Maclean, David John
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


McLoughlin, Patrick
Wheeler, John


McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)
Whitney, Raymond





Winterton, Nicholas
Tellers for the Noes:


Wood, Timothy
Mr. Michael Neubert and


Yeo, Tim
Mr. David Lightbown.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 6

EVIDENCE BY CHILDREN IN RELATION TO CERTAIN OFFENCES

'(1) In any proceedings a video recorded interview with a witness under the age of 14 (other than the accused) shall be admissible as evidence of any fact of which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible as if made under section 38(i) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

This section applies—

(a) to an offence which involves an assault on, or injury or a threat of injury to, any person, or the death of any person; or
(b) to a sexual offence; or
(c) to an offence which consists of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, an offence falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above.

(3) In this section "sexual offence" means an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 1960, the Sexual Offences Act 1967, section 54 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 or the Protection of Children Act 1978.

(4) The Secretary of State shall make rules to provide—

(a) that the interview shall be made as soon as is practicable after the alleged offence;
(b) that the video recording of the interview is complete and accurate and has nothing added, omitted or altered; an edited copy of the video recording may be used with the consent of both prosecution and defence;
(c) the interview shall be carried out by a fit person acceptable to the court.

(5) Before a video recording is used in evidence against any accused person he and or his legal representatives shall have the right to inspect and view it.

(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of cross-examination at the hearing by or on behalf of the party against whom the child gives evidence.

(7) Nothing in this section affects the rights of a judge to withdraw the case from the jury, or the duty of the judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting uncorrobated evidence.

(8) Crown Court rules and rules made in accordance with provision of the Magistrates Court Act 1980 may be made for the purposes of this section;.—[Mrs. Golding.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

7 pm

Mrs. Llin Golding: I beg to move. That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 7—Use of live video links for remand proceedings—

'(1) Where the accused is remanded in custody prior to committal proceedings under sections 5 and 10 of the Magistrates Court Act 1980, it shall be possible to hold "remand proceedings" by means of a live video link where all parties agree.
(2) The court may give leave under subsection (1) above only if it is satisfied that the video link allows evidence to be given in a way which allows persons concerned in the case to see, hear and communicate with the accused.
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of the accused to appear in person at remand proceedings.'.

New clause 8— Evidence by children in relation to certain offences by use of live video links—

'(1) A witness under 14 (other than the accused) may give evidence through a live video link in proceedings before a Crown Court on a trial on indictment where the offence is one charged in subsection (2) below. Such evidence may not be given without leave of the court.

(2) This section applies—

(a) to an offence which involves an assault on, or injury or a threat of injury to, any person; or
(b) to a sexual offence; and
(c) to an offence which consists of attempting or conspiring to commit, or of aiding, abetting counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of, an offence falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above.

(3) In this section—
"sexual offence" means an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Indecency with Children Act 1980, the Sexual Offences Act 1967, section 54 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 or the Protection of Children Act 1978.

(4) Where the court consider it necessary it may if it so wishes allow the questioning of the child to be conducted through a fit person other than the prosecution and defence counsel.

(5) The court may only give leave under subsection (1) above if it is satisfied that the video link allows evidence to be given in a way which allows all persons concerned in the case to see, hear and communicate with the witness.'.

Mrs. Golding: In moving new clause 6, I speak on behalf of young children in this country who are, or who have been, subjected to sexual abuse and violence. I speak also for those who are now adults but who have been scarred by the perverted desires of some men and women who abuse small children.
Our law has been described as a molesters' charter. Can any of us doubt that, when recent Childline statistics have spoken of up to 700 calls a day from children who need help? They are the young victims of violence and sexual abuse and they need the help of the law. They also need the help of this House. We must listen to them. We must no longer pretend that these young victims can be ignored by the law.
It does not bear thinking about that our own children, or grandchildren, might be the victims of child abusers who cannot be brought to trial. Why should we, as Members of Parliament, think that it is any easier for families in our constituencies when they see the law act in this foolish and uncaring way? Yes, we need to consider the accused and to protect their rights, but at what point does the molesters' charter consider the victim— the child?
The Bill certainly provides for the use of video evidence, but the Opposition believe that there is an overwhelming need for such an important provision— and the safeguards—to be clearly stated. As the Bill stands, that is not so. To that end, we have tried to take into account, when framing new clauses 6 and 8, all the objections that have been raised.
A video recording should he made as soon as practicable after an alleged offence. Nothing should be added; nothing should be omitted; and nothing should be altered. It should be made by a fit person—somebody who is acceptable to the court. Before it is used in evidence, the accused and their legal representatives should have the right to inspect and view the video recording. It would not affect the right to cross-examine at the hearing, or the right of the judge either to withdraw the case from the jury or to warn about uncorroborated evidence. A video recording is not a pre-trial hearing. It is a piece of evidence that is similar to any other evidence, and it is there to be either accepted or rejected by the jury.
It is important that the use of a live video link should be understood. The child will be in another room, outside the court, and will be accompanied by somebody w ho is acceptable to the court, such as a court attendant. The child will be able to see only the person who is speaking to him or to her—that is, one person at a time, be it the judge, or defence counsel or prosecution counsel. The child will be unable to see the accused or anybody else in the court who might be able to influence his or her evidence.

Mr. Edward Leigh: The whole country is united in its abhorrence of this type of crime, but may I put a practical point to the hon. Lady that she ought to consider? I say this as one who has experience of the criminal courts in this country.
We agree with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, but her proposal may result in more acquittals of defendants. Counsel for the defendant would be able to say to the jury at the end of a trial that less weight should be given to the child's evidence because it had not been tested in open court. I think that the hon. Lady should address that difficult problem.

Mrs. Golding: I thank the hon. Gentleman. As I make progress with my speech, I think that he will see that we have considered that problem.
With a live video link, everybody in the court would be able to see the child and watch the child's face on the television screen. In video-link evidence, a court may, when it thinks fit under the terms of the new clause, allow the question to be put
through a fit person other than the prosecution or defence counsels.
That would be useful where very young children are involved who may have great difficulty in communicating.
Will video recordings and live video links increase the chance of wrongful convictions? I do not believe that they will. In seeking to find the truth, while protecting a child from undue influence, we are also seeking to guard the accused against wrongful conviction. A growing tide of people are no longer prepared to accept the law as it stands, and want to see it changed on this issue. I have received many telephone calls and letters of support. These have come from such organisations as the National Children's Bureau, the Police Federation, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. the Royal College of Nursing, from doctors, nurses, barristers, teachers, playgroup organisers and many people in all walks of life. Indeed, yesterday I received a telephone call from a group of women in Belfast who told me that they were about to go around the estate to collect a petition.
The usefulness of the provision of video recordings cannot be questioned. The Texas police on the BBC programme "Panorama" said that of 235 accused facing video evidence, 221 pleaded guilty after watching the video recording. That meant that 221 children were spared the ordeal of a court appearance and that the offenders could be identified and offered psychiatric help, which is very important when we consider that many of these offenders are often part of the same family.
With all this concern, will the Minister give the House some assurance that there will be specific provisions in the Bill about video recording? If he is not prepared to accept the new clause, he should tell the House where the proposals fall short of the Government's requirements. If


he will not make provision in the Bill, he should tell the House that the Government are not prepared to help those children who so desperately need our help.
New clause 7 deals with the
Use of live video links for remand proceedings.
The clause allows further use of the video system and allows it to be more cost-effective, with the saving of police and court time. I hope that the Government will consider the proposals, for which I have received much support from members of the legal profession.

Mr. Mellor: As I know that many hon. Members wish to speak in the debate, it might be helpful to the House if I explained the Government's position, so that those who speak subsequently will be able to do so knowing the context in which I believe the proposal should be viewed.
I want to begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding) on raising these issues, which I believe are of fundamental importance. I very much welcome the opportunity to debate these matters and hope that our discussions will have the widest currency, because I can think of few more useful tasks upon which Parliament can embark than considering this issue.
I want to set out what I believe would be the effect of the three new clauses. New clause 6 would allow statements made by a child under the age of 14 in a video-recorded interview to be admitted as evidence of the truth of their contents, where the child is a witness—either as a victim or otherwise—in a trial of a sexual offence or an offence of violence. The right of the accused to cross-examine the child at the trial would not be affected.
That is an important point in relation to the matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle (Mr. Leigh) in his intervention. My hon. Friend was correct to point out that some of the proposals, notably that submitted by Professor Glanville Williams—at least in its first form—appeared to trench on the rights of cross-examination. I am not sure that Professor Williams holds that view any longer. However, new clause 6 does not affect the right of cross-examination, and that must be a major point in its favour.
New clause 7 does not relate to children and should properly be dealt with separately. It would allow remand hearings to be conducted by live video link, with the agreement of all parties. I believe that that is a most interesting idea. Plainly, there are technological and resource implications that do not allow me to accept the proposal tonight. However, the difficulties of bringing prisoners from prison to appear in court, could be solved if there was a video link. The time for that idea will come, but, alas, I cannot say that its time is tonight.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: The Minister has said that there are resource implications. However, in terms of the Treasury, are there not negative resource implications? The cost of installing the equipment will be gained many times over by the saving in the time of police and prison officers and, in addition, there will be a very important law and order saving because, as the Minister knows, a considerable amount of police time is taken up by police escorts for prisoners on remand.

Mr. Mellor: The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that there would be what are known in the trade as "offsetting savings". Whether the costs would be totally or partially offset I do not know. Amidst the many other points that we have considered, this is not a point that we have had a chance fully to cost or discuss. It is an interesting idea which, I am sure, in due time cannot be denied. I am afraid that I cannot say that we can accept it this evening. However, I am sure that in due course exploratory work would have to be done.

Mr. Tony Favell: Will my hon. Friend contact the authorities in Texas? I have seen the video links operating with the consent of both parties in criminal and civil proceedings. That practice saves a lot of money.

Mr. Mellor: I am concerned that our criminal justice system should reflect the advantages that technology can apply. All too often, our criminal justice system appears to many people to be rooted in an altogether older and bygone age, important for some matters of principle but not so important— indeed, regrettable—in respect of some matters of practice. I would have no objection to the proposals in due course, but I must say—I do not mean this rudely— that new clause 7 is perhaps a trifle premature at this stage, although it is well worth airing.
New clause 8 reproduces those parts of clause 21 which deal with children's evidence by live video link. It is important that those who did not soldier through the three and a half months of Committee proceedings should understand that the Bill proposes a major innovation, that children should be able to give evidence via a live video link. That is a major step forward. Basically, new clause 8 reproduces clause 21 with the added provision in subsection (4) that the court should be able to
allow the questioning of the child to be conducted through a fit person other than the prosecution and defence counsel.
It is not clear whether that would be with or without the agreement of the parties. It would introduce into law a novelty—namely, a person other than counsel for one side or the other.
Before making my detailed response, it may be helpful if 1 try to set the discussion in context by describing the real practical evidence that the Government have given of their concern to root out child abuse and ensure that the criminal justice system is responsive to the needs of children.
We looked carefully at the Criminal Law Revision Committee's report on the criminal law on sexual offences against children. That revealed no significant gaps, but recommended increases in penalties for certain offences. The Government assisted my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Drake (Miss Fookes) to take through the House of Commons the Sexual Offences Act 1985, which increased the penalties for indecent assault on a young girl from five years to 10 years and for attempted rape from seven years to life. It is worth stressing that in 1985 there were about 300 rapes or attempted rapes of girls aged under 16. I hope that that Act significantly strengthened the ability of the courts to sentence appropriately in those cases.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Brittan), when Home Secretary, set out a policy, which my right hon. Friend the present Home Secretary has continued, that those sentenced to life imprisonment for the sexual or sadistic murder of children may expect to serve at least 20 years. I point out, from my


experience of handling life sentence cases for three and a half years in the Home Office, that some such offenders were released after 12 or 13 years under the old arrangements. Some such offenders will never be released, and I am confident that that meets with the approval of the whole House. Those sentenced to more than five years for crimes of violence—which include the sexual abuse of children—will not normally be paroled.
We must consider also, in due course, the laws of evidence which bear very much on video links. I hope that I am forgiven for pointing out that in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 important changes were made in the law of evidence to facilitate the routing out before a court of incidents of abuse, many of which take place behind closed doors and within the home and which therefore are some of the most difficult offences to bring to light. Section 80 (3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes a wife or husband a compellable witness where the spouse is accused of a sexual or violent offence against someone under 16.
Those who love the law of evidence—I cannot claim to be one— know that it has some rather bizarre rules about whether one spouse can be compelled to give evidence against the other. We have entirely removed those rules from the scene. Often, in the case of abuse of a child within the home, the act will be committed by one adult and the only other adult in the home who can give evidence is likely to be the spouse. My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths), a battle-hardened veteran of the Standing Committee on that legislation, knows only too well that that was an important, although perhaps not the most commented on, point in the legislation.
It is worth pointing out that section 62(10) of the Act provides that, if an arrested person refuses without good cause to permit the police to take an intimate sample—say blood or semen— a court or jury may treat the refusal as corroboration of other evidence against the accused. That is important in relation to child sex abuse. Where the victim is too young to be sworn, his or her evidence must be corroborated, and section 62(10) provides a forensic basis for corroboration in certain cases.
The pilot project which the Metropolitan police are running in the London borough of Bexley is designed to ensure that youngsters, when they have a complaint to make about physical or sexual abuse, are taken to and interviewed in a hospital. When children are taken to a police station, they tend to associate that with a suggestion that they have done something wrong. The evidence is then taken by a specially trained person, who may or may not be a police officer. It is videoed to avoid the child having to go through the ordeal of making statements over and over to different people who need to know. That video can be shown— this is relevant to the Texas experience mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Mr. Favell)— to the accused. The United States experience shows that, where video recordings of the complaint are shown to the accused while he is interviewed, it increases the likelihood of an admission that might prevent the ordeal of court appearances.
We have already said—I want to build on this later—that the- Bexley experiment and other police practices are being collated by the chief inspector of constabulary with a view to our reviewing police procedures, with the aim of issuing a circular to chief officers that would mirror the successful circular on the treatment of rape victims

which led to many more women being prepared to make complaints of rape. I am afraid that this has led to some lurid headlines in the newspapers which have asserted that the increased willingness of women to complain about rape means a substantially increased incidence of rape during the past few years. I do not believe that that is the case, but we must take it on the chin and try to improve our procedures. That is certainly our aim.

Ms. Clare Short: The Bexley experiment is impressive. but I am impatient about how soon we shall get such procedures throughout the country. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the procedures to be recommended in the circular on rape have not been implemented throughout the United Kingdom. When will the circular be issued? How much force can be put behind it? Will it be just a recommendation, or is there some guarantee that such changes will be implemented everywhere?

Mr. Mellor: I cannot give the hon. Lady a precise time scale, for reasons to which I shall come. We want to proceed with it. As the hon. Lady knows, one problem is that there are separate, autonomous police forces., accountable to their own police authority. Many argue, rightly, that that is an advantage, since it prevents the problems that many envisage in the creation of a national police force. But there is a downside to that—change is sometimes slow to come to some parts of the country. That must be accepted. The climate for interviewing rape victims has changed very much since the notorious television series a few years ago—which, paradoxically, did a great deal to wash out one or two practices which were not otherwise known to the public. This is a real step in the right direction.
Prevention is a crucial element in all this, because youngsters must be warned of the dangers which they can sometimes face if they accept the blandishments of a stranger to enter his car or to go off with him. That is why we are running a "Stranger Danger" campaign. Its aim is to increase the awareness of children, parents and teachers of the problems of child molestation, to get across a set of simple rules for children to follow and to alert parents and children to the need to ensure that children know and follow those rules.
One such scheme was successfully linked with the showing of "Peter Pan". Children who attended the cinema were issued with a document jointly sponsored by the Home Office and Walt Disney Productions on the never-never code, which sought to put across to children in a non-frightening way the points that they need to know for their safety.

Ms. Clare Short: I am sorry to interrupt the hon.. Gentleman twice, but I am worried about the "Stranger Danger" education programme. About 80 per cent. of child sex abuse occurs in the home or the neighbourhood where the child lives. If we teach our children that they are in danger only from strangers, we arc not addressing the problem. We are not arming them with the ability to go to someone to complain and to feel confident that they will be cared for. Most children who are abused are terrified about complaining to anyone. That is part of the problem.

Mr. Mellor: Plainly, there are problems with the home., but that would not be a reason for us not acting against the particular problems the child faces from a molester. Some of the most notorious and repugnant cases have


involved children being abducted or lured into cars by strangers. We must address all parts of the problem, one of which is certainly the threat from strangers.

Dr. Norman A. Godman: I am pleased to hear the Minister's sympathetic response to this social evil. Given that most attackers are men and that most victims of sexual abuse are young girls, does it not make sense to have more women police surgeons examining these victims outwith police stations?

Mr. Mellor: The hon. Gentleman has raised an important point, but I wonder whether—I am not trying to evade this, because it is a significant point—he would bear with me for a few minutes, because that is the final point that I wish to raise. I have much sympathy for it.
We have also put into place a wide-ranging system which allows checks to be run on people employed by public authorities who will come into contact with children. This follows the relevation that one child murderer had worked as a baby sitter, notwithstanding the fact that he had a long record of sexual offences. We are closely considering with voluntary bodies extending that system to the voluntary sector. I hope that the House agrees that these are all major steps forward. This allows me to say, as more than an act of piety, that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I are very concerned about the problems of child abuse, not least because, as parents of young children, we know only too well how vulnerable young children are and how utterly monstrous and repugnant— among many monstrous and repugnant offences—offences against children are, whether within the home or outside it.
Therefore, we advise the House to accept the live video link as a major step forward, because it must be our aim to try to ensure that a child victim of physical or sexual abuse comes to the end of that dreadful experience when he or she complains to the authorities, and that the dreadful experiences do not continue after the complaint has been made. One of the worst of those experiences is to have to give evidence in a busy courtroom, in the presence of the offender. A child will often find that a wholly intimidating process. It is difficult to see how the system can allow a child to relax while requiring that child to go into such wholly alien surroundings. We hope that a live video link will remove the most acute aspects of that trauma.

Mr. Lawrence: rose—

Mr. Mellor: If I could finish my point, I shall give way to my hon. and learned Friend later.
Several important points of detail remain to be dealt with. Clause 21 provides for the giving of evidence by a live video link. However, I should make it clear that we should like to consult widely about important details. For example, should the judge and counsel be present in the same room as the child, or should they be in the courtroom? Who should be with the child if the judge and counsel are not? Should the child see what is happening in the courtroom?
Plainly, as the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme explained, the jury must see the child. However, does it help or hinder the child's feeling of relative ease to

see the court? It is inevitable that any reconstruction of what has happened will be a disturbing experience, but would it make it more or less disturbing for the child to see what is happening in the courtroom, as well as to been by those in the courtroom?
We shall need to consult on all those points to ensure that the major advance that is secured by clause 21 works. It is not good enough to legislate on the overview. We must get the detail right. I know that several hon. Members will wish to assist in that process, as will several interest groups outside the House.
I now give way to the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), a fine upstanding representative of the legal profession, who will want to welcome this progressive move.

Mr. Lawrence: Flattery will get my hon. Friend almost anywhere.
I am not opposed to this sensible, interesting and exciting provision. However, the Minister has not yet told us— although he came close to doing so— how this provision will be implemented. It seems that, since it is a novel scheme, we should do what is normally done in such circumstances and run a pilot scheme, a controlled experiment, or series of such experiments, in some parts of the country to see how it works out and the problems that are thrown up. Is that what the Minister has in mind?

Mr. Mellor: Yes, that is certainly what we have in mind. That is partly what I was discussing in dealing with where we go from here. It is not good enough simply to say that we should have live video links: we must ensure that we get the technology and the atmosphere right. That will be advanced by conducting experiments, and we shall do so.
I hope that I have not taken an unduly long time to come to the central issue of this new clause, but it is important that we see the proposals in the proper context, which is whether it would be a further improvement if video recordings of interviews with child witnesses were more readily admitted as evidence.
I should like to make it clear, as I did in Committee, that it would be wrong to deprive the accused of his right to cross-examine the child in a trial in which a video recording had been admitted. I am sure that we all agree on that. Of course, that would be traumatic. I sympathise with parents who do not like the idea of the child being questioned critically about what happened. However, we would go from one extreme to the other— from an alleged insensitivity to the rights of the complainant, to a certain insensitivity to the rights of the defendant—if we did away with cross-examination.
Such cross-examination cannot be carried out other than by the counsel who has been appointed by the defendant to represent his interests. I say that quite firmly because, however much we envisage a well-meaning person interposing himself between the defendant and his lawyers on the one hand and the child on the other, that would dilute the interaction between counsel and child which is a key part of protecting the rights of the accused person— who we must remember is innocent until adjudged guilty. It would be inappropriate for us to fail to recognise that fact.
I have yet to be persuaded that such a person exists who could properly carry on the business of asking questions on both sides and do so in such a way as to satisfy us all that justice had properly been done. However, that is not


to say that anything goes and that the child should be subjected to brutal cross-examination. I do not believe that many counsel employ such techniques, because that would be wholly counter-productive. I am glad that those hon. Members who are lawyers and have some practical experience know that that is not the case. It is the judge's duty to prevent the bullying of a child. We hope that we would make the child's position easier by putting the child in a room away from the defendant and possibly—this remains to be decided—physically away from counsel also.
However, the question whether the video recording should be shown as part of the case remains to be considered. The child could be further examined in chief on that by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defence, all via the live video recording. I have considerable sympathy with that idea, because I can see advantages for the child and for the jury who have to decide the issue. The would have the opportunity to see the child's first full coherent attempt to explain exactly what he or she had been subjected to. A video showing the child's responses would be a telling document to put before those with the difficult task of unravelling the truth and deciding upon an issue of guilt or innocence which has severe consequences for both sides.
We must face up to the difficulty of whether we can be sufficiently sure of our ground in making such a change now. We already have to confront the difficulty, on which opinion is seriously divided, whether there is a role for an amicus figure who would interpose himself between counsel and child to ask questions.
There is also the question whether the use of a recording advances or derogates from the efficient transaction of court business, and whether it is an assistance or detriment to the child. Those are not issues on which we are entitled to plunge in on our own value judgements. Indeed, it has been suggested that the prospect of wider cross-examination because of the availability of the video could be detrimental to the child. It is possible that that could yield more fruits for cross-examination than if the child recounted the evidence live, via the video link, that very day. In that case, it might be a mixed blessing.
The dominant consideration in experiments such as the one at Bexley is to reduce the formality of interviews, to help the child come to terms with the situation and, sometimes, to provide a basis for intervention by social workers rather than criminal proceedings. If everyone knew that the recording was to be a key document at any future trial, it would be difficult to resist a tendency for the interview to become more rather than less formal. Those genuine issues need to be addressed.
I am extremely well disposed to this proposal, but it would be wrong for us simply to change the law now without consulting all the interest groups. The Law Society and the Criminal Bar Association, whose assistance has been properly prayed in aid by Labour Members on other parts of the Bill, have expressed the gravest reservations about the impact of such proposals on the right to cross-examine and on the retention of the oral tradition. Indeed, Labour Members often prayed in aid the retention of the oral tradition in relation to other parts of the Bill, and I make no criticism of that.
There should be an examination, the details of which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will want to give a little later because they are bound up with some other matters that I shall turn to. Having secured the live video

link—we must not overlook that major step—there should be proper consideration coupled with proper consultation, with some research evidence base, to see whether what seems to be a good idea can be shown to be such. I hope we can see how it would work in practice and, perhaps, has worked in other jurisdictions.
That should be done, not to kick the ball into the river from which it will take years to fish out, but as a tightly disciplined exercise which will enable the results to be available within a sensible time span—it is significant that during the dinner hour we have such a well-attended House to discuss these issues—and will enable the House to return to the issue. We will then have a proper factual base on which to make a properly considered decision, having, rightly, consulted those who have a right to make their views known to us before we legislate. That would be a proper way of recognising the strength of the case and is in no sense an escape from the responsibility of making a decision.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: As I did not serve on this Committee but have been worried about the matter and been unable to reach an easy conclusion, I welcome what my hon. Friend said. It is common knowledge that many tape recordings are made of initial interviews of children who have been sexually abused. For the experiment and reference work to be done properly, those consulted will need to be able to look at some of those recordings before they form a judgment. Will they be eligible to do that, or will the police recordings be excluded from examination?

Mr. Mellor: That is a good point and further illustrates the details that cannot be avoided in providing us with a basis on which to make sensible progress. I hope that those recordings can be made available because, plainly, they are at the heart of the matter. I cannot answer conclusively, but I hope that they will be available on the basis that they will not be published but will be used to inform consideration by people of experience.
Several elements of child abuse need further consideration within a properly disciplined time span to enable early decisions to be taken. There is the question of the manner in which complaints are dealt with. I welcome and do not resent this debate, because I appeared on "Childwatch" to challenge one of the more stuffy old cobwebs of the law's approach to children. One of the most depressing aspects of the programme was the evidence of several doctors about the way in which medical examinations are carried out on children—the very point raised by the hon. Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman). The ordeal of giving an account of events and of being physically examined must not be worse or more humiliating for the child than the ordeal of having been sexually assaulted and brutalised in the first place.
To pick up the point of the hon. Member for Birmingham Ladywood (Ms. Short), there is a case for sending messages by circular to the police about how these things should be dealt with. There is a case for considering how the various agencies involved in the investigations of these matters conduct themselves. That would involve not only the police but doctors and social workers. Many complaints lead not to court but to social work action. We want to explore more technically precisely what can be done to improve the present position and to discover how inadequate it is. At present, most evidence and information is anecdotal.

Dr. Godman: I am pleased to hear what the Minister is saying about the examination of children in such cases. Does he agree that the medical examination of a child who has been abused could form part of the healing process, if the medical examination is conducted properly by those who are appropriately trained? Does he further agree that, as part of the healing process, a genital examination should always form part of a wider medical examination?

Mr. Mellor: I certainly agree with that, but as I found during my work on drugs, what I think about clinical matters does not matter much; what matters is the duty under which doctors regard themselves. They tend to respond to the views of their colleagues and to certain appropriate medical directions. At the heart of the exercise would be an exploration of whether the medical profession would want to consider in more detail the way in which these examinations are carried out.
There is room for further exploration of the video link and the appropriateness of using video recordings; there is room for exploration of the way in which a complaint is handled by the authorities, whether by the police, doctors or social workers; and there is room for a close examination of the way in which the rules of evidence bear on child witnesses, particularly whether the present rules of corroboration are appropriate and whether it is appropriate for a child to give sworn evidence.
It is particularly important that we take up the compelling strand of medical evidence that a child is less likely than an adult to invent an account of a sexual experience which is otherwise beyond the child's knowledge. The question is whether that can be established sufficiently as part of a medical consensus to make the present basis on which the laws of evidence are founded factually inappropriate. There is room for further exploration.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary proposes to make an announcement soon setting out the precise details of the way these examinations should be conducted. I hope that the proposals can go forward in a non-partisan way. There is concern on both sides of the House and my views have been greatly assisted by the points made orally and in writing to me during the passage of the Bill. I hope that what I have said will satisfy the hon. Member for Ladywood and her colleagues that we are not fobbing them off or kicking the ball into the river.
A great deal has been done, but more remains to be done. We will be better able to do that which remains to be done when we have cleared the thicket of facts, circumstances and consultations, and carried out our legitimate legislative function, after proper consideration has been given to very weighty matters.

Dr. Godman: I support the new clause. Clauses 17 and 21 are welcome advances on current practice. I believe that no child should be medically examined in a police cell. The practice of children being examined in police stations must cease forthwith. A focused medical examination, where gentle treatment is required, should form part and parcel of a wider medical examination of a child. As I said earlier to the Minister, a medical examination of a child in those circumstances can form part of the healing process.
It is deeply regrettable, even disgraceful, as the Scots have sent me here, that the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill contains no similar provision. That Bill was debated in

Edinburgh last Monday. I informed the Solicitor General that I would table two new clauses that would be similar to clauses 17 and 21 of this Bill. Remembering that we have children's hearings in Scotland, these new clauses may be more appropriate, with certain changes, for the courts in Scotland.
New clause 6 is, I believe, more radical than clause 17, even though that clause allows a judge to admit a video recorded interview as admissible evidence. New clause 6 will encourage such an interview to be conducted as soon as possible after the offence has taken place, although I acknowledge that many horrible incidents often do not come to light for weeks or months. The police officers and social workers are doing fine work in the experiment in Bexley. I have met the social workers and police officers involved in this most useful and human approach to the difficult task of interviewing a child in dreadful and deeply distressing circumstances.
New clause 8 is more radical in approach than clause 21. The present practice of submitting children to cross-examination in the sombre surroundings of a courtroom is disgraceful and, in today's climate, indefensible. The antique formality and arcane lawyer's language of those proceedings must prove to be for many children a harrowing experience. Child witnesses or victims should be cross-examined in informal surroundings—similar in some respects to the children's hearings in Scotland, although many of those cases proceed to the sheriff court or even to the High Court.
Every Crown court in England and every sheriff court in Scotland should have a children's room, where such a cross-examination could take place in much less foreboding and disturbing surroundings than in a courtroom. In a recent case in a sheriff court in the east of Scotland, an advocate, representing a teacher who, it was alleged, had sexually assaulted a eight-year-old boy, shouted at that boy in the witness box. The manner and behaviour of that advocate was so disgraceful that the sheriff was quite right to adjourn the proceedings for five minutes to allow the advocate to calm down. That disgraceful incident involved the bullying of a eight-year-old child by a lawyer.
Our aim must be to make the examination of a child as compassionate and sensitive as possible. Although I may be persuaded or dissuaded on this matter, I believe that the judge, prosecuting council and defence agent should be in the room with the child. They should be informally attired and should sit at the table with the child, rather like in our children's hearings, which have in attendance the reporter to the children's panel, three members of the panel, the child, his or her parents, and the social worker.
The child should be accompanied by an adult, perhaps by a social worker who is independent of the case. There should also be what we in Scotland call, in our children's hearings, a befriender, someone who can calm down the child. The accused, the jury, the press and the public can watch the proceedings on a large monitoring screen in the courtroom. The press and the public do not need to be present. In the High Court, at the trial of a serious charge of sexual abuse, 35 to 50 people can be present. In Scotland the judge has the right to clear the courtroom of certain people. Nevertheless, the jury of 15 is still present, as are officials and others. That is not the solution.
The answer is to cross-examine the child in informal surroundings. Every Crown court building should have a children's room for the examination of children in the


most informal circumstances. I believe that these new clauses push off—as do clauses 17 and 21—into an era of more compassionate and sympathetic examination of children caught up in these crimes. Compassion and sympathy must be shown from the first moment that a child reports such an offence to a teacher, school attendance officer or health visitor. That sympathetic approach to the child must not stop once the case goes to court. The video presentation or closed circuit television network mentioned in the new clause should be part of a more humane approach to the examination of children.
I next ask the Minister about women police surgeons. Most victims are young girls. Most perpetrators of these attacks are men. Most examinations should be conducted by women doctors who have had the appropriate training. These examinations should not take place in a police station. One case that was brought to my attention recently was of a child being examined in a police station in a room that had had a sticky label, with the title "Medical Room", attached to the door. That is a disgraceful state of affairs. Children should be examined by appropriately qualified doctors in hospitals. That is why I say that we need an increase in the number of women police surgeons.
Clauses 17 and 21, or more appropriately these new clauses, take us much further down the road to compassionate investigation of a child involved in a case of sexual abuse.

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Mr. Roger Sims: I warmly support the proposals embodied in new clause 6. Had it not been for my absence from the House last week with a Select Committee, I would have been happy to add my name to it. I congratulate the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding) on the manner in which she has handled this issue both in Committee and outside. She has shown the vigour and enthusiasm for a cause which we learnt to expect from her predecessor, although she has not yet demonstrated his prolixity.
I have had experience as a magistrate in a juvenile court. I voice the support of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, which is naturally anxious about this. I serve on its central executive committee, as does the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy), who wishes to be associated with my remarks.
It has long been possible to produce a record of events in writing, and, with the development of technology, it is now possible to have a record of events in sound. A further development now makes it possible to have a video recording. If a written and a sound recording are acceptable in a court, why not a video recording? After all, the principle has been started upon in this very building, by having a live television link. If a live television link is acceptable, it is not such a great step to have a recording of TV proceedings.

Mr. Lawrence: There is, of course, a substantial difference. One can cross-examine live the police officer who is putting before the court a tape-recorded interview, but what we are discussing here is not being able to cross-examine live.

Mr. Sims: I think that my hon. Friend the Minister made it clear that that is exactly what could happen in subsequent proceedings. A video recording would simply

be another form of evidence. I thought that was clear from what my hon. Friend had said. One point that he did not clarify, and on which the hon. Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman) touched, has been put to me—that under clauses 13, 14 and 15, video recordings would be admissible as a document. He used the expression "document" in referring to video recordings.

Mr. Mellor: My hon. Friend is right. Video recordings would be a document and would be admissible, but the way in which clause 16 is phrased is such that the judge would be likely to rule in favour of admissibility only in exceptional circumstances. It would be possible, if we were to make progress with this, in due course to change the presumption, which at the moment is against admissibility.

Mr. Sims: I am grateful for that intervention. It strengthens the desirability of a specific legislative proposal to cover the idea that we are discussing. Child abuse is a serious and growing problem, as is demonstrated by the number of children who have taken advantage of Childline, which was set up a few months ago. Therefore, it is important that we should not only obtain convictions of those guilty of child abuse but do all that we can to reduce its incidence, in particular by dealing with cases as promptly as possible.
If evidence comes to light suggesting that there has been a case of child abuse, many week may elapse between the defendant being arrested and charged and the matter being aired in court. It may be that by that stage the parents of the child who has been the victim may simply not be willing to allow that child to appear, for very understandable reasons. They do not want the child to have to go through the trauma of appearing in court, whether it be with a video link or in the court itself. In that case, a conviction would be most unlikely.
Even with the live television link, the problem is that, because of the long time that has elapsed between the events that are the subject of the hearing and the hearing itself, the child's memory is bound to be dim. At that age, children have short memories. They are also more impressionable, and it may be that the child has been schooled to tell a particular story. Inevitably, whatever it says, it will carry that much less weight and make it less likely that a conviction may be secured.
If, as soon as possible after the discovery of a possible abuse, the child victim can be interviewed face to face, not with a television link, by an experienced person, in neutral surroundings and with the aid perhaps of models or pictures, surely that video can be extremely useful in court proceedings. Indeed, if all that interview has been videoed, it may make court proceedings unnecessary. As the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme said, experience elsewhere suggests that whatever the initial protests of the defendant, faced with a video along the lines that I have described, he will confess. The great advantage then is that he can be dealt with forthwith, whatever may be the appropriate form for dealing with him, which may he a question of punishment or treatment. The important thing is that that can be undertaken straight away without a lengthy wait and court proceedings.
If we have to wait for the court proceedings to take place, the video of such an interview can surely offer to the court important and valuable evidence to which it can give appropriate weight. I appreciate that the whole question whether there should be subsequent cross-examination


comes into the matter. My hon. Friend the Minister will be aware of the considerable work done by Professor Glanville Williams, to whom my hon. Friend referred, and to Mr. J. R. Spencer, in his sector. I do not wish to protract the proceedings on the new clause by going into their arguments in detail, but they seem to me to be formidable. I am glad to know that my hon. Friend is sympathetic to the case.
I understand that there may be shortcomings in this clause as drafted. However, I am a little concerned that nothing may be done at all. I take the liberty of reminding my hon. Friend the Minister that in Committee he said:
Legislative opportunities do not arise every year."—[Official Report. Standing Committee F; 12 March 1987, c. 1066.]
This is an opportunity.
I listened carefully to what my hon. Friend said about taking a careful look at this, and his promise that we shall shortly have a more detailed statement on what form that will take. He suggested that the House could return to the issue. I was not clear what sort of time span there would be. Before long, presumably, this Bill will become law, and other events may intervene. One would like to think that something could be done on this front. Therefore, before the Bill completes its passage, I wonder whether my hon. Friend might consider including in it some general provisions which would allow my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to make suitable regulations and take appropriate steps to implement the general principle of what we are trying to support without necessarily going into details at this stage.
Having said that, I thank my hon. Friend for the sympathetic reception that he has given to the new clause and hope that he will take on board the suggestion that I have made.

Ms. Clare Short: I agree with the hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims). Obviously, the Minister's remarks about promising to review all of this and to move forward urgently are welcome, but we are left with a worry about the time scale and the exact nature and terms of reference of the review. He referred to a statement that is to be made by the Home Secretary. That means that we are responding to his arguments without all the information that we ought to have in front of us. Like the hon. Member for Chislehurst, I wonder whether it is possible to put some amendment into the Bill that could be used after the review has taken place rather than wait for the next appropriate Bill to amend the law. In that way we could make progress in this area.
The evidence of the scale of the problem in this country is quite horrifying and terrifying. The research evidence is that at least 10 per cent. of all children are sexually abused, half of them when under the age of 10 years. There have been studies in various countries, including the United States, but this evidence has been accumulated in Britain by asking adults about what happened to them in the past. So if the problem is getting worse, as suggested by the NSPCC and so on, it might be even worse than that.
The perpetrators are almost without exception males, although occasionally there are colluding wives or cohabitees. But it is a male problem; it is men that do it to children. This part of our sexual culture—the way that men behave sexually—is shocking and horrifying.
Two thirds of the victims are girls and one third are boys; and 80 per cent. of the abuse takes place in the family or in the neighbourhood where the child lives. This is the most shocking thing of all. Virtually every woman with whom I have ever discussed this issue has had some experience in her childhood, be it a flasher or some bloke at a cinema trying to put his hand on her knee. But that is something quite different from living in a family where it is going on all the time and the child cannot turn to the people who are supposed to look after it to get protection. That is a much more serious problem. When we discuss these matters we talk as though it is the odd man, a stranger; we talk as though that is the nature of the problem and that is how it has to be dealt with. Unfortunately, it is not. There are horrific cases of abuse that hit the headlines, but 80 per cent. of it is repeated abuse within the family or in the neighbourhood in which the child lives.
It is also clear that such abuse in childhood is enormously damaging throughout life. I have been approached recently by some very impressive women who are working in therapy in this area in Birmingham. They talk about groups for adult women who were abused as children and are still bruised and emotionally upset; it is still affecting their whole attitude to life, their emotions and their relationships with their husbands and children. They have never had any help or assistance over a period of 20 years or more, and they are still in a damaged state because of that. The reason is that there are not enough facilities for that kind of help.
We know that much abuse goes undetected and unprosecuted. In this review—I do not know how wide it will be—the question of the education of those who deal with children in detecting the signs of abuse is very important. In the past—and Freud was partly to blame for this—it was often put down to child fantasy. Freud suggested that children fantasised about these matters, and much of the education of nursery nurses, teachers and so on indicated that that was so. But all the current evidence is that it is not so. As the Minister said, when children talk about these matters, they are more likely to be telling the truth than are adults even, because they can only get experience of these matters through being abused in the ways they allege. We really must look at the training of all individuals who deal with young children so that when children complain they are believed. Part of the problem is that children complain and are not believed.
8.15 pm
The Minister referred to the Bexley experiment. Like everyone else, I am extremely impressed by that but I am impatient to see it extended throughout the country.
Just a week ago, when I was in the bar one evening, a stranger who was visiting the House approached me and told me what happened to his daughter, a four-year-old girl, who had been abused by a neighbour. The first time she told her father he did not believe her; the second time he did. He rang the NSPCC, not knowing what to do, and was told that he should report the matter to the police. He went along to the police station with his daughter. A policeman in uniform interviewed her and she started to cry and said, "Daddy, what have I done wrong?", and she would not speak. It went on, and she had to have a medical examination.
The father asked if her own doctor could conduct the examination, but was told that that was impossible. So the


medical examination took place. The child cried, she was hurt, and she said that was what was done to her by the neighbour. It was obviously a continuation of the distress: what the doctor did that hurt was what the man next door had done. A few weeks later the child had to go to her doctor with an ordinary chest infection. She would not go in, and became hysterical. That is evidence of how much it distressed her to be medically examined in that way.
The outcome of the case was that the police said that there was insufficient evidence. No prosecution has been brought, the father feels deeply aggrieved and the neighbour is still living next door. The father is unemployed and cannot afford to move house. When he said to the police that if that was it he might deal with the matter himself by some kind of violent attack on the neighbour, he was told that if he did that he would be prosecuted.
I tell that story because I feel that it is typical of what is taking place throughout this land. Children are being hurt by the investigation that is supposed to assist in bringing about a prosecution—and that is not as crude a form of abuse as sometimes takes place.
When one considers the damage that the experience of the police station and the medical examination does to children, one is tempted to conclude that in some cases it is better not to prosecute. I am told by those advising me that that is absolutely wrong. One of the problems for children who have been subjected to continuing abuse is that they blame themselves and think there is something wrong with them, something impure. The experts say that prosecution is very important to the child, so that it may have a sense that society is on its side, and very important to the perpetrator so that he may have a sense that this sort of thing is going to be stopped.
There are families, my experts in Birmingham tell me, in which abuse has gone through generations—men who have abused their children have gone on to abuse their grandchildren. It is unbelievable, but they are aware of those patterns, and they are serious workers in this area; they are not just making wild allegations. So prosecution is extremely important, as is the promise of the review, but it is not the whole of it. Detection is part of it and so is therapy.
Some of the children who have been abused do not even know that they are entitled to control their own body and tell people that they are not allowed to touch them and use them in this way. Small children who have been abused do not have our conventional understanding of what they are entitled to do sexually, because they grow up in households in which they learn from adults that this kind of treatment of children is normal.
Part of the therapy when such practices are discovered is to re-educate the child about its own emotional behaviour. For example, where abuse is detected, one finds children being taken into care and blaming themselves because they are the ones who are taken out of the family as though they have done something wrong. Then they are put with foster parents, where there is sometimes evidence of their being abused. That is partly because of the way in which children who have been constantly abused behave. When they are being friendly they often behave in a sexually active way, and this seems to trigger continuing abuse.
All these questions must be looked at. We need more prosecutions, we need to look at the nature of the evidence, video links, and so on, but we must also look at training

—so that abuse is detected and children are protected—and at the facilities for therapy throughout the country, so that children who have been damaged can be helped to overcome the effects of the abuse that they have suffered.
I agree with the Minister that these matters are so important that we should not deal with them in a party political way. However, we are entitled to be impatient. I hope that before the end of today the Minister will give us some indication of the time scale of the review and what views he has on the sort of legislative vehicle he envisages for any changes he wishes to make. Perhaps he should go back to the suggestion made by his hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst—that some amendments should be put into the Bill, perhaps in another place, in broad enough terms to be triggered later so that, once the review has taken place, there will not be another long delay before an appropriate Bill comes along.

Mr. Dickens: I was delighted to hear the Minister refer to the Bexley experiment, because there is no doubt that when children have been sexually abused, their first recollections are very important. By the time the child comes to the remand hearing, the committal proceedings and then the Crown court, that child has filled its head with so many things in between and its memory can be hazy and so cause problems in cross-examination. Therefore, it will be valuable if a child makes a statement and it is recorded at the first opportunity. I hope also that that recording could be shown to the child again so that he or she can recall what was said before going into each of the court hearings. That would be important.
Such a system works very well in Texas. Indeed, the sheriff of Dallas who visited the House of Commons had words with me. He gave me lots of useful information. For instance, in America, certainly in Texas, when children are nine years old they can give evidence and be sworn and believed just as an adult but if a child is under nine he has to go in front of a competency panel. That is a group of eminent people who ask the child questions such as, "Do you get smacked when you arc naughty? Do you tell the truth? Are you good?" In the end, they give the child a certificate of competency. Once a child has that certificate, even if it is under nine years old, it can go into court and be believed in the same way as an adult.
Parents in this country feel most strongly that the law and our court proceedings are loaded heavily in favour of the sex abuser and against the child. It is hard for the child to be believed. In fact, judges will place great stress on telling members of the jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a child. Of course that is right; we do not want innocent people to be prosecuted. However, we do not want a charter for the child abuser. On most occasions, the child abuser commits the offence not in public but in private. There is seldom an audience. Sometimes they let themselves down by involving more than one child, but often when the child complains or the offence is found out by the parents, or the child has to go to the doctor with some medical problem, it is too late even for forensic corroboration, and things are very difficult.
I have received on my desk many cases involving children's homes where the children are mentally disabled and people are certainly abusing them but the Director of Public Prosecutions is unable to act in spite of the fact that he, the police and the Attorney-General know very well that those things are happening.
I am encouraged to hear the Minister speak about the Bexley experiment. However, I agree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) that we are impatient because children are being abused all the time. The quicker we get safety valves in place so that the system is not loaded against the child and the parents of a child have a chance to bring someone to court and obtain a conviction, the better.
There is no doubt that child abuse is growing in this country, but parents are much more willing now to allow their children to testify. They feel that if they do not allow the child to go through the terrible experience of testifying, the man or woman—the hon. Member for Ladywood is correct, it is mostly men—will strike again and the problem will be pushed on elsewhere.
In America, where the initial videos are shown to the defence, as they would have to be, the defendant sits there with his lawyer and watches the film. Sometimes it is remorse that makes him plead guilty and sometimes it is the fact that he does not want the video shown in open court. On other occasions he can see that the evidence is strong or it might be part of a plea bargain where he feels that if he spares the child any further embarrassment the judge will be more lenient with the sentence. That is sometimes the case. I am not a lawyer and I think that plea bargaining has its place to save the child that traumatic experience. I speak simply as a parent and trustee of Childwatch.
The Government have been making rapid strides. They have reviewed the child care law, published inquiries into the sad deaths in cases of child abuse—we have learned from the lessons—and put the names of those who have been warned or convicted of child offences on a central computer so that there can be a blackball system when someone seeks employment to work with children. Those are all marvellous things that the Government have been doing, and I applaud them; I do not attack them. I should like to place on record my thanks to the Home Office and the departments within the Home Office for following up the many cases that I keep sending to it. I should also like to thank the Attorney-General. They have been very helpful and a strength to me in my campaigns.
I think that the Opposition's new clauses are right. I should like to see those things. However, it seems from what the Minister has said that it is a little premature, because we have the experiments and we want to get it right. It is a shame that we have to start our own pilot schemes when there is so much evidence in other countries on which we could draw. However, that is probably due to the volume of work within the Department, the problem of getting it right and the pressure from our legal friends who are obviously guarding their preserves. The Home Secretary has to deal with all those things.
I want to be fair, and I say to the Opposition that I agree with what they have said. I am sure that the Lords will have something to say on the new clauses. I have great sympathy with them, but I am satisfied with the answers that the Minister has given. However, I urge him and his Department to deliver the goods quickly. A general election will not make any difference, because this is an all-party issue. We are not fighting each other on protecting children in this honourable House; we are united. I am sure that the Home Office will continue to deliver the goods so that we can protect children, so that the child is

heard more readily, so that the scales are not loaded in favour of the abuser but a balance is restored on behalf of the victim. There should be justice, so that people are not acquitted simply because of the way in which our legal system operates. Therefore, I support the Bill as it stands but the new clauses are marvellous and I am sure that in a short time they will be part of our legislation.

Mr. Lawrence: I rise, not to guard my preserve, but to guard the preserve of everybody in this country who wants to see that justice is done. I congratulate the Government on bringing forward clause 21 as an attempt to deal with a substantial modern evil.
The video link is such a significant and revolutionary proposal that everybody will think it is a good idea in principle. However, we must take great care before its details are put in train because of the very real possibility, if we are not careful, not only that innocent people might be convicted—it sometimes happens that innocent people are accused in our courts, even of sexual offences against children—but that the guilty will more easily go free. That is why I do not see much merit in new clause 8, because the
fit person other than the prosecution and defence counsel
may not be fit enough in experience and practice to ask the child the right questions, either for the prosecution or for the defence.
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New clause 6 seems to offer an alternative to the live television link. It is difficult to conceive that the interview would be videoed or the child would give its evidence live via a television link. Of the two possibilities, it is obviously better for the child to give evidence live by the television link. The other should be relegated to an alternative, to be used if there is no live television link in certain circumstances upon which the court may subsequently decide.

Mrs. Golding: I want to put the hon. and learned Gentleman right, as I am afraid that he is confused about the use of video recording and the live video link. The video recording is a presentation of a piece of evidence that is recorded before—often well before—the case comes to court. The video link provides the facility within the court to cross-examine a child, if need be.

Mr. Lawrence: There is a possibility that the child could be interviewed in chief on a television link. That would make the video recording of what had been said earlier redundant. That possibility should be considered. If the video interview is to be used only as evidence in chief and the child is then wheeled in for cross-examination, I doubt whether the marrying-up would be a successful procedure.

Mr. Mellor: My hon. and learned Friend, who is one of my most clear-headed colleagues from the legal profession, has shown how necessary it is to explore the ground further to see how we stand. As I understand it, the video link provision would permit examination in chief and cross-examination via the video link in circumstances to be determined. The case for video recording in no way depends on whether the live video link is available. Rather, it depends on whether there is some advantage in a system that allows the child's first account of what happened to be given to the authorities in the form of a video recording, and whether that would be a valuable document that could be shown to a jury and would assist it to determine the


truth or otherwise of that account. The child would then be available, via the live video link, for further examination in chief and cross-examination, should that be necessary. The matter that we must consider further is the balance of advantage of allowing a video that is taken in such circumstances to be admitted.

Mr. Lawrence: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making the position clear. It shows that there are many variants of the use of video links that have to be considered with great care.
I agree with what has been said about children being good witnesses in court—my experience confirms that. They do not seem to he over-intimidated by circumstances in court into forgetting their complaints. The courts have been most considerate to children: judges usually take off their wigs, and sometimes their gowns, and ask council to do likewise. The usual forbidding formality of the court is reduced so that children can give evidence in more informal and friendly surroundings, and my experience is that they give it well.
The greatest problem in many cases might be the child's identification of the offender. That is unlikely to be admissible, as part of the evidence in a case, on a video link. It is inconceivable that children would produce evidence of identification at an identification parade. That may be another complication. That apart, the problem does not seem to be quite as severe, because it is not as traumatic for the child to recount afterwards what happened as to identify the offender, if he is a stranger.
If it is possible for the defence counsel to say to the jury, "Of course, if you had seen this child and been able to judge its demeanour in court as it was asked questions by both sides, that would have been better than seeing it on television"—

Ms. Clare Short: Why?

Mr. Lawrence: The impression that the hon. Lady might give when seen on television being questioned by an interviewer or an audience might sometimes be misleading. The only way to remove all the misleading factors that sometimes obtain on television is to have the viewer present. That is why it would he desirable, if it were not otherwise undesirable, to have the child in court. If the child's absence makes it more likely that an accused person will get the benefit of the doubt and be acquitted, even though he is guilty, that would be counter-productive. Therefore, the quality of the television must be excellent.
At present, defence solicitors and counsel say to an accused person in these circumstances, "You must realise that if you are guilty and are found guilty, and have caused a little child to go into court to give this kind of evidence, you will receive no mercy whatever from the judge." That constitutes a great deal of proper pressure on an accused person who is guilty to plead guilty and avoid what might be the worst consequences of trying to brazen it out and force a child into the witness box to give evidence.
If it becomes easier for an accused person to plead not guilty and see how matters develop on television, the measure may be counter-productive. I do not want that to happen. That is another reason for considering the matter with care, lest someone who is guilty finds it easier to be acquitted under the television system than under the present one.
According to clause 21 and new clause 6, the television link cannot be used without the leave of the court. Defense

counsel might say that he did not want the television link, and the judge might say that he overruled him, and wished to keep it.
If there is a television link and the man is convicted, there could be an appeal. If someone who was otherwise guilty and would have been convicted was acquitted on appeal because he had not had a fair trial, as the wishes of his counsel had not been observed by the judge, who gave his leave for a television link instead of refusing it, that, too, would be counter-productive. The Lord Chief Justice will have to lay down careful guidelines on the way in which a judge at a Crown court deals with these video links—

Mr. Dickens: rose—

Mr. Lawrence: —and circulate them to Crown court judges, so that they can follow and abide by carefully worked-out procedures.
There are dangers in this procedure, but I do not think that they outweigh the very real advantages. If they do not, we will strike a significant blow against the child abuser. Because there are dangers, there must be care. Every detail must be properly worked out so that nothing goes wrong. Although I should like to see this matter concluded as quickly as possible, I do not think that it would he right for my right hon. Friend to skip over any of these problems in order to put the matter immediately or very speedily into action.
I hope that my remarks have not been too lengthy.

Mrs. Golding: May I say how much I welcome the Minister's remarks on new clause 7? We welcome the comment that perhaps one day its provisions will come to fruition. I welcome also what the Minister said on new clause 8 about the live video link. Perhaps when he looks at the proposal in new clause 8, when he considers additions to clause 21, he will see how excellent new clause 8 is.
On new clause 6, while I welcome some of the things that the Minister said, I cannot see that there are any real difficulties with the new clause. It has been gone through most carefully to get rid of many of the objections raised in the House, and although I understand that the Minister needs to consult the legal profession—perhaps it is the main stumbling block in his mind—other professions have put their weight behind the new clause. The nursing profession, the National Children's Bureau, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Police Federation—many people—have already considered these things and said that this provision needs to be made now. I hope that when the Home Secretary makes his statement to the House he will ensure that it is something that can happen in this Bill and not have to be carried over for yet another Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 9

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

'The following shall be substituted for section 12(1)(a) of the Juries Act 1974 (as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977)—

(a) That person shall have the right' to challenge not more than three jurors without cause and all or any of the jurors for cause.'.—[Mr. Chris Smith.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Chris Smith: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to maintain the right of peremptory challenge of up to three jurors for each defendant in a criminal trial. In the Bill the Government are seeking to remove that existing right of peremptory challenge. This is one of the most important changes in the Bill. In Committee, we made it clear that Opposition Members regard it as an unacceptable change. We wish to retain the right of peremptory challenge, so we have tabled this new clause.
It is very important to maintain peremptory challenge to ensure not only the fairness of jury trial but also the perception of that fairness by those who stand trial in front of a jury. In Committee, the Home Secretary set out in some detail his arguments for seeking to remove all right of peremptory challenge. I went back to those proceedings today in preparing these remarks and found that his arguments seemed to centre round two specific points.
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The first was that the right hon. Gentleman saw the right of peremptory challenge as giving what he called "a substantial tilt" in favour of the defendant in court proceedings. His second argument was that peremptory challenge was a derogation from the random principle which ought to exist in the selection of juries. Both arguments are faulty.
The evidence does not substantiate the case that peremptory challenge gives a substantial tilt in favour of the defendant. The Government themselves set up the Crown prosecution service survey of peremptory challenge and the published results of that survey are now available. That survey, set up and published by the Government, says:
In both single-defendant and multi-defendant trials, the use of challenges does not appear associated with a lower likelihood of conviction. Over half (60 per cent.) of all trials in which one or more peremptory challenges were used ended with convictions on one or more counts. This is slightly higher than the conviction rate of 53 per cent. in trials in which no challenges were used.
The evidence of the survey is absolutely crystal clear. There is no tilt in favour of the defendant where peremptory challenge is exercised.
The Home Secretary himself admitted later in Committee that, as he said,
Not much can be built on the statistics in the only form in which we could provide them".
He also said:
they do not show anything the other way".—[Official Report, Standing Committee F, 3 March 1987; c. 840.]
He is saying, in effect, that the statistical evidence shows the impact of peremptory challenge to be relatively neutral when it comes to securing a conviction. The conclusion must therefore be that there is no substantial tilt in favour of the defendant, the evidence for this coming from the Government's own figures and survey.
Let us just look at the other argument of the Home Secretary—the importance of the random principle. To say that the random principle must be maintained and can only be distorted by the use of peremptory challenge assumes that the system of jury selection is perfectly random at present. It is not. First, there is the use of limited areas for drawing jurors from the electoral lists; then there are further restrictions in drawing names from

simply some particular pages of the electoral lists. The composition of jurors ends up far from a random reflection of society at large.
Substantial evidence was also revealed by the research of Baldwin and McConville. The evidence was adduced at considerable length by my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) in Committee, but it bears reiteration because it is very important. They discovered that only 28 of 3,912—that is, 0·7 per cent—of jurors in Birmingham were of West Indian or Asian origin. That is not a random reflection of the population of Birmingham. One would almost certainly have expected the figure to be 15 or 20 times as great if it were to be a random reflection. They noted a similar, although slightly less marked, disparity in the use of jurors of Irish origin. They also found that 72·5 per cent. of jurors were male, whereas the percentage of males in the 1976 household survey was 49·7.
As if to reinforce that point in the Baldwin and McConville survey, there is the example of the Bristol riot trial, in which all the defendants were black and the judge advised the defence during the initial court proceedings to use the right of peremptory challenge to obtain a more racially balanced jury. When that advice comes from a judge, it must surely lead us to question whether the system is perfectly random.
To remove the possibility of a safety valve that can correct some of the imbalances which may on occasions occur in the production of juries is, we believe, to go in the wrong direction. The use of peremptory challenge helps to adjust in favour of balance where an ultimately nonrandom and imperfect system has not operated to produce balance.
Those seem to be the two principal reasons that the Home Secretary was advocating for the Government's decision to move for the abolition of the right of peremptory challenge. However, there are several reasons, in addition to the arguments against the Home Secretary's points, which can and must be made to reject the Government's case. There are two particularly over-whelming reasons which were made by the Government themselves in the White Paper "Criminal Justice", published in March of last year, which started the process which germinated into the Bill which we are discussing today.
In paragraph 35 of the White Paper, the Government said:
The problem is whether that result can be achieved without either leaving defendants with an understandable sense of grievance or opening up challenge for cause to an unseemly and disturbing degree.
There are two important points there. The first is the likelihood of an increased and perverse use of challenge for cause. If the right of peremptory challenge is removed, there is likely to be a much more frequent and much more obstructive use of challenge for cause. I do not think that that would necessarily be in the interests of the proceedings of the court or of the feelings and dignity of jurors.
One point which has been made is that a juror, if peremptorily challenged, may feel aggrieved. I believe a juror is far more likely to feel aggrieved if he has been challenged for cause than if he has been challenged peremptorily. The likelihood of an increase in challenge


for cause is one reason which must be borne in mind and which leads us to wish to retain some degree of peremptory challenge.
The other major reason—in some ways the most important reason of all—is the crucial importance of the need for the defendant to have confidence in the fairness of the system. One of the pillars of our system of justice is that the defendant must feel that he has been given the fullest possible chance to have a fair trial. If no peremptory challenge is open to him, we have removed what is in many ways a vital safety valve to enable him at least to feel that he has had the opportunity to secure a completely fair and balanced jury. It is a very important point about the perception of the system by those who are accused, be they innocent or guilty but particularly when they are innocent. That above all leads the Opposition to say that peremptory challenge must stay. Therefore, we hope that the House will vote for the new clause.

Mr. David Ashby: Speaking in the debate on another new clause, my hon. Friend the Minister said that it was the duty of the Government to legislate only after proper and due consideration of a matter. Indeed, in the context in which he was speaking, he was also talking about there being a preliminary trial of the evidence obtained by the use of a video. That is a sentiment which I wholeheartedly applaud.
The proposition put forward is that the jury system should be changed radically without any evidence to support it. It is said that the jury system is not random and is not representative. Of course, statistically that could never be so when a jury was selected. That has been well set out by the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith). He also stressed something with which I, as a lawyer of considerable experience in defence as well as in prosecution agree: the importance of a fair trial and the feeling of a defendant that he has had a fair trial. That is fundamental to our system of justice.
Why is that so important? If a defendant has a sense of injustice, he will never be satisfied with the result of his trial. If he is sent to prison—and we seem to be sending more people to prison than any other nation—it is important that when he is in prison he should feel that he had a fair trial with an opportunity to be fully represented and to express himself. One has only to think why that is so important. We have one prison officer to every 10 or 20 prisoners. If a prisoner is unhappy, he will not be very manageable in prison. He will have a sense of injustice and a tremendous chip on his shoulder. Undoubtedly, in terms of pure cost, it will mean a higher proportion of prison officers to prisoners. It is important that a prisoner should feel that he has had a fair crack of the whip.
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Not only is jury selection not random, but on the many juries that I have encountered, out of 15 jurors, 12, 13 or 14 are women. I have no objection to women serving on a jury. It is important that they should be on juries. One has only to walk around the streets to find that women comprise 50 per cent. of the population. One cannot say that random selection is necessarily representative. The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury drew attention to the statistics in Birmingham, where only 0–7 per cent. of black people perform jury service, whereas the percentage should be higher.
A defendant from the middle of Brixton will not be happy if he sees 15 white people from Acacia avenue. He will not feel that e is getting a fair trial. He will think, "Those people do not understand my position, the sort of problems that I have, or the sort of pressures that I have been under." He will not feel that he will have a fair trial. Likewise, if a young male person stands trial by a jury with 12 or 15 middle-aged ladies on it, he will think that they will not understand young people, their problems and the things that they do and feel. He will not feel that such a jury is representative.
I do not believe that by having two black people, by challenge, on a jury, one is any more likely to be acquitted. I do not think for a moment that if one has a few more males, a few more females, or younger people on a jury, one will get an acquittal. Indeed, the statistics show that one will not. However, the defendant will feel that he will have a fairer trial and a more representative jury. It is far better to have a trial heard by what amounts to a representative jury.
The right to peremptory challenge is often used merely to keep a better balance on a jury. The statistics show that such challenges do not give defendants an unfair advantage. The whole argument started because the Home Secretary said they give defendants an unfair advantage. Of course, statistics now show that when there is a challenge, a defendant is slightly more likely to be convicted. It is said that it is to protect defendants that this measure is being put forward, and that it will be more helpful to defendants.
We have no statistics or evidence. The only argument that we have had has been based on a hunch. Hon. Members continue to hear phrases such as, "I feel," "I think," "people say," "some judges think," and we have even heard, "the Lord Chief Justice thinks." We are trying to change the evidential practice of centuries. In evidential terms, a thought or a hunch amounts to zero. Adding hunches to thoughts amounts to nothing. One has no evidence upon which to change the practice of centuries.
I am sure that, after proper consideration, most people would feel that the jury system should not be changed on the basis of a hunch, thought or feeling. A change should be based on evidence. The judicial system is good, and the jury system is delicate. It is not to be lightly overthrown or changed. It needs to be changed on the basis of hard facts and evidence. All the hard facts and evidence point to a need not to change the jury system.
The matter started when my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Jessel) rather sensationalised the Cyprus secrets trial. I am bound to say that he was not alone. Many people at that time were looking round for a scapegoat for what was a sensational acquittal. Many of us felt that that acquittal showed the maturity of the British system of justice. I cannot think of any other country in the world where allegedly confessed traitors would have been acquitted. That spoke of the maturity and independence of our judicial system.
However, the Bill speaks of immaturity, not maturity. It speaks of rushing into something without thinking; of acting on the spur of the moment on the basis of the sensationalisation of the secrets trial when one was really looking for a scapegoat. In that case, a solicitor tried to sell confidential material to the papers, in breach of all ethics. We have in that case an anecdote of a most dishonest and disreputable member of the legal profession.

Mr. Toby Jessel: No one has ever denied it.

Mr. Ashby: Apparently, part of that anecdote is that one person said that he wanted one sort of jury, a second another sort of jury, and the third, a distinguished lawyer, said, "What the devil, we cannot choose our jury anyway."
My hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham says that no one has denied it—

Mr. Jessel: No one has.

Mr. Ashby: —but he will appreciate—if he does not, I am telling him now—that any decent member of the legal profession, any barrister, could not speak even now to deny, affirm or anything else what went on in that conversation. He could not do that.

Mr. Nicholas Budgen: Is not the irony of this that all of us who have earned our crust at the criminal bar have challenged jurors in the hope that we may obtain a jury that is advantageous to our point of view, but usually it does not work out that way? The extraordinary mystery of the jury system is that juries act against what we, as defenders, believe to be our interests.

Mr. Ashby: Yes, I could not agree more. One cannot go into how a jury reaches a decision. That, as my hon. Friend rightly says, is the marvellous mystery of a jury, and long may it last.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I agree with everything that the hon. Gentleman has said so far, but is he mindful of the fact that, when talking about manipulation or alleged manipulation in the Cyprus spy trial, all the jurors who tried the case, whether there were challenges or not, had been vetted by the prosecution to ensure that they were suitable for such a case?

Mr. Ashby: I understand that to have been the case. Certainly that was reported in the press to be the case. However, I was not at the trial. I know no more than what I have read in the press and what has been said in the House.
Some people say that the secrets trial was a multiple trial and that in multiple trials the right to challenge should be limited. However, one should recognise that multiple trials are at the behest of the prosecution which puts together a number of people. In law, each individual is being tried individually. Technically, all the defendants are put together in one trial as a convenience. To impose such a limitation would be a complete breach of that principle.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said that challenges for cause were acceptable and allowable. Such challenges for cause are limited. The question is asked of the judge and many, if not most, challenges are not allowed. Much has been made in respect of peremptory challenges and much has been said of the fact that we should have challenges for cause.
One point that arises for the practising advocate is that most barristers are aware that jurors attend trials willingly. We all know that they give up their homes and their jobs to perform a public duty. A random selection process can throw up jurors who are, to say the least, illiterate. As trials become more and more complex, many documents are involved. An experienced advocate is always quick to detect a juror who cannot read, or who appears to be illiterate, and challenges. I know that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will say that that is simply a challenge

for cause, but it is important that most advocates should feel that they are not putting a juror through the degrading experience of having his shortcomings exposed to the entire court.
Such a juror always starts by saying that he has left his glasses behind, or that he cannot read from that distance, and asks for the oath to be read to him. When there is a pile of documents, if a peremptory challenge is made, the juror will not feel that he has been picked on specifically or that his shortcomings have been exposed; yet he will be out of the trial, and it can quickly be established that the next juror can read.

Mr. Favell: I have listened to my hon. Friend and to other learned counsel who are present this evening. As they all appear to agree that the challenge is completely hit and miss, why on earth should we keep it?

Mr. Ashby: I hope that I have been saying that it is not.

Mr. Budgen: It is hit and miss; that is the advantage of it.

Mr. Ashby: First, I was talking about a way of obtaining what appears to be a fair and balanced jury. My second point is not hit and miss. Peremptory challenge is often used as a polite way of challenging for cause without offending someone who, for example, cannot read. I am sure that few advocates have not done that time and again.
It is as necessary for the prosecution to stand jurors by—in other words, to challenge them—as it is for the defence. That applies to what might appear to be peremptory challenges. Justice must be seen to be done, and be seen to be even-handed. Without that, we have no justice. If the prosecution can challenge without cause, the defence must have the balancing right. Not to give that right would violate the very principles raised by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State when he spoke in support of the European convention on human rights, which insists that the prosecution and the defence should have equal rights.
As I have said, my experience runs contrary to my right hon. Friend's hunches. However, it coincides entirely with his research. Challenges do not alter a jury to make it convict or acquit, but they can alter a jury to make it more representative. They make all parties in the court happy with the trial and more prepared to accept a conviction because it follows a fair trial. If a single piece of evidence can be adduced to rebut what I have said, I shall reconsider my decision to vote in favour of the new clause.

Mr. Alex Carlile: The Home Secretary has what appears to be a personal determination to get rid of the right of peremptory challenge. In my view, that determination is based on myth. The Home Secretary appears to regard the right of peremptory challenge as a Trojan horse invading the jury system and leading to an abuse of jury trials—through abuse of the peremptory challenge itself—and to an unfair advantage in favour of the defendant. However, as the debate on this issue has continued over the months, that Trojan horse has been shown to be no more than the Home Secretary's hobby horse. We considered this matter in detail in Committee, and I spoke at length on it. You will be comforted to know, Mr. Speaker, that I do not intend to speak tonight at great length on the matter. However, I wish to reiterate a few points which, I suggest, are important.
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It has been suggested in recent years, particularly in relation to the Cyprus spy trial, that there has been abuse of the right of peremptory challenge, but no evidence whatsoever has been produced to justify that allegation. At most, there has been a little bit of anecdote about what happened between counsel in the robing room during the Cyprus spy trial. But neither the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Jessel). nor anybody else, other than those members of the bar, knows what happened.
The most one can say is that it appears that at that trial there was some discussion between counsel as to how the right of peremptory challenge should be exercised. That discussion was completely proper. It happens in many cases, and it is right that it should happen. It is a proper, and sometimes an important, part of the duty of counsel.
The allegation that in some way the use of peremptory challenge gave an unfair advantage to a defendant has been thoroughly laid to rest by the Crown prosecution service survey, to which the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) adverted a little while ago. We know that the Government enthusiastically expected that the CPS survey would show that if jurors were peremptorily challenged at a trial, the defendant was more likely to be acquitted. In fact, the CPS survey showed the opposite. Putting it at its highest, there is no evidence whatsoever that peremptory challenge gives any advantage at all to the defence.
My next point is a very serious one. If we remove the right of peremptory challenge so that all jury challenges by the defence have to be challenges for cause, we shall open up a hornet's nest of practical problems that will beset the courts for years to come. I shall give a few general examples of situations in which peremptory challenges are sometimes used. The first is the kind of case to which the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) referred— the apparently illiterate juror. I agree with him that experienced counsel can tell very quickly whether a juror appears to be illiterate.
If the right to peremptory challenge is exercised, all that the defence counsel has to say is, "Challenge." The juror leaves the jury box; there is no embarrassment, and he does not know why he has been challenged. The judge usually refers very simply to the right to challenge and to the fact that it has been exercised and says that the next person should step forward. It is all over within a matter of seconds.
If, however, defence counsel had to challenge for cause on the ground that the juror was illiterate but the prosecution did not agree that the juror was illiterate, or the juror did not agree that he or she was illiterate, the juror would know what was being alleged on behalf of the defendant and might regard that as an insulting allegation.
A test may have to be applied as to whether a person is illiterate. In a fraud case, for example, it would be absurd to have an illiterate person on the jury, because there would be many documents to examine. What tests will be applied? Will there be reading or arithmetical tests? If at the end of the day the judge decides, having considered the matter, that the juror is literate and therefore should be on the jury, how can the defendant expect a fair trial from that juror? What will be the effect on the rest of the jury if that juror turns out to be the strongest character among the 12?

Mr. Favell: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman in favour of the American system, in which each juror is cross-examined independently before a decision is made by the defence counsel as to whether that juror should appear on the jury? That is what the hon. and learned Gentleman appears to be advocating.

Mr. Carlile: Not at all. The hon. Gentleman has riot been listening. I am simply warning the House that if peremptory challenge is removed that very American system which he and I both dread so much will develop. He has hit the nail on the head. I do not know why the Home Secretary finds this such a funny subject. Right through the Committee stage he wore the same grin as he is wearing tonight. I doubt whether the Home Secretary has ever seen a jury trial through in his life. It would be interesting to hear if he had.
As those of us in practice know, it sometimes happens that among the waiting jury there is a person who appears to be asleep, labile, frivolous, apparently drunk or apparently drugged. In those circumstances, responsible defence counsel would again use that one word "challenge" and that would be the end of the matter. What happens if he has to challenge for cause? He will have to stand up and say to the judge, "Challenge for cause. That juror, in my opinion, is drunk or drugged." What will happen then? There will be a debate in front of the juror in question. The judge must decide the issue in the presence of the juror. If he finds that the defence counsel, albeit acting in good faith, was wrong and the juror was not drunk, drugged, labile, frivolous or sleeping, what effect will that challenge have on the defendant's prospects of a fair trial? In my submission, those prospects could be very severely damaged.
Another example, and one that was not raised in Committee, relates to trials in Wales, including those in my constituency. As the House will know, a substantial proportion of people in Wales speak Welsh as their first language. It is very easy to tell when a jury is being sworn in Wales whether a juror is more comfortable in Welsh or English. That is a very small practical problem that is solved by experienced counsel, because there is an alternative oath. The Welsh version is printed on the back of the English version. Therefore, as soon as the juror stands up to take the oath, as long as the counsel can see the language on the back of the jury card, he knows in which language the juror will take the oath, and so can challenge before the oath is taken.
Quite understandably, many defendants in Wales, people who are not standing trial for offences with any kind of political overtones, simply feel more comfortable in their native Welsh language and wish to be tried by people who understand that language. Although in some courts in Wales there are simultaneous translations— a system which works well—that practice is not followed in all courts. Defendants are often interviewed by the police in the Welsh language because, fortunately, many officers speak Welsh. The nuance, inflexion and emphasis of the Welsh word may be very difficult to identify for an English-speaking jury. All those of us who have practised in Wales have experienced that from time to time.
What will happen? Will counsel have to stand up and say to the judge, "Challenge, your Honour, because that juror does not speak Welsh."? Will we then have a Welsh language test to distinguish between learners like myself, who in those circumstances might or might not be allowed


on the jury, and fluent Welsh speakers, who would be allowed on the jury? What standards will be applied by the courts? If the judge decides that the juror should remain on the jury, that decision could have a devastating affect on the defendant on whose behalf the challenge had been mounted.
If the House goes down the road proposed by the Government— I notice with some pleasure that this is opposed by a substantial number of Conservative Members—we will introduce into our law a dangerous area of dispute, debate and complexity. I believe that about 600 Crown courts sit on any given day. Will there be 300 or 600 different practices? Even 15 different practices in this important matter of challenge for cause would do a grave disservice to the reputation of our criminal justice system.
Our present system may not be very logical, but sometimes the best things are not very logical. This system has stood the test of time. It makes defendants feel that they have had a fair trial, although, as we know from the evidence, the use of the peremptory challenge does not really affect the outcome of the trial. There is something about our system of jury challenge, which I know from talking to people from abroad who have watched our courts, that people at first find surprising, but when they have seen it operate find very acceptable and praiseworthy.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: I think that we all admire the ingenuity of the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) in securing this debate. I understood that, if one tabled an amendment on Report which just said, "Leave out clause 86", it would not be called. What one now does is table a new clause repeating what would have been in clause 86 and, happily, it is called. I am delighted that it has been. I say to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, in case he gets the wrong impression, that not all the lawyers in this House disagree with what he is doing. I support his intention to accept the Roskill committee's recommendation to get rid of the right of peremptory challenge.
I disagree totally with one point made by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), which was expressed differently by my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Jessel). The hon. and learned Gentleman described the spy trial as an abuse of the system of peremptory challenge. So long as the right of peremptory challenge exists, it is the responsibility and duty of defence counsel, if they consider that it is in their client's interest, to use it. I do not believe that there was any abuse in that case.

Mr. Budgen: One of the mysteries of this system is that all of us have used the right of peremptory challenge to try to rig juries in our favour but, more often than not, it does not work that way. Although we believe that we have done a great service for our client, more often than not we have not.

Mr. Carlisle: The delight of my hon. Friend is the honesty of the language that he uses. As he said, he has attempted to use the peremptory challenge to rig juries in favour of those whom he has represented.

Mr. Lawrence: It would not be an abuse.

Mr. Carlisle: It would not be an abuse. It is the duty of defence counsel, so long as that power exists, to use it in what he believes are in the interests of his client. The question is: should it exist?

Mr. Budgen: It does not work.

Mr. Carlisle: I shall come to that point.
Frankly, I do not believe that it should exist. I am a strong believer in the jury system. I believe that it means trial by 12 of one's fellow citizens, chosen at random, and that it should not be the right of the defence to "rig"—to use the word of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen)— a jury to assist his case.
The fact is that, totally properly and rightly, especially in multi-handed cases, clear efforts are made by the use of peremptory challenge to achieve a jury that the defence rightly or wrongly believes— I concede to my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West that the defence may do so wrongly—to be more likely to give a verdict in its favour. That is not what the jury system is about. If one is to defend that system and the vital importance of the right for trail by a jury of 12 of one's fellow citizens, one must accept that they should be 12 of one's fellow citizens who are chosen at random, and that there should be no power to attempt to manipulate the jury in favour of the defence.

Mr. Ashby: Would my right hon. and learned Friend accept a jury of 12 men, or an all-female jury? Does he think that that would be a reasonable random selection?

Mr. Carlisle: One must accept that the right to challenge for cause can be removed. I see no reason why one should not argue that it is wrong to have a jury of one sex trying a particular case and put to the judge the argument that there should be someone of the other sex on that case.
I have never claimed to be an amateur psychiatrist, nor do I believe that one is employed as a barrister to act as a psychiatrist. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West has said, one is often wrong when one challenges. The existence of that right is largely archaic. Therefore, I support what the Government are trying to do. As we want to get on with all the other matters in this debate, I have made the point that I wanted to make and have tried to do so succinctly. I hope that the House will support my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in the view that he has taken.

Mr. Budgen: Most of the important things in life are not capable of scientific proof. It is not possible to prove the advantages of parliamentary democracy or the advantages of the jury system. If I may embarrass my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, I should like to say that one reason that I admire him is his diffident and kindly attitude to the most important traditions in our society. He understands the importance of slow, inconsistent, organic change and the importance of the Tory tradition, as opposed to the radical tradition, in the Conservative party.
As a Tory, but one who, on occasions, is also a radical, I am none the less a supporter of the jury system. I am a practitioner before juries. I have been an undistinguished provincial barrister since 1962. As I have muddled my way through my professional life, I have come to the conclusion that the jury system is one of the most


important bastions of freedom in our society. Of course, it is incapable of any logical analysis or of any understanding, by clever analysis, of one decision or another.
As one listens to the debate, one realises that most of all it is about a sense of justice, a concept which is as vague and insubstantial as it is possible to put forward. However, when my hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) put it forward, I felt that it was important.
If, for a moment, I could try to engage my right hon. Friend's interest, I might say to him that in Wolverhampton we recently had a series of severe civil disturbances. They occurred mainly because the West Indian population did not have my instinctive Tory sense of the rightness of the jury system. They said—quite wrongly, in my opinion—that they did not agree with the police complaints procedure. They do not understand the impartiality of a coroner's inquest. They do not believe that the Director of Public Prosecutions would act fairly and impartially in respect of the police. They do not understand that an English jury would act fairly in dealing with a policeman whose action had led to the death of a black man. In short, they were uncertain about English institutions.
I do not understand English institutions, just as I do not understand my diffident faith in the Church of England, but I support institutions that I do not understand. [Laughter.] One of the great dangers of the arrogant and logical person is that he believes that that which he cannot understand should be dismissed. One of the most important aspects of the jury system is its mystery, which depends most of all upon its random quality. Its random quality is to some extent achieved by the right of peremptory challenge.
I remember standing in robing rooms at a quarter to 10 and saying to my fellow barristers, "Right-ho chaps, let's get on with rigging the jury. We shall object to anybody who gets into the jury box wearing a suit or who is seen near the Financial Times or The Daily Telegraph." But it does not work. While at the age of 28 I used to think it was all a tremendously clever and logical wheeze, now as an unsuccessful middle-aged man I bow before the mystery of the jury system.
I remind my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who is a distinguished student of English history, that sometimes mystery is more important than logic. He should interfere with the system of peremptory challenge only with the greatest diffidence. Most of all, the system of peremptory challenge leaves the defendant and his supporters with a sense of justice and a sense of justice prevents mob rule in our society. That sense of justice is lacking most of all in the West Indian community in Wolverhampton, because they do not trust our institutions. I advise my right hon. Friend not to interfere with our institutions, because 98 per cent. of our population trust in them. The public do not understand them, just as they do not understand this institution, but the jury system, for all its inconsistencies and illogicalities, is a mystery with which we tamper at our peril.

Mr. Toby Jessel: Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

Mr. Budgen: I am not learned.

Mr. Jessel: My hon. Friend was talking as if he were. Does he think it was wrong in 1978 or whenever it was to reduce the number of peremptory challenges from seven to three?

Mr. Budgen: It is entirely a matter of balance and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West would say, about the sense of justice of the community.
A limited right of peremptory challenge upholds the sense of justice that the community has in the random nature of the jury, which we must preserve at all costs. By obliterating the right of peremptory challenge, we will damage the random nature of the jury and undermine the sense of justice that the community has in the jury system.
We can get angry about the decision in the Ponting case, but that is an example of the residual power of the jury to say, "Never mind what the law is or what the judge says, we intend to enter a verdict of not guilty." I say, as a narrow lawyer, that that is a scandalous verdict. None the less, as a citizen who does not wish to see mob violence or the West Indian population out on the streets, I say that it is better that we have an occasional verdict such as that in the Ponting case than that we should have mobs on the streets of Wolverhampton.

Mr. Favell: It is all very well to talk about justice, but is it not correct that the accused is not interested in justice but in getting off, and that that is why he is in favour of peremptory challenge?

Mr. Budgen: It is true that both the accused and his counsel are interested in getting him off, and the barrister who works the system within the limits of the law is perfectly justified. But there is a wider consideration of the sense of justice that is felt by the public, as expressed by the black man in a pub in Wolverhampton, who says, "I am not going on the streets tomorrow or into the Mander centre to make a nuisance of myself because Mr. Bloggs, who has been accused of attacking a policeman, will he tried by a randomly selected jury, selected in part by peremptory challenge." He says— although he really does not understand what he is saying—"I trust in the jury system."
The jury system, for all its defects and inconsistencies, is as much a part of our institutions as the House of Commons. We should not tamper with the jury system any more than we would tamper with the House of Commons.

Mr. Jessel: "Trial by Jury", by Gilbert and Sullivan, starts with the usher enjoining the jury to be free from bias.
He sings:
With stern judicial frame of mind
From bias free of every kind,
This trial must be tried.
The verse begins:
Now, Jurymen, hear my advice—
All kinds of vulgar prejudice
I pray you set aside.
A juryman echoes:
From bias free of every kind,
This trial must be tried.
A little later the judge speaks of his early career at the Bar and sings:
All thieves who could my fees afford
Relied on my orations
And many a burglar I've restored
To his friends and his relations.
These days, a barrister who wishes to restore a burglar to his friends and relations has no need to rely solely on


his power of oration, his forensic skill or his legal knowledge. He has a fourth weapon—to tamper with the composition of the jury, and that is frequently done. I am glad that the Government have decided to act. Trial by jury in Crown courts has become distorted.

Mr. Alex Carlile: What is the hon. Gentleman's evidence that trials have become distorted as a result of the use of peremptory challenge? I defy him to produce any evidence.

Mr. Jessel: I produce it now. This is an account by Mr. Bray of the meeting of counsel before the Cyprus secrets trial. He says:
A meeting was called for Sunday 14th for all Counsel to be present … The meeting was called for 9.35 and all Counsel save Colin Pitt attended"—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. It is quite in order for the hon. Gentleman to read this quotation, or better still, to paraphrase it.

Mr. Ashby: Briefly.

Mr. Jessel: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) said that there was no evidence, as did the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), so I am producing it.

Mr. Ashby: It is not evidence.

Mr. Jessel: My hon. Friend is contradicting it, so I shall read it out.

Mr. Ashby: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Jessel: No. I will not give way. I propose to read this quotation. It is an account of what occurred at a pre-meeting on the Cyprus secrets trial. Mr. Bray says:
Robin Simpson's point was that we wanted a young, working-class jury. Michael Hill made the comment that he really wanted an anti-establishment jury and that we were better off to have a young middle-age middle-class jury. Robert Harman pointed out that there was a dichotomy of views that we will just take what we get. John Alliot's view was that we couldn't improve on fate. Gilbert Gray indicated that if the jury is not too well educated and is of too low an intelligence, they may take more note of the Judge and therefore we ought to go for people who were young, not unsmart but no women. Victor Durand chimed in by saying that if the jury were young they may be unpatriotic. John Alliott indicated that we ought to pool resources as far any challenges were concerned that Michael Hill pointed out that we ought to challenge one, two, three, by one counsel and so on with another Counsel until we achieved a joint policy.

Mr. Budgen: The irony is that while these very distinguished members of the bar all make these Machiavellian calculations, almost certainly they do not work. The extraordinary thing is that, in spite of people being knocked out by these calculations, the jury comes to a proper decision on the evidence. The difficulty in what my hon. Friend is saying is that if one prevents these peremptory challenges, one undermines general public confidence in the jury system.

Mr. Jessel: There is not enough confidence in the jury system with the frequent use of peremptory challenges. If these very brilliant barristers, leaders in their field, at least one of whom wants to become a High Court judge, spend a Sunday morning in the back room of the Old Bailey

planning what kind of jury they want, they must believe that it will have some effect for their clients. Otherwise, why would they do it?

Mr. Ashby: rose—

Mr. Budgen: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentlemen, who are distinguished barristers, would not get away with this sort of behaviour in court.

Mr. Jessel: I will not give way to either of my hon. Friends, because I have given way once to each.
Juries are supposed to be selected at random. The right of challenge existed to try to have an unbiased jury so that, if a juryman was thought to be biased, the defendant could remove that juryman. Now, a system of peremptory challenge is being used to introduce a bias, but a bias towards acquittal. That may be fair to defendants who may be guilty but want to be acquitted, but it is not fair to the general public who want to be protected against vicious and violent crime.

Mr. Chris Smith: The hon. Gentleman says that this is being done to introduce a bias towards a defendant. That is patently not true. A Crown prosecution service survey shows that, where peremptory challenges were used, 60 per cent. of the cases resulted in conviction, whereas 53 per cent. of cases where peremptory challenge was not used resulted in convictions. The evidence is against the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Jessel: It seems to me that 60 per cent. is a rather low rate of conviction. It is as if the police were fighting against vicious and violent crime with one hand tied behind their back.

Mr. Budgen: My hon. Friend seems to have a touching faith in the effectiveness of the judgment of members of the bar. I accept, of course, that members of the bar try to rig the juries, but the fact is that they do not succeed.

Mr. Jessel: Well, it seems to me quite wrong that, if justice is intended to be paramount, they should have the right to try to rig the juries. That seems almost self-evident, and I hope that the House will support the abolition of peremptory challenge.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I support my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and criticise new clause 9 as being thoroughly unhelpful. It was the Labour party in 1977, I believe, that reduced the number of peremptory challenges from seven to three.
My main contention is that the peremptory challenge has been abused—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has only just got to his feet.

Mr. Bruinvels: The peremptory challenge has been substantially abused; there has been a case in which multiple defendants have appeared in the dock and the entire jury has been removed through peremptory challenge. That is perfectly proper, but I do not think that it is the best way forward to get a proper random jury. It is not random at all with this peremptory challenge.
As far back as 17 April, column 1008, I raised with the Prime Minister during Prime Minister's Question Time my concern at the very high acquittal rate in trials by jury. I expressed the fear that not all jurors today were respecting law and order, and I went on to say that I did not believe


that all those jurors saw anything wrong in breaking the law. I highlighted the point to the Prime Minister that I felt very much that a number of jurors were deliberately acquitting rather than convicting. I asked her to introduce random selection— [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I ask the House to give the hon. Gentleman a fair hearing. Everybody else has had a fair hearing.

Mr. Bruinvels: I asked the Prime Minister if she would introduce a new process whereby there would be a genuinely random selection of jurors. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister agreed with this, referred to the White Paper on criminal justice and very much supported that line.
On 9 July 1986 my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, in answer to a private notice question made it quite clear that the peremptory challenge was to be abolished, and that was particularly welcome. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) is making such a noise, Mr. Speaker, that I give way to him, under pressure.

Mr. Ashby: Does my hon. Friend accept that some people who are tried by jury just may be innocent? Does he not consider that the fact that there is a higher conviction rate where there has been peremptory challenge destroys his argument and the basis of his question to the Prime Minister?

Mr. Bruinvels: My argument is certainly never destroyed and I shall seek to prove this by the high acquittal rate, which I shall reveal in a moment.
Peremptory challenge has been widely criticised as not bringing about a truly representative jury. I feel very strongly that the juries, even as selected now at random, are not ideal. I make no criticism of the role of defence counsel, who do everything in their power to get accused people acquitted. Some may be innocent, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West has said. Nevertheless, it is a horses for courses syndrome at the moment. They do not like establishment figures. Those carrying The Daily Telegraph or the Financial Times are the ones most likely to be kicked off juries, because they are more liable to convict. I feel that defence counsel have been interfering wrongly with the random nature of juries.
I am pleased that the peremptory challenge is being abolished, except for cause— the removal of certain jurors for stated reasons—which will remain. In our free and democratic system we must have a genuine right to a free trial by 12 good men and true, by 12 of one's peers, 12 fellow citizens. There is no doubt that defence counsel have been manipulating the system to secure an acquittal purely by challenging the appearance, ethnic origin or sex of a particular juror.
I feel that all people should he able to be advised in advance that they may or may not be liable for jury service. I agree with the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) on one thing only; perhaps juries at the moment are not totally random. In other words, perhaps they are not a complete cross-section of society in general. I think that fewer people should be excluded from service. For example, small business men should still be able to serve as jurors. If we gave such people plenty of notice for example, three months— that they will be

liable to jury service, we would get a truly representative jury. I would like to see more professional people on juries. That is not always possible.
I believe that there should be a morality and loyalty test before jurors are allowed to serve—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. It is unfair to the hon. Gentleman for private conversations to continue while he is making a point.

Mr. Alex Carlile: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. Gentleman to start speaking on this new clause about a morality and loyalty test? I submit that it has absolutely nothing to do with the clause. It is just an absurd flight of fancy of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Speaker: Every hon. Gentleman makes his speech in his own way.

Mr. Bruinvels: We arc talking about challenging jurors. I would have thought that even the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) would have understood that a morality test is one way of challenging whether a potential juror is the right person.
People liable for jury service should be checked to find out whether they believe in punishment. That is particularly important.
On 9 July 1986, during a statement by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, I revealed the acquittal rate at Snaresbrook and Leicester. It was far too high in Snaresbrook where the rate was 58·2 per cent. and at Leicester it was 15·5 per cent. [Interruption.] I put it to the House then and I put it to the House now, even though the Opposition do not necessarily want to hear it, that it is a shocking indictment of our jury system that we have such a high acquittal rate. Either the prosecution were not good at presenting their case, the jurors did not believe the evidence, or rather, in my belief, they did not want to believe the evidence and deliberately let people off the hook. That is unacceptable. I have been calling since then for a total reform of the jury system and of the way in which jurors are selected. I raised that point on 24 June 1986 with my hon. Friend the Minister of State.
I am particularly pleased that the age limit for jurors is to he raised. On 24 July 1986, column 388, I asked my right hon. Friend if he would consider doing that. It was not a planted question and I was particularly pleased with the answer. If we are to have a truly representative and balanced jury we need some of our elderly citizens on it as well. By increasing the age of potential jurors to 70, 2 million extra people will be eligible for jury service. That is to be welcomed.
I ask to see a truly genuine and representative jury, hearing all people who are brought before the court on any charge. I believe that the peremptory challenge has done a lot to undermine British natural justice. It is for that reason that I support my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and ask the House to throw out new clause 9.

Mr. Lawrence: I shall vote for new clause 9 and against the Government, because after 25 years in the criminal courts with juries, I believe that the Government's proposal is nonsense. The reasons are easy to understand for anybody who practises in the criminal courts, but may not immediately be obvious to anyone who does not.

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Motion made, and Question put,
That, at this day's sitting, the Criminal Justice Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour.— [Mr. Lightbown.]

The House divided: Ayes 253, Noes 161.

Division No. 130]
[10 pm


AYES


Alexander, Richard
Dunn, Robert


Alton, David
Dykes, Hugh


Amess, David
Eggar, Tim


Ancram, Michael
Evennett, David


Arnold, Tom
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Ashby, David
Fallon, Michael


Ashdown, Paddy
Farr, Sir John


Aspinwall, Jack
Favell, Anthony


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Fookes, Miss Janet


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Forman, Nigel


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)


Baker, Nicholas (Dorset N)
Fox, Sir Marcus


Baldry, Tony
Franks, Cecil


Batiste, Spencer
Fraser, Peter (Angus East)


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Freeman, Roger


Beith, A. J.
Freud, Clement


Bendall, Vivian
Fry, Peter


Benyon, William
Gale, Roger


Bevan, David Gilroy
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Gardner, Sir Edward (Fylde)


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Blackburn, John
Glyn, Dr Alan


Body, Sir Richard
Goodhart, Sir Philip


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Gorst, John


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Gow, Ian


Bottomley, Peter
Gower, Sir Raymond


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Grant, Sir Anthony


Bowden, A. (Brighton K'to'n)
Greenway, Harry


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Gregory, Conal


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Griffiths, Sir Eldon


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)


Bright, Graham
Grist, Ian


Brinton, Tim
Ground, Patrick


Brooke, Hon Peter
Grylls, Michael


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)


Browne, John
Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)


Bruce, Malcolm
Hampson, Dr Keith


Bruinvels, Peter
Hanley, Jeremy


Bryan, Sir Paul
Hannam, John


Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon A.
Hargreaves, Kenneth


Budgen, Nick
Harvey, Robert


Butcher, John
Haselhurst, Alan


Butler, Rt Hon Sir Adam
Hawkins, Sir Paul (N'folk SW)


Butterfill, John
Hawksley, Warren


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
Hayes, J.


Carlisle, John (Luton N)
Hayhoe, Rt Hon Sir Barney


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Hayward, Robert


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Heathcoat-Amory, David


Carttiss, Michael
Heddle, John


Cash, William
Henderson, Barry


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Hicks, Robert


Channon, Rt Hon Paul
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.


Chapman, Sydney
Hind, Kenneth


Chope, Christopher
Hirst, Michael


Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)
Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)


Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushclifle)
Holt, Richard


Cockeram, Eric
Hordern, Sir Peter


Colvin, Michael
Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)


Coombs, Simon
Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)


Cope, John
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N)


Cormack, Patrick
Hubbard-Miles, Peter


Couchman, James
Hunter, Andrew


Cranborne, Viscount
Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas


Crouch, David
Irving, Charles


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Jackson, Robert


Dickens, Geoffrey
Jessel, Toby


Dorrell, Stephen
Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Jones, Robert (Herts W)


Dover, Den
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine





Kennedy, Charles
Nicholls, Patrick


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Norris, Steven


Key, Robert
Onslow, Cranley


King, Roger (B'ham N'field)
Oppenheim, Phillip


Kirkwood, Archy
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.


Knight, Greg (Derby N)
Osborn, Sir John


Knox, David
Ottaway, Richard


Lamont, Rt Hon Norman
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Lang, Ian
Patten, J. (Oxf W &amp; Abgdn)


Latham, Michael
Pawsey, James


Lawler, Geoffrey
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


Lawrence, Ivan
Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Lee, John (Pendle)
Pollock, Alexander


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Porter, Barry


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Portillo, Michael


Lester, Jim
Powell, William (Corby)


Lightbown, David
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Lilley, Peter
Price, Sir David


Livsey, Richard
Proctor, K. Harvey


Lloyd, Sir Ian (Havant)
Raffan, Keith


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Lord, Michael
Rathbone, Tim


Luce, Rt Hon Richard
Rhodes James, Robert


Lyell, Nicholas
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


McCrindle, Robert
Ryder, Richard


McCurley, Mrs Anna
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Macfarlane, Neil
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


MacGregor, Rt Hon John
Shields, Mrs Elizabeth


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Sims, Roger


MacKay, John (Argyll &amp; Bute)
Skeet, Sir Trevor


Maclean, David John
Soames, Hon Nicholas


McLoughlin, Patrick
Speed, Keith


McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


McQuarrie, Albert
Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)


Madel, David
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Major, John
Stokes, John


Malins, Humfrey
Taylor, Matthew


Marland, Paul
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Thorne, Neil (Word S)


Mates, Michael
Thurnham, Peter


Mather, Sir Carol
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Trotter, Neville


Meadowcroft, Michael
Viggers, Peter


Mellor, David
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Merchant, Piers
Walker, Bill (T'side N)


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Wallace, James


Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Warren, Kenneth


Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)
Wheeler, John


Miscampbell, Norman
Whitney, Raymond


Moate, Roger
Winterton, Mrs Ann


Monro, Sir Hector
Winterton, Nicholas


Montgomery, Sir Fergus
Wood, Timothy


Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)
Yeo, Tim


Moynihan, Hon C.



Mudd, David
Tellers for the Ayes:


Neale, Gerrard
Mr. Tony Durant and


Nelson, Anthony
Mr. Francis Maude.


Neubert, Michael





NOES


Adams, Allen (Paisley N)
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)


Anderson, Donald
Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Buchan, Norman


Ashton, Joe
Caborn, Richard


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Campbell, Ian


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Campbell-Savours, Dale


Barron, Kevin
Canavan, Dennis


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Carter-Jones, Lewis


Bell, Stuart
Clark, Dr David (S Shields)


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
Clarke, Thomas


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Clay, Robert


Bermingham, Gerald
Clelland, David Gordon


Bidwell, Sydney
Clwyd, Mrs Ann


Blair, Anthony
Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Conlan, Bernard


Boyes, Roland
Cook, Frank (Stockton North)


Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)
Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)






Corbett, Robin
Madden, Max


Corbyn, Jeremy
Marek, Dr John


Craigen, J. M.
Marshall, David (Shettleston)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Martin, Michael


Cunningham, Dr John
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Maxton, John


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
Maynard, Miss Joan


Deakins, Eric
Meacher, Michael


Dewar, Donald
Michie, William


Dixon, Donald
Mikardo, Ian


Dobson, Frank
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Dormand, Jack
Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)


Douglas, Dick
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Dubs, Alfred
Nellist. David


Duffy, A. E. P.
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
O'Brien, William


Eadie, Alex
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Eastham, Ken
Park, George


Fatchett, Derek
Pendry, Tom


Field, Frank (Birkenhead)
Pike, Peter


Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)
Radice, Giles


Fisher, Mark
Raynsford, Nick


Flannery, Martin
Redmond, Martin


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Rees, Rt Hon Peter (Dover)


Forrester, John
Richardson, Ms Jo


Foster, Derek
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)


Foulkes, George
Robertson, George


Fraser, J. (Norwood)
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Garrett, W. E.
Rogers, Allan


George, Bruce
Rooker, J. W.


Godman, Dr Norman
Rowlands, Ted


Golding, Mrs Llin
Sedgemore, Brian


Gould, Bryan
Sheerman, Barry


Gourlay, Harry
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Hamilton, James (M'well N)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Hamilton, W. W. (Fife Central)
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Silkin, Rt Hon J.


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Skinner, Dennis


Healey, Rt Hon Denis
Smith, C.(lsl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Heffer, Eric S.
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'ds E)


Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)
Snape, Peter


Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)
Soley, Clive


Home Robertson, John
Spearing, Nigel


Howarth, George (Knowsley, N)
Stott, Roger


Hoyle, Douglas
Straw, Jack


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Janner, Hon Greville
Thorne, Stan (Preston)


Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)
Tinn, James


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Torney, Tom


Lambie, David
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Lamond, James
Wareing, Robert


Leadbitter, Ted
Weetch, Ken


Leighton, Ronald
White, James


Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Williams, Rt Hon A.


Litherland, Robert
Winnick, David


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Woodall, Alec


Loyden, Edward
Young, David (Bolton SE)


McCartney, Hugh



McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Tellers for the Noes:


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Mr. Frank Haynes and


McTaggart, Robert
Mr. Allen McKay.


McWilliam, John

Question accordingly agreed to.

Question again proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Lawrence: I shall vote against the Government. Clause 86 is nonsense, because it abolishes for no justifiable reason a procedure which achieves faster, fairer justice and which costs practically nothing. My right hon. Friend is making a stick with which to beat himself and the criminal justice system. He may well come to regret it.
What is a peremptory challenge? I am astonished to find, when I talk to some of my hon. Friends and colleagues who are most vociferous against the

peremptory challenge, that they have not the faintest idea what it is. I shall explain. At the beginning of a trial a jury is brought in. The jurors take the oath and stand in the witness box. If nobody challenges them, the 12 become the jury, but if counsel for the defence gets up and says, "Challenge" that juryman stands down and somebody else comes forward, takes the oath and, if unchallenged, stays.
Under our existing law that procedure can take place only three times. Each defendant—most trials are single defendant trials— has only three challenges. The defendant who challenges a juryman has no idea of the juryman's name, his occupation, where he comes from or his beliefs. All that he has succeeded in doing is removing somebody who, until the moment of challenge, was to be a juror.
10.15 pm
One must consider how little pain and suffering are involved in the procedure by which, in a few minutes, we secure a jury to try a case. In most of the cases in which I have been involved, no juror has been challenged. Most of the time, in most courts there is no peremptorry challenge. One does not challenge a juror if a jury has been together and, by breaking them up, one will irritate them or set them going in any way against oneself or one's client. There are strong reasons for not making peremptory challenges.
How does it help to secure justice by having a peremptory challenge? The point is that an accused who has been in custody for 12 months may well go into the dock to be tried, believing that everything is fixed against him. The one safety valve that he has is, through his counsel, to relieve himself of two or three jurors who he may believe have been put there by the prosecution to secure his conviction. When that matter is dealt with, he is happy and content that he has exercised his right to break up a jury which might have been rigged against him.
I assume that the House has read all the evidence that has been adduced on the matter. I remind the House of what the Criminal Bar Association has had to say about the peremptory challenge. It said:
We remain implacably opposed to the abolition.
Lawyers do not have anything to gain by the peremptory challenge. With the right to a peremptory challenge, choosing a jury takes minutes, not hours. If it took hours to choose a jury, thereof would be more work for lawyers. In a sense, it is contrary to their financial interests.
I should prefer to accept the advice of the experts than that of some of my hon. Friends and colleagues in this place who have never been inside a court of law and would not know how to get into or out of one if they were shown the front door of the Old Bailey. The Criminal Bar Association said:
During the last 25 years we know of stories that may be apocryphal but nevertheless disturbing of judges and court clerks keeping convicting juries together for another case.
It is precisely because of such stories that accused people sometimes think that the system is rigged against them.
This is a cheap and relatively painless way—it may irritate one or two jurors who are challenged, but they go next door and are called for the next jury—of ensuring that someone who is accused of a crime can feel that the system is not weighted against him and that he will have a fair trial. He will then co-operate. He will sit in the dock throughout the trial. He could make a noise, cause a disturbance and be taken down to the cells. He can disrupt


the progress of the trial, but he does not do so if he is content that he is getting a fair trial. In a small way, the right, which he seldom exercises, to challenge three jurors is his safety valve. It guarantees for him that he will have a fair trial. If he uses his right to challenge three jurors, whose names, addresses, occupations and propensities he does not know, so what?
If I were a black man and I were being tried for a serious crime and the jury was all white, I might very well want a black man on the jury, and why should I not have? If I were a man and I were being tried by a jury of 12 women, I might very well want a man on the jury, and why should I not have? If I were a young person and everybody on the jury was 50 or 60, I might very well want a young person on the jury, and why should I not have? If by getting those people on the jury I feel that the trial will be fair and that I have a chance, the system of justice works. It does not work as long as there is bitterness in any accused person who thinks that the system is rigged against him. That is why it is patently clear to anybody who practises in the courts that this is a faster and fairer means of selecting a jury.
The reason why the stick will be made for my right hon. Friend's back is that nobody is postulating that the man must have the 12 jurors who go into the jury box at the start. Everybody is agreeing that he shall have the right to challenge a juryman for cause. I have heard the most appalling nonsense this evening about how a peremptory challenge can tailor a jury. All that that does is to get somebody who looks a bit better than the man who has just been challenged. That is not tailoring the jury.
Let me tell the House what tailoring the jury is. Tailoring a jury is what happens if someone is challenged for cause. Tailoring a jury is what they do in the United States. Tailoring a jury is when a juryman is asked to stand up and say where he lives, how old he is, where he worships, what he thinks about blacks and young people. That is what goes on in American courts, and as a result it takes a day or two to choose a jury. It takes five minutes in an English court. More time can be spent tailoring a jury when jurors can be challenged for cause than trying a case.
If our trials, instead of lasting one, two or three days, start lasting one, two or three weeks because we have challenges for cause instead of the three peremptory challenges, where have we gained? Where will our system of justice be if cases come on more slowly because the queue is even longer? The very problems that my right hon. Friend and the Government are facing is delays in our courts, yet here we are coolly, calmly and deliberately introducing a measure that will increase the delays in our courts, increase the queues of people waiting for justice, make sure that witnesses have more time to forget their evidence and that more of the guilty are acquitted—the very reverse of all that we are trying to do.
I am not saying that that will happen in every case, of course it will not, but it will happen more often than it happens now if we get rid of this simple means of challenging jurors by three peremptory challenges.
There is another reason why an unfairness might exist in the new clause. The right to challenge jurors without cause is being abolished, but nothing is said of the Crown's right to stand by. Presumably, the Crown will have the right to challenge jurors, but the defendant will not. The Crown will have the right to say, "Stand by. I do not want

him. I do not like the look of him." What is the defendant to feel about justice when the prosecution has a right of which the defence is deprived? That is another reason why the accused person will be worried and why he may be unsatisfied with the system of justice that is trying him.

Mr. Budgen: I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will deal with a point which I am sure my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has very much in mind. If large sections of the community do not have a sense of the justice of the jury system, that, unfortunately—we all of us want to do our best to oppose this—leads to riots, various forms of marches and all the rest because people do not trust our existing institutions, which, for a variety of reasons, most of which are entirely illogical, have the majesty of mystery attached to them. Is that not a good reason to try to stick to what is already working, rather than to interfere for spurious and logical reasons?

Mr. Lawrence: My hon. Friend made his point in his speech, and now he has made it again in another speech. It is a perfectly valid point, and I have nothing to add to it. I do not wish to exaggerate my point. Whether it leads to race riots is beyond the reasonable ken of my objection to the measure.
I have said all that I have to say. The Government have introduced a nonsensical measure. They are trying to give the impression— there is no need, because they are doing enough for law and order in all other directions—that they are taking dynamic action against an evil in our system, namely, the practice of tampering with juries. The measure is ill-conceived and misunderstood. It has the support of no one apart from one or two of my colleagues who are more loyal to the Government that I can be. It does not have the support of many practitioners at the criminal Bar. It is dangerous.
My advice to the Government is, "For goodness sake, leave the present position well alone. Drop it, and accept the new clause that has been sensibly tabled by the Opposition." It breaks my heart to have to say that, but the Opposition seem to understand the workings of the criminal legal system better than does my right hon. Friend. The Government's over-enthusiasm for the cause will be utterly counter-productive, and they will end up doing far more harm than good.

Mr. Gerald Bermingham: I shall be extremely brief. I have sat and listened for some time to various hon. and learned Gentlemen on the Conservative Benches. The hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) speaks with both practical and other experience. What he says is perfectly correct, and I endorse every word. I contrast it with the garbage—I put it as simply as that— uttered by the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels), who has absolutely no knowledge of these matters. His trite, inane and vote-grabbing comments are a disgrace to the House. In the interests of justice, I hope that Conservative Members will listen to the sane, experienced voice of the hon. and learned Member for Burton, and will vote accordingly.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Douglas Hurd): As our discussions on the Bill have progressed— from long before Second Reading to the Standing Committee, and thence to this evening's debate— I have come to understand the deep affection in which peremptory challenge is held. Let me say rather


emphatically that I do not mean that it is held in affection by the public; I refer to the practitioners in the courts who have advanced the case again this evening. No one who supports the Government's position— certainly no Minister—has any criticism of the way in which the practitioners have exercised a right that is now theirs.

Mr. Frank Dobson: Why change it?

Mr. Hurd: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would allow me to continue for a second.
I do not think that the Cyprus trial—or any other trial—or anecdotes of what happened on a particular occasion, or did not, are relevant. However, I feel that my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Jessel) deserved a rather fairer hearing, considering his persistence in the matter over many months. The points that he made this evening probably more accurately reflected the opinion of most of our constituents than the points made in challenge to him.
I believe that the real distinction is between those who wish for mechanisms that construct or engineer particular kinds of jury and those who, like myself, feel that the simplest and fairest way is to take a jury as it comes. Some hon. Members who have opposed the Government tonight have said that the peremptory challenge is effective, producing a fairer jury. Others— notably my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen)— have said that that is an illusion. We must take both limbs of that contradictory argument in favour of the new clause.
In Committee the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) said:
I congratulate the Home Secretary on the use of the word 'engineering'; it is better than 'construction', which I used earlier. The jury should reflect the defendant's world."— [Official Report, Standing Committee F, 3 March 1987; c. 841.]
To some extent we are retracing our footsteps in Standing Committee, but if we are to try to reflect the defendant's world, peremptory challenge is a very blunt engineering tool with which to do it. If the objective is to secure a delicate balance on the jury, or to make sure that the jury is fully representative, the whole system is faulty and peremptory challenge will not put it right. However, the supporters of the new clause are aiming in that direction.
10.30 pm
The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) referred to peremptory challenge achieving a completely fair and balanced jury. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) said that we must aim at achieving a representative jury. However, the serious as opposed to the cynical advocates of peremptory challenge have never been able to show how peremptory challenge achieves that objective. Clearly it does not.
Peremptory challenge may secure that a person who represents a defendant's interests sits on the jury in place of the challenged juror, but it does so in a purely haphazard way. That is not the objective of peremptory challenge. It is designed to take off the jury a person to whom the defendant objects without a reason having to be given. If we want completely fair and balanced juries, representative juries and juries that reflect the defendant's world, peremptory challenge does not achieve that purpose.

Mr. Ashby: How would my right hon. Friend achieve a balanced jury? The random selection process does not achieve a balanced jury; it results, as I said earlier, in a row of people from Acacia avenue. How would my right hon. Friend achieve the balanced and representative jury that is so desirable?

Mr. Hurd: I should not attempt to do so, because I believe, as does my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. in the random principle. I would not, however, base my case on the Tory appeal to mystery. Nevertheless, juries are selected on a random basis. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West is trying to tinker with the system, but his attempt is rather ineffective. He has not been able to show that peremptory challenge produces a representative jury.

Mr. Jerry Hayes: My right hon. Friend has referred to the random system of jury selection and to the defendant having to take the jury as he finds it. But it does not work like that. In some cases there is jury vetting, and the defendant feels that the whole system is stacked against him.

Mr. Hurd: I shall be turning to that question later.
As for the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), may I say at the outset that the smile on my face was simply in admiration of his skills in turning an intervention against him to his advantage. Lei me be patronising to him in response to his rather patronising approach; he was prompted to say that the law should be made by lawyers. There was a trace of that, too, in the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence). If we were to rely solely on the advice and opinions of lawyers in forming the statute book of this country, it would be very different from what it is today, and I do not believe that it would be better.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery deployed skilfully his basic point. He is one of the serious defenders of the right to peremptory challenge, but he left the Chamber too early to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, who purported to speak on the same side but who torpedoed that argument.
The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury attempted to deal with the statistics. I am not a statistician and I do not think that he is. I do not think that any statistician would have dealt with the statistics in the same way as the hon. Gentleman. The statistics do not and cannot tell us anything about the effects of peremptory challenge because they do not tell us anything about the nature of the cases where peremptory challenge was used.

Mr. Kaufman: Will the Home Secretary give way?

Mr. Hurd: The right hon. Gentleman had better let me finish my argument before he tries to destroy it.
If peremptory challenge was more often used in cases where the defendant's case was fairly hopeless, obviously that would produce the figures quoted by the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury. That is why I said perfectly fairly upstairs in Committee—and repeat again today—that no argument can be based either way on that set of statistics. Before the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) leaps to his feet, he will concede that I have never based the case on statistics or on anecdote. I have based the case on what I believe to


be principles of logic and common sense. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton that common sense is the most important basis.

Mr. Kaufman: If the Home Secretary is stating that the statistics are not relevant to the debate and do not assist us, why did he have the survey undertaken and why did he tell us that it was essential that we have the statistics available for when we debated this clause?

Mr. Hurd: I undertook to have the survey carried out very early on in response to the original initiative proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham. The survey was carried out and the statistics were available. The right hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that I have never based the argument on the statistics for the reasons that I have just given. The statistics show that this practice is quite widespread and that it is more widespread in London than elsewhere. However, they do not and cannot show the effects.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton and the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery dealt with their fears about challenge for cause. It is argued that as night follows day we would see an expansion of the use of the challenge for cause. There is the terrifying scenario of lengthy interrogation of potential jurors about their personal circumstances and beliefs. I cannot see the basis for that fear. Current case law and practice militates against that and there can be no serious doubt about that. The extent to which our judiciary would be likely to change current practice is a matter upon which I cannot speculate. However, we have kept senior members of the judiciary fully aware of our present proposals. I see no grounds, from what the judiciary have already said, to suppose that it would open the gates to the kind of challenges for cause that the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton are so concerned about.

Mr. Alex Carlile: How is the Home Secretary going to stop the challenges for cause? Defence counsel has an absolute right to stand up in front of the judge and make whatever submissions he wishes. How will the Home Secretary stop those submissions?

Mr. Hurd: If the practice of the judiciary continues as it is at present, those submissions will be fruitless.

Mr. Lawrence: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Hurd: Yes, I will give way in a second.
If they are fruitless, and are seen continually to be fruitless, they will not be repeated.

Mr. Lawrence: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the reason why the practice hitherto has been not to challenge for cause is that there has been the right to peremptory challenge and that has satisfied everyone?

Mr. Hurd: Indeed, I understand that. However, I do not understand the logic of saying that if we do away with peremptory challenge, the judges and the courts will change the current practice and allow a continuous series of challenges for cause on grounds that they would not admit today.

Mr. Budgen: It is true that, as my right hon. Friend said, constant challenges for cause would be fruitless. No doubt the judge would turn them down. But the fact is that they

undermine the random nature of the jury. I am sure that my right hon. Friend agrees that the general confidence of the public in the jury system is vital. A system that allows anti-establishment lawyers constantly to bring forward complaints for cause and to have them turned down by the judge, so that they can then complain to the media that they were involved in an unfair trial, has the effect of undermining the validity of the trial.

Mr. Hurd: My hon. Friend is always ingenious, but I do not think that that is probable. I do not think that lawyers, of whatever persuasion, will go on bouncing up and down, making challenges for cause of a kind that it is the court's practice continually to reject.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton was not on the Standing Committee, and there is no reason why he should have followed our discussions about standby. I entirely accept, as I did on Second Reading, that the Government's proposal has implications for the use of the prosecution right of stand-by. In Committee, I circulated draft guidance to prosecuting authorities restricting the use of stand-by to cases of terrorism or national security in which jury checks are authorised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General or, exceptionally, where a manifestly unfit person should be excused with the minimum of embarrassment.
If my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton and my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South-West study the restrictive nature that we now propose for the use of stand-by, which is of a quite different character and, in any case, is must less often used than the right of peremptory challenge, they will see that we have dealt with that as fairly as we can.
The Government's case is that peremptory challenge is not effective in creating a jury which reflects the defendant's world. The question is whether the tilt to the system away from random selection continues to be justified. Of course, I believe that the tilt was justified in the days when the system in other respects could be said to be unfair to the defendant, but I do not believe that that is so today.
We are left with the main plea of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicestershire, North-West, which was backed by other hon. Members, that, whatever the merits of peremptory challenge, it has the merit that it leaves the defendant with the idea that he has had a fair trial. But there is another side to the argument. The wider public interest and wider public confidence in the system must be considered as well. There are many grounds on which defendants who are found guilty object to trial. I know that because I receive many letters from people who are in prison having been found guilty when they think that they should not have been. But I do not think that it is very probable that this argument would rate highly among them.
Of course, the attempted tilt is to the defendant. I do not understand the argument which denies that. Here we have a change which the Government propose which is not revolutionary or radical. I entirely accept the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. One of the purposes of being a Tory is that one believes that change should be "gradual", to use his word, slow and organic and should come down through the ages. That is exactly what has happened here. We used to have 35 peremptory challenges. Then it was reduced to seven. No doubt, the profession was keen that nothing


should be done and thought that there was magic in the word "seven", yet it was reduced to three. Obviously, through the years Parliament has felt that, as the system as a whole becomes fairer to the defendant, this tilt in favour of the defendant is no longer necessary. We propose a strengthening of the jury system. This is a strengthing of the random principle which lies at the heart of the jury system. It is the slow, organic conclusion of a process which has been going on for a long time. That is why I recommend that the House should not accept the new clause.

Mr. Chris Smith: We have had a long and, at times, serious debate on a serious matter that lies at the heart of the Bill. There have been some interesting speeches, particularly from the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) and the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby), who set out some of the kernel of the argument on this issue.
Other comments filled me with considerable anxiety, for example those of the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels), who said that because some members of juries did not respect law and order there were too many acquittals. I urge the hon. Gentleman to think carefully about what he said, because it did not do justice to members of juries or to the criminal justice system. We in the Labour party certainly wish to do that.
10.45 pm
Hon. Members have referred to the fact that in the 1970s the Labour Government limited the right of peremptory challenge from seven to three. In the disingenuous words of the Home Secretary, all that the Government are doing is furthering the process of organic change, adjusting to further realities and tilting the system a little more. There is a world of qualitative between reducing the number of challenges available from seven to three and abolishing the right altogether. When the reduction took place, Labour Members made it clear that they were not supporting abolition.
The Home Secretary also said that peremptory challenge does not achieve a balanced or representative jury, and he is right. The use of peremptory challenge does not necessarily achieve that, but nor does the present supposedly random system. Sometimes that system has thrown up a perceptibly imbalanced, unrepresentative jury. In those cases, there must be some recourse to the defendant without having to go through an enormous, elaborate procedure of challenging for cause, which, as the hon. and learned Member for Burton warned us, may lead to days of wrangles in the courtrooms. There must be some provision for the defendant to ensure that at least there is one woman, man or black person on the jury so that he feels he is being tried fairly.
The Home Secretary said that the statistics did not tell us much, but they drive a coach and horses through the argument of the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Jessel) that juries subject to peremptory challenge let off defendants. The evidence on that is clear. The Home Secretary is right in saying that the statistical difference between 60 and 53 per cent. of convictions does not tell us much about the success or failure of peremptory challenge to select a jury which is more or less minded to listen to the defendant.
The hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Favell) got close to the truth in an intervention when he said that surely we

should recognise that this is a hit-or-miss operation. He went on to ask, "If it is a hit-or-miss operation, why have it?" I will answer that in a moment.
The other side of the coin is that one could ask, equally validly, "Why remove it if it is a hit-or-miss operation?" If that lands us with a jury that is just as likely to acquit or to convict as the jury that existed in the first place, and if the defendant believes that it has enabled him to be subject to a fairer system, there are no valid grounds for removing that option or chance. That is the crucial point.
The Home Secretary said that peremptory challenge puts a tilt in the system away from the random. He asked whether that assists the defendant. It does not necessarily assist the defendant, but it gives him a sense of fairness of the process. We are talking about a perception of justice or injustice when we put this new clause before the House. We believe that peremptory challenge should he retained and that the defendant should be assured, and have the perception, that the system has treated him or her fairly. We believe that the Home Secretary is wrong to remove peremptory challenge. We have, therefore, tabled this new clause.

Question put, That the clause he read a Second time:

The House divided: Ayes 69, Noes 176.

Division No. 131]
[10.50 pm


AYES


Adams, Allen (Paisley N)
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Alton, David
Hayes, J.


Ashby, David
Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)


Ashdown, Paddy
Howarth, George (Knowsley, N)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Kennedy, Charles


Beith, A. J.
Kirkwood, Archy


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Lawrence, Ivan


Boyes, Roland
Leadbitter, Ted


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Lester, Jim


Bruce, Malcolm
Lewis, Terence (Worsley)


Budgen, Nick
Livsey, Richard


Caborn, Richard
McCartney, Hugh


Campbell-Savours, Dale
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Canavan, Dennis
McKay, Allen (Penistone)


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
McWilliam, John


Clay, Robert
Madden, Max


Clelland, David Gordon
Michie, William


Conlan, Bernard
Nellist, David


Corbyn, Jeremy
Pike, Peter


Craigen, J. M.
Raynsford, Nick


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Shields, Mrs Elizabeth


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Skinner, Dennis


Deakins, Eric
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Dixon, Donald
Soley, Clive


Dobson, Frank
Spearing, Nigel


Fatchett, Derek
Steel, Rt Hon David


Fisher, Mark
Stott, Roger


Forrester, John
Taylor, Matthew


Foster, Derek
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Franks, Cecil
Wallace, James


Fraser, J. (Norwood)



Freud, Clement
Tellers for the Ayes:


Godman, Dr Norman
Mr. Gerald Bermingham and


Golding, Mrs Llin
Mr. Michael Meadowcroft.


Ground, Patrick





NOES


Alexander, Richard
Benyon, William


Amess, David
Bevan, David Gilroy


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Biffen, Rt Hon John


Baker, Nicholas (Dorset N)
Biggs-Davison, Sir John


Baldry, Tony
Blackburn, John


Batiste, Spencer
Boscawen, Hon Robert


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Bottomley, Peter


Bendall, Vivian
Bottomley, Mrs Virginia

Bowden, A. (Brighton K'to'n)
Freeman, Roger


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Gale, Roger


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Bright, Graham
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Brinton, Tim
Goodhart, Sir Philip


Brooke, Hon Peter
Gorst, John


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Gow, Ian


Bruinvels, Peter
Gower, Sir Raymond


Bryan, Sir Paul
Greenway, Harry


Butcher, John
Gregory, Conal


Butler, Rt Hon Sir Adam
Griffiths, Sir Eldon


Butterfill, John
Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)


Carlisle, John (Luton N)
Grist, Ian


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)


Carttiss, Michael
Hanley, Jeremy


Cash, William
Hannam, John


Chapman, Sydney
Harvey, Robert


Chope, Christopher
Haselhurst, Alan


Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)
Hawkins, Sir Paul (N'folk SW)


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Hawksley, Warren


Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)
Hayward, Robert


Cockeram, Eric
Heathcoat-Amory, David


Colvin, Michael
Heddle, John


Coombs, Simon
Henderson, Barry


Cope, John
Hickmet, Richard


Cranborne, Viscount
Hicks, Robert


Crouch, David
Hirst, Michael


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)


Dorrell, Stephen
Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)


Dover, Den
Hubbard-Miles, Peter


Dunn, Robert
Hunt, David (Wirral W)


Dykes, Hugh
Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas


Eggar, Tim
Jackson, Robert


Eyre, Sir Reginald
Jessel, Toby


Fallon, Michael
Jones. Gwilym (Cardiff N)


Favell, Anthony
Jones, Robert (Herts W)


Forman, Nigel
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Fowler, Rt Hon Norman
Key, Robert


Fox, Sir Marcus
King, Roger (B'ham N'field)


Fraser, Peter (Angus East)
Knight, Greg (Derby N)

Knox, David
Osborn, Sir John


Lamont, Rt Hon Oorman
Ottaway, Richard


Latham, Michael
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Lawler, Geoffrey
Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil


Lee, John (Pendle)
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Patten, J. (Oxf W &amp; Abgdn)


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Pawsey, James


Lightbown, David
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


Lilley, Peter
Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Porter, Barry


Lord, Michael
Portillo, Michael


Luce, Rt Hon Richard
Powell, William (Corby)


Lyell, Nicholas
Proctor, K. Harvey


Macfarlane, Neil
Raffan, Keith


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Rathbone, Tim


Maclean, David John
Rhodes James, Robert


McLoughlin, Patrick
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Madel, David
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Major, John
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Malins, Humfrey
Skeet, Sir Trevor


Malone, Gerald
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Marland, Paul
Speed, Keith


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


Mather, Sir Carol
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Thompson, Donald (Calder V)


Mayhew, Sir Patrick
Thorne, Neil afford S)


Mellor, David
Thurnham, Peter


Merchant, Piers
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Viggers, Peter


Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Warren, Kenneth


Miscampbell, Norman
Wells, Sir John (Maidstone)


Montgomery, Sir Fergus
Wheeler, John


Moynihan, Hon C.
Wood, Timothy


Mudd, David
Yeo, Tim


Neubert, Michael



Nicholls. Patrick
Tellers for the Noes:


Norris, Steven
Mr. Tony Durant and


Oppenheim, Phillip
Mr. Francis Maude.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 10

COMPENSATION FOR CLOTHING

'In the case of a claim under section 78(1)(a) compensation shall be payable for loss or damage to clothing or personal adjuncts of the claimant.—[Mr. Kaufman.]

Brought up and read the First time.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 11—
Character and way of life—
'In deciding whether to withhold or reduce compensation on the grounds of a claimant's character, way of life or conduct in which he has engaged at any time the Board shall take into account any relevant criminal offences of which he has been convicted .but shall not take into account his lawful behaviour, race, sex, political or religious beliefs or sexuality.'
New clause 12—Minimum compensation levels—
'The Secretary of State shall not make an order under section 81(1) which reduces the minimum award of compensation to less than £150.'.
New clause 13—Compensation for police officers—
'Any police officer who sustains an injury while attempting in the course of his duties to enforce the law shall be eligible for compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.'.

Mr. Kaufman: We now come to what, from the point of view of the Government's policy, is the shoddiest part of this Bill. Two weeks ago the Government gave away billions of pounds in an attempt to bribe the electorate in the general election whenever it comes. In this part of the Bill they are saving tiny amounts of money at the cost of victims of crime of small means and also at the cost of members of the police forces of this country. I find it remarkable that it is possible for the Government to resist amendments which will afford victims of unpleasant crimes small amounts of compensation which could make a very great difference to their lives.
This new clause would entitle those suffering criminal injuries to compensation for loss of or damage to clothing or personal adjuncts. We are not saying here that we want people of ample means to be recompensed for the loss of expensive garments. That is not the implication of what we are proposing. We are not proposing that the state, through the public purse, should compensate people for what insurance policies ought to be able to put right; nor are we saying that, even when insurance is not available, people whose means are considerable should be recompensed in order to obtain new clothes in place of older clothes which have been damaged or destroyed as a result of a criminal assault.
We are saying that, by the very nature of things, by the very nature of the large numbers of violent crimes in the country today, a considerable number of people of very modest means are going to lose the clothes which they have on their backs, which are the only clothes available to them.
I do not know about Conservative Members, but I certainly know about my own constituents. Whenever I go about parts of my constituency I am deeply depressed at the patent poverty of my constituents as demonstrated by the clothes that they wear. If one goes around many of the wards in my constituency and sees the unemployed people or people living on supplementary benefit—one-parent

families, elderly people, pensioners—the extent to which they are no longer able to dress as well as they used to is clear. Their clothes are often old; their clothes are often drab; their clothes, despite their best efforts to keep them in good repair, have seen better days a long time ago.
That sort of person in my constituency is more liable to be a victim of a crime of violence than people of greater affluence because, despite any views or legends to the contrary, it is the poorer people who are predominantly the victims of crime and it is the poorer people in the inner city areas such as I represent who are most likely to be the victims of violent crime.
Again and again it happens that somebody who is a victim of a crime of violence has his or her only available clothes damaged beyond repair. We regard it as regrettable that it is not going to be open to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to compensate such people by giving them the cost of a new set of clothes, a new jacket, skirt, coat, pair of shoes or whatever it might be. Therefore, I am depressed that the Government have so far been unwilling to make the sort of concession that the clause requests.
As I have said, it is not that the money is not available. The money is there in enormous quantities and money is being handed out in tuppenny tax reliefs all over the country. A minute fraction of the tuppenny tax relief is all that is required to fulfil the aim of this new clause. Therefore, I hope that the Government will no turn it down but will say that they recognise that there is an important case.
New clause 11 is a different sort of clause, one with which we are seeking to rectify a serious shortcoming in the Bill as it stands. The Bill has a provision that limits eligibility for criminal injuries compensation. I refer the House to clause 79(2)(b), which states that the board shall have powers to refuse to award compensation or reduce compensation
where they consider that the making of any or, as the case may be, a full award of compensation would be inappropriate having regard to the claimant's character, his way of life or the conduct in which he is engaged at any time.
Of course, we are not saying that where somebody has been guilty of a criminal offence he should necessarily be eligible for criminal injuries compensation. However, it seems that a subjective view of merit for compensation is not one that is appropriate for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to take.
We do not believe that somebody should have his eligibility for criminal injuries compensation limited or removed because of his race. We do not believe that that should be so because of his sex or because of his political beliefs. We believe that a Communist or even— I will say it-a member of the National Front has as much right to obtain compensation for criminal injuries as anybody in what one might call the main stream of British political life. We certainly do not believe that there should be discrimination on the basis of religious belief, even if that claimed religious belief is minority, unconventional or unpopular. I do not believe that somebody who is, for example a Moonie, should be deprived of eligibility for criminal injuries compensation if he has been a victim of a criminal assault. I do not believe that anybody should be deprived of compensation on account of their sexual preferences. Sexual preferences in this country are all lawful, provided they are carried out within the law.
That being so, I do not believe that there ought to be any subjective assessment of merit with regard to eligibility for criminal injuries compensation but that the test should be simply whether the criteria applying to eligibility are fulfilled by the applicant. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will accept that, in order to clarify beyond doubt the obligations upon the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.
11.15 pm
We come to new clause 12, in which we seek to lower the floor for criminal injuries compensation. Of all the obnoxious actions which the Government have taken in recent years, possibly the most obnoxious was when, at the time of the autumn statement last year, they raised this floor from £400 to £550. They did this—even if they did not admit it, the Green Paper on criminal injuries compensation admitted it— simply in order to save money. When the lower limit was increased to £400 from 1 February 1983, the Green Paper, the report of an interdepartmental working party, said that this was the first time it had been increased in real terms. My right hon. Friend the Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) had raised it simply to maintain it in real terms, but this was the first time, said the working party, that it had been increased in real terms.
The report was quite open and honest about why it was done:
the aim being to contain the cost of the Scheme by excluding a greater number of cases involving only minor injury and loss".
That is what the Government did again, when they raised the floor from £400 to £550 last autumn. What does it mean? It means that the Government have reduced by about a quarter the number of those who are eligible for criminal injuries compensation. They have done so to save the niggardly sum of £2,300,000—because, of course, at the bottom end of the scale aggregate compensation for many thousands of people comes to very small sums of money.
I really do not know how the Prime Minister can, as she did at Torquay a couple of weeks ago, go on about the sadness of criminal injuries victims, when at the same time she herself is depriving victims of the right to compensation, a quarter of them, all for £2,300,000, yet she is giving away billions of pounds to others. So if the Government are not going to accept this amendment, I hope that they will stop whining and moaning in this hypocritical way about their concern for victims, because they are deliberately and specifically removing the eligibility of victims for compensation.
The fourth new clause that we have tabled—No. 13—relates to compensation for police. I believe that the Government have behaved very meanly towards police officers by keeping what was clause 74(7) in this Bill, even though they amended it in Committee. We put some cases to them in Committee. Once again, the Government demonstrated an extraordinarily niggardly attitude towards police officers injured on duty.
The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths), who is here, fairly questioned me on Second Reading when I criticised what was then clause 74(7). I was saying that we would move—as we did in Committee—for the deletion of that clause, the clause that then excluded from compensation, and now limits the eligibility

for compensation of not only serving police officers but other people who serve the public in positions of hazard and danger.
We said that we would move to delete that clause, and the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds said:
I should like him"—
that was me
to be precise. Is he saying that he will return to the present position—that where police officers take exceptional risks they should receive compensation—or is he saying that he will go all the way back to the position which existed some years ago when that test did not have to be met?"—[Official Report, 27 November 1986; Vol. 106, c. 480.]
I replied that we would restore the present position. Because of the increasing incidence of crime it is unfair that there should not be proper compensation for police officers, firemen, ambulance men, security workers, nurses and others who may be involved in hazard in the course of pursuing their duty if it results in injury. In some cases, it can mean limited compensation and in other cases a great deal, because the injuries may be very serious.
In Committee I was questioned by Ministers about the difference between injuries. The Minister of State said:
The right hon. Gentleman must understand that although, as I hope I have made clear, the accident must be concerned with the matters which he discusses, it could mean that somebody running along perfectly flat ground to prevent somebody from riding a bicycle on a pavement could qualify under the scheme. That would not be right."— [Official Report, Standing Committee F, 24 February 1987; c. 769.]
I asked why it would not be right. If somebody is attempting to stop a crime, and particularly if he is involved in pursuit, is he to think twice about whether he will go that next step in case he is injured and will not be compensated for it? Of course people will not do that. A person carrying out that service to the community does not think as he pursues a criminal or a potential criminal, "Shall I stop running now because I might not get compensation?" The spirit of public service is too great for that. It is deplorable that the Government should not respond to our wish to have this rectified.
I think the Police Federation made a great mistake in accepting the compromise that the Government offered— that is, to reinstate exceptional risk. If the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds advised the federation to accept that, I think he was mistaken in that advice. If the Police Federation had held out for the deletion of that subsection, it would have had our support. If it had said that it was dissatisfied, I do not believe that the Government could have carried the day in Committee or in the House. I am not saying that the hon. Gentleman advised the Police Federation to accept the compromise because I do not know, but if he did, he did not do the police a service because they could and should have got the lot. I still think that they should get the lot. That is why we have tabled the new clause.
Here again the amounts of money at issue are minute; they are a fraction of 0·1 per cent. of the Budget that the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced two weeks ago. I cannot understand how it is possible for the Government to say that they have all this money at their disposal and then he so mean as to tell police officers and other public servants injured on duty that they cannot qualify except on the basis of exceptional risk—that being, of course, a subjective concept.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: Much of what the right hon. Gentleman says is music to my ears, and I shall listen


carefully to my hon. Friend's reply. When the right hon. Gentleman suggests that the quantum is very small, I hope he has taken account of the fact that in an average year the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board will make awards for as many as 15,000 police officers. For example, during the miners' strike at least that number were eligible for compensation. Can the right hon. Gentleman say when he resumes his speech whether what he has in mind is a statutory compensation scheme or merely a discretionary arrangement of the CICB?

Mr. Kaufman: We are dealing here with what the Bill says, and we can only amend the Bill. I have said— indeed, I said it to the hon. Gentleman when he questioned me—that we believe that there should be a scheme for police officers that is different from the CICB scheme. We believe that a scheme should be built into their contracts of engagement. We believe that it should be an automatic scheme. We believe that it should he a scheme that applies to families where there is loss, and certainly where there is bereavement. We want a different and much more secure scheme, which we would readily negotiate with the Police Federation and other representative bodies of the police forces. But we are not dealing with that here.
We are dealing here with an exclusion and we believe that that exclusion is wrong. I talk here of small amounts of money because that is all that we are dealing with. I have a letter sent to Opposition Members from the Police Federation last November before clause 74(7) was amended by the Committee. It took the view that about 1,500 claims a year were at issue then. Clearly, there will be fewer now, but the smaller the number at issue, the more miserly the Government are shown to be and the more easily it is possible for the Government to provide the compensation with scarcely a waver on the graph of public expenditure. That is why we believe that, now that it has been reduced to this area in this scheme, as distinct from the scheme that the Labour party would introduce, the Government have no excuse for being so recalcitrant on this issue.
That is particularly so because, as I say, since 17 March when we make a request from small amounts of public expenditure the Government cannot say that the money is not there. The fact is that the money was there in huge quantities and the Government have decided to use it for other reasons than to compensate victims of criminal injuries. They have decided to use it in order to hand out a bribe to try to win the general election and be damned to the police whom they say they support and be damned to the victims of crime about whom they say they care. That is why we have tabled this group of amendments.
I can best sum up our view on this by quoting from The Times the words of Miss Helen Reeves, director of the Association of Victim Support Schemes. When the raising of the floor was being considered, she said:
We are saddened that the Government is to confirm that limit. We would like to see it gradually eroded by inflation. If it is kept up, large numbers of victims will be excluded.
The Government's criminal injuries compensation scheme is being put on a statutory basis, but that scheme is in a huge mess because we have so much more crime and, because of that, more people have become aware of the possibility of compensation.
It is right for the Government to say that applications for criminal injury compensation are growing faster than

the level of crime, but that is simply because the public, through being victims of violent crime, are catching up with the possibilities of compensation.
It is a fact that 60,000 people are now awaiting compensation. It is a fact that in 1985–86 30 per cent. of those who had their cases resolved had had to wait for over a year. It is a fact that a year ago at least 11,800 people had had cases pending for over a year. It is a fact that the number of people now awaiting criminal injuries compensation is nearly three times the number who were awaiting it when the Labour Government left office. Some of those people have suffered injuries so unspeakable that it makes me shudder to describe them or even to think about them.
The Government have not done justice to criminal injuries victims. The Minister will talk about the sums of money that the Government are adding to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. I know, because he admitted it in Standing Committee, that he has not got as much as he would have liked; the Treasury has done him down. But, as he admits, all that he is going to be able to do with what he has got is to reduce the queue by 5,000 a year for three years. At the end of those three years, the queue will not even start to be reduced again. What is more, he is not reducing the queue as it will be; he is reducing it as it is now. He may be reducing an existing queue, but he is not reducing a putative later queue.
11.30 pm
Let not the Minister of State— who has done his best, but failed, to obtain decent amounts—say that he is increasing the amount available under the scheme. It is for a limited period, for a limited reason and with limited scope. What we want is hundreds of millions of pounds to be made available under the scheme. Let us suppose that the taxpaying electorate were faced with a choice between adding £500 million to the criminal injuries compensation scheme, and losing a fraction of a penny from their income tax cuts. If there were a referendum tomorrow, I think that they would choose to add £500 million to the scheme.

Mr. Mellor: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we keep a tab of those commitments, which are at present running at £34,000 million. Is that commitment another £500 million to add to Labour's public expenditure plans?

Mr. Kaufman: No. I am saying that, given the choice, I know what choice the people would make. I also say that we shall lower the floor in the way proposed in new clause 12. The amount of additional public expenditure involved will be minute, but a large number of people will be assisted.
The Minister of State had better not make glib interventions like that, when he knows that two weeks ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer could have provided the country with a decent, properly funded, properly functioning, speedily paid criminal injuries compensation scheme, and chose not to, in the hope that—of all things—the hon. Member for Leicester, East (M r. Bruinvels) would be re-elected. That is one of the most grotesque political and expenditure priorities in the history of modern democracy.
Let not the Minister of State say for a moment that the money was not there, and let him not issue glib challenges to us. The challenge is to him. We have four new clauses and every one of them, if put to the electorate, would receive an overwhelming majority in favour.
I reiterate the four things that we want: compensation for loss or damage to clothing or personal adjuncts; no withholding or reduction or compensation on the basis of a claimant's character or way of life; lowering of the floor to £150; and the removal of the exceptional risk proviso from criminal injuries compensation for constables and others injured in the course of their duties.

Mr. Mellor: We have heard the usual endearing display of brazen virtuosity from the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman). I congratulate him on being able to maintain in such adversity such a sustained attack on the exceptionally generous way in which the Government have dealt with the victims of crime. He knows the facts and the figures cannot be denied. He tried to take the wind out of my sails by saying, "It is no good the Minister of State talking about money." I shall certainly mention it, although I do not intend at this time of night to go over all the ground that we traversed in Standing Committee.
The right hon. Gentleman knows only too well that in the next financial year we shall be spending, in real terms, three and a half times what the Labour Government spent on compensating victims. We will also spend money on victim support schemes. Although they were in existence throughout the lifetime of the Labour Government, they did not receive one penny in Government assistance.
The right hon. Gentleman also knows that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary was able to secure no less than £113 million of extra resources for the scheme last October. How that can be portrayed by the right hon. Gentleman as a defeat for the Home Office, I do not know.
The right hon. Gentleman has given the lie to any suggestion that what we are doing is done to save money by drawing attention to one inescapable fact— there is an inevitable backlog of cases, and always will be, when the scheme has to deal seriously with major, traumatic injuries and when hearings are required. That is why, in the world where one has to run things rather than criticise others for running things, we cannot have a scheme which does not concentrate on the real injuries which require major compensation. That is why we have decided to lift the floor.
The right hon. Gentleman knows that I cannot accept new clause 12. He knows that, when the scheme was first introduced in 1964, the base limit was set at what was then three weeks' average wage. That is pretty much the scale we have with £550, which enables us to focus on people with more severe injury. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the pace of the increase of violent crime has been slower throughout the 1980s than it was during the 1970s, but that, for perfectly proper reasons, more people now claim compensation. We go out of our way to ensure, through victim support schemes and citizens advice bureaux, that people know their entitlement to claim under the scheme. No such conscious attempt was made under the Labour Government and, even now, only a minority of victims apply for compensation.
As for new clause 13, the right hon. Gentleman finds himself in the position of, I think, Engels—I am not well up on revolutionaries—who said that one cannot agitate a man with a full belly. The right hon. Gentleman is trying to lead a charge when those who might have supported him have melted away. A perfectly reasonable

distinction has been drawn since 1979 about the basis on which compensation should be paid to people who are injured accidentally.
The case that the right hon. Gentleman erected on sand about compensation to police officers relates not to an intentional application of force but to accidental injuries. The Police Federation which, as ever, was sustained in its efforts by the diligent and unswerving efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths) properly made representations to us to restore the situation to what it has been recently and what it remains— that there should be compensation when an exceptional risk is taken.
I was interested when the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to say that someone who runs across flat ground to stop someone riding a bicycle on a pavement should receive compensation if he falls and injures himself from a criminal injuries compensation scheme which is designed to compensate people for injuries inflicted on them by criminals. That is taking debating licence too far. However, the right hon. Gentleman is only playing with the issue, as he has made clear. Having made grandiloquent statements about how the public would leap up and down at the prospect of the spending of another £500 million in taxes—those who like to jump up and down at the prospect of paying taxes would have every opportunity to do so once the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) took over Treasury responsibilities, if that were ever to happen—the right hon. Gentleman was asked whether he was to make a pledge or enter into a commitment, but he jumped away from that like a scalded cat, as well he might.
The answer to new clause 13 is that we have entered into an arrangement with the Police Federation which I believe to be, and which I understand it believes to be, entirely satisfactory. On that I must rest.
When it comes to new clause 10, I accept that we are drawing a line in one place when it could have been elsewhere. The right hon. Gentleman knows that such margin as I had, notwithstanding the exceptional additional sums that have been made available for the scheme, was taken away from me—I do not complain about that—by my agreeing to meet the claims of railwaymen who suffer nervous shock as a result of people trying to commit suicide in front of railway trains. That means that the £400,000 that it would cost to compensate for clothing is not available, £800,000 having been made available for railwaymen.
There is a perfectly logical case for the exclusion, but if we are to have a commitment of additional spending by some future Labour Government to compensate for clothing, let us hear it now. The right hon. Gentleman knows that if someone has his clothes ripped as a result of a criminal action, and that is the only damage, there is no basis for a claim. Claims must be based on criminal injuries. However, if an injury lies within the scheme and additionally clothes are damaged, compensation can be obtained for the clothing as well as for the injury.
We do not propose to continue with that provision, for two reasons. First, it seems arbitrary that someone can recover for damage to property merely because they have been physically injured, but not otherwise. That does not seem logical. That is why we shall restrict property claims to personal adjuncts. Secondly, the average payment for damage to clothing has been about £15 to £20 under the scheme, and that is well documented. I am well aware of


the impoverishment of some claimants, although they are only a small minority, but £15 to £20 is hardly a large sum on which to make such a great claim as that which the right hon. Gentleman submitted. There is an ability to apply for exceptional payments if there is no other way in which clothing can be replaced.
It is regrettable that these lines have to be drawn, but it is necessary to do so when formulating a practical scheme. We have taken the view that we should focus on the more serious injuries, and that is what we are doing.
I can offer something positive to the right hon. Gentleman in responding to new clause 11. As I understood the right hon. Gentleman, he is not pushing against the entitlement of the board to make reductions on a basis that is broadly equivalent to the contributory negligence arrangements that prevail in the civil courts. Indeed, the entire scheme proceeds by analogy with claims for personal injuries before the civil courts. It is true that in clause 79 the principal ground for withholding the whole or part of a claim lies within subsection (2)(c), which reads:
that he was not to any extent responsible for the injury to which the claim relates".
Paragraph (b) relates to what is already within the rules of the scheme under K— "Character and Way of Life"- which, inter alia, states:
The applicant's criminal convictions will influence whether the application should be rejected completely or the award reduced because of character and way of life. Any attempts the applicant has made to reform himself should also be taken into consideration.
The passage continues to identify the nature of convictions that would be borne particularly in mind. It is clear that that is more specifically related to convictions than the construction of subsection (2)(b) might be.
It is on that basis that we have no wish to enhance the ambit of the arrangements that the board presently applies. I should like to discuss with the chairman of the board the proposal that is contained in new clause 11, and I hope that it will be possible to bring forward some restriction in another place to meet the point that has been raised.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I shall comment briefly on new clause 13, but in doing so I welcome what my hon. Friend the Minister has just said about new clause 11. If his ruminations bear fruit, I shall be interested to see what the Government are able to provide when the Bill goes to another place.
I was fascinated by the speech of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman). I never look a gift horse in the mouth. I assure him that the Police Federation will study very carefully both what he has said and the terms of his new clause. I understand that in it he is offering an all-embracing occupational accident insurance policy. I do not think that any police officer would resist that for one moment. It is uncommonly generous of the right hon. Gentleman to propose it. It would make the police unique—but they are unique. I am happy to accept, for careful study, his generous offer.
11.45 pm
It would have to be built into a new, separate and statutory compensation scheme. The right hon. Gentleman has said on previous occasions as well as tonight that, constrained as he is by the Bill, he can only seek to make improvements within the parameters of this legislation and that if he had the opportunity to do so he

would put together an entirely new scheme. I take it that it would be a statutory scheme. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the Police Federation has a number of reservations about that. However, the offer will be studied with care.
In respect of the Police Federation, I regard myself as, above all else, one of the custodians of the Edmund-Davies pay formula. The right hon. Gentleman knows that that pay formula was constructed from a whole series of factors that make the police unique. I refer to the shortage of police officers at the time; to the 24-hour responsibility that they uniquely must bear; to the very severe standards of discipline to which they and their families are exposed; and to the loss of civil liberty, whereby a police officer must, on joining, abandon all trade union and political activities. Above all else, there was built into the formula the risk of hazards on the job. It was to that point that the interdepartmental working party of civil servants drew attention when it made what, I confess, I regarded as the outrageous proposal that found its way into the Bill that we debated on Second Reading.
I should approach any proposals for a new insurance scheme a little charily if it appeared to put at risk or to cut away at the basis of the Edmund-Davies formula, which is constructed on the unique hazards that police officers have to face when doing their job. Whenever there is civil disorder, whether it be at Wapping, or connected with the miners' strike, or elsewhere, very large numbers of police officers suffer severe or minor injuries. I note that the right hon. Gentleman proposes to cover all those injuries. I hope that he has been able to carry with him the Trades Union Congress and his friends in the National Union o f Mineworkers. I shall be very interested to hear about that. I am bound, therefore, to welcome all that the right hon. Gentleman has said about an occupational insurance policy that would insure the police against all future accidents.
It is a disgrace that the original proposals should have been jumped out of an interdepartmental working party report into the Bill, without any consultation. It was quite proper that the Police Federation should immediately protest. On behalf of the federation I entered into negotiations with the Home Office. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and my hon. Friend the Minister of State behaved in an entirely civilised manner. They recognised the problem, accepted that the policy was a mistake, and returned to the previous position. The Police Federation's view is bound to be that it struck a bargain with the Government, and in the circumstances it will not go back on that bargain. It is grateful to the Home Secretary for what he has done. In all the circumstances—as the right hon. Member for Gorton will understand the—federation's best position is to take what it can from the Government and be grateful for that, but to look very carefully at the proposals made by the right hon. Member for Gorton.

Mr. Kaufman: The debate has confirmed my view that the Police Federation was badly advised in the decision that it made. If the implication of the remarks made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edrnunds (Sir E. Griffiths) is that he was a participant in that process and an adviser to the federation, I believe that he advised the federation badly, because the federation could and should have received more. It should not have settled for what it agreed in the end. Public sympathy was rightly with the police,


and the bargaining position of the Police Federation was a good deal stronger than may have been explained to the federation by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds. Of course, the hon. Gentleman was correct to state that, the Police Federation having made a bargain with the Government, it should stick by it. That is an honourable position and I have no doubt that the federation will maintain that honourable position. I simply say that I do not believe that the federation was sensible to strike that bargain. If the federation had stuck with the Opposition, it would have done a great deal better. I have advised the Police Federation before, as the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds is aware, that it should change its adviser and get a better deal.

Mr. Richard Ryder: ; It should have chosen the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn).

Mr. Kaufman: My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) would have done a better job for the Police Federation than the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, who only got the federation a return to the status quo. If it had had a little chat with me instead of with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, the smiles on the faces of members of the federation would be broader than they are now.
However, the federation was badly advised. It has made a bargain and is sticking to it. I have repeatedly said—I said this to the largest meeting available to me at the Labour party's fringe meeting at the Police Federation meeting at Scarborough last May and I have repeated it to many other police audiences and to police as individuals,— that as far as the Opposition are concerned the Edmund-Davies agreement is intact. Whatever we propose must be in addition to Edmund- Davies and should not require a re-negotiation of Edmund-Davies formula. That point must be clearly understood. I want no one to believe that somehow or other we want to reopen the Edmund-Davies package to produce the better scheme to which I believe the police are entitled. I hope that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds will take that message away with the greatest of clarity.
We all know the Minister. He is coming to the end of a very long stint and he has done his best, but he has failed with the Treasury. He can only give us any kind of leverage when it comes to the new clause that does not cost any money. He told us that it will cost him £400,000 to allow the clause on clothing, but he could not do that because he had done justice to the memory of his ancestor and done right by engine drivers. I do not believe that it should be a matter of choice. We should have both. Now that the Minister has told us that his assessment of the cost of the clothing new clause is £400,000, we can set that within the context of the Budget announced two weeks ago. I have already made our position clear on the police and on the very small additional cost that would be implied in the lowering of the floor to £150.
In this life we take what we can get. What I can get is new clause 11. As I have got new clause 11, I am taking it. I expect the Minister to deliver. Having clinched that deal with the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

BAIL ACT 1976 NOT TO APPLY TO MURDER OR RAPE (No. 1)

'(1) Subsection (2) of section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 shall be amended by inserting after the word "offence", in the first place where it occurs, the words "other than murder or rape".'.—[Mr. Peter Bruinvels.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Bruinvels: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take the following: New clause 15—Bail Act 1976 not to apply to murder or rape (No. 2)—
'Where a person is brought before a magistrates' court or the Crown Court charged with the offence of murder or rape and he applies to the court for bail in connection with the proceedings, and where objection is made by the police to such an application, that person shall not be granted bail.'.
New clause 17— Bail in cases of homicide and certain other serious offences—
'After paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 there shall be added the following:
3A. In every case where the defendant is charge with murder, attempted murder or an offence contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, any bail application shall be heard before a judge sitting in the Crown Court in open court, and before granting bail the judge shall certify in relation to the defendant that:—

(a) he has a settled address;
(b) he has surrendered his passport (if any);
(c) he has not been convicted of any of the offences described above;
(d) there are not substantial grounds for believing that he would fail to surrender to custody;
(e) there are not substantial grounds for believing that he would interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, whether in relation to himself of any other person;
(f) there are not reasonable grounds for believing that he would commit an offence while on bail.".'.

New clause 22— Restriction of bail on indictment—
'(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 and Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976, no person indicted on a charge of murder shall be released on bail.
(2) No person with a previous conviction for an indictable offence shall be released on bail without the consent of the Crown, when charged with a further indictable offence.'

Mr. Bruinvels: Following the Winston Silcott case, when Silcott was sentenced to a minimum of 30 years' imprisonment for murdering PC Blakelock and the headline in the Daily Telegraph stated:
Pc Blakelock's killer was facing fourth death trial",
the House must be asking itself: has the Bail Act 1976 failed? The importance of any court decision in granting bail cannot be exaggerated. It is the duty of any court considering a bail application to balance the liberty of an unconvicted individual, who while awaiting trial is, of course, presumed innocent, against the requirements that those charged with criminal offences are duly brought to trial and the public protected.
The factors influencing the exercise of this discretion are encompassed in the Bail Act 1976. That Act placed a duty on the court to grant bail to an accused appearing before it. The presumption of bail can be overridden where the court is satisfied that the accused will abscond, will commit further offences on bail, will interfere with the course of justice or, more importantly, where there are fears for the defendant's safety. The establishment of any


one of those four factors to the satisfaction of the court will usually be enough to result in the accused person being remanded in custody, as should have happened in the Winston Silcott case.
The report on bail procedures in magistrates courts which was published in 1974 makes it clear:
When an unconvicted person is remanded or committed for trial, there should be a presumption in favour of his being granted bail.
A Bail Act press release, issued by the Home Office on 17 April 1978, made it clear that the
primary purpose of the Act is to improve the quality of bail decisions. It is hoped that this will help to eliminate unnecessary remands in custody and thereby reduce prison costs and relieve some of the pressure on prisons resulting from the increased rates in serious crime.
Hon. Members will not he unnecessarily concerned about whether prisons are crowded or overcrowded; they will he more concerned about whether the right kind of person is granted bail when necessary, and whether or not the police object. Although there may be a saving in court time, with fewer remand hearings being necessary, the court must retain full powers to order that those who seem likely to abuse bail or to be a danger to the public are kept in custody until their trial.
The Bail Act has created. I believe wrongly, a statutory presumption in favour of the grant of bail, by providing that, where a person is before a court and is charged with or convicted of an imprisonable offence and a remand is necessary, the court must remand him on bail unless satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on bail, would abscond, commit offences while on bail or otherwise interfere with the course of justice.
The primary purpose of the Bail Act appears, therefore, to be to improve the quality of bail decisions by setting out more clearly the questions to which the courts should address their minds when taking these decisions and, by improving the procedure, to ensure that these matters are considered at the right time. But it has become a bail lottery. I believe that a person charged with the offence of rape or murder should not be entitled in any circumstances to hail. Strangely, because of the bail lottery system, there is not consistency in practice. Anomalies strike at the heart of the criminal justice system. It is well known that the courts' proportionate use of custody for convicted offenders varies greatly from one court area to another.
I have itemised the presumption of bail, why it is allowed, the likelihood of the accused absconding, the likelihood of him committing further offences while on hail and the likelihood that he will intimidate witnesses or interfere with the course of justice, which were involved in the Winston Silcott case. There might also be fears for the accused's safety.
The proportion of those charged with indictable offences who are granted bail has risen slightly since the implementation of the Act, although there are no conclusive records. In 1979, 83 per cent. were granted bail and in 1984 86 per cent. In Leicestershire, 78 per cent. of those charged with indictable offences were put on bail.
On 20 June 1980 Sir David McNee, the Commissioner of Police, made it clear that he was fearful about the misuse of bail by criminals. The nature and gravity of charges must be considered in the decision whether to grant bail. On 9 May 1983 Lord Hailsham, speaking to a group of magistrates, said that the greatest caution should be exercised before granting bail to defendants facing

grave charges, such as murder, rape or wounding with intent, and that if the provisions of the Bail Act were applied properly,
only in exceptional circumstances would one expect bail to be granted to a person charged with murder, rape, wounding or other grave crime.
My new clause makes that point clearly.
12 midnight
On 8 May 1983, The Observer reported that Lord Hailsham, giving advice on bail, discussed the controversy over the case of a double rapist who while on bail murdered a housewife on Humberside. On 21 March 1987 the Leicester Mercury reported that he warned:
I always was afraid that people would have to be bailed, if the Bail Act was passed, in circumstances where there was a serious danger that offences might be committed while the charged person was on bail. This, of course, is what has happened in this case.
He referred to the case of Winston Silcott, who was freed to kill again. He made it clear that the Bail Act must be changed. An article in The Independent states that although there was a lack of information offered in the Silcott case
the Lord Chancellor insisted: 'I did warn the House of Lords when it went through that they had put it so strongly in favour of giving bail that they would find people committing offences when they were out on bail.'
The two grounds given in the Silcott case were that he might abscond and that he might interfere with witnesses. It is significant that it was not mentioned that he might commit another murder.
On 21 February 1987 The Independent reported:
There have been two recent examples where alleged rape victims have been killed by those accused of the rapes while out on bail. They were given their freedom by magistrates.
In The Sun, Mr. John Kay itemised four cases of repeat murders and four cases of repeat rape while the accused were on bail. They were John Wrigglesworth on a murder charge, Ian Sherlock on a murder charge, David Swan on a rape charge, Michael Halt on a murder charge, Archibald Cummings on a rape charge, Anthony Elliot on a murder charge, Christopher Meah on a rape charge and Jim Smith on a rape charge.
Judges and magistrates are expected to use their discretion when considering bail applications for serious charges, such as rape and murder. New clause 14 provides that no bail should ever by granted to those charged with murder, rape, or attempted rape or murder. In other cases., judges and magistrates may grant bail. Similarly, under new clause 15 it would be possible for those charged with murder, for example in a domestic case, to be allowed out on bail, if the police did not object. Provided the police did not object, those charged with murder or rape would he allowed out on bail.
There has been great abuse in particular rape cases. On 24 March 1987, The Guardian reported that a person on bail on a murder charge was found hanged. The police had been fearful for his safety and that he might do damage to himself, but he was still allowed out on bail. Anybody who is suspected of murder should not be given bail in any circumstances.
The Home Secretary said that defendants are suspected of committing murder but have not been convicted and may be acquitted subsequently. That is right, but it is not necessarily satisfactory. Trials should be speeded up. Courts should not be inhibited in granting bail, whether or not there are 50,000 people in prison. Judge Robert Lymbery QC, as Lord Hailsham said, was probably right


in his decision in the Silcott case. It grieves me to say that, because PC Blakelock lost his life through Silcott being let out. There is a connection. However, Lord Hailsham said that freedom of action was curtailed by the Bail Act, but Judge Lymbery said that he was given as "many" facts as he was able to ascertain.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us why he would allow bail to people who are charged with attempted murder? The intention required for the commission of an offence of attempted murder is specifically that of guilt, whereas for murder it can be merely the intent to cause serious injury.

Mr. Bruinvels: I am not in favour of bail being granted in either case. I have every confidence in the police presenting their case once they have brought the case to court. People who have a history of evil intent, and who are charged with murder or rape, should not be granted bail until they have appeared in court and have been successfully prosecuted or legally acquired. No one who is accused of murder should be allowed bail. I have raised this matter with various Law Officers and Home Office Ministers.
It is an error of judgment to allow out on bail people who are accused of murder. Far too many people are allowed out on bail when the offences against them are serious. I have asked my hon. Friend to consider amending the law so that persons who are accused of murder and rape may not be granted bail under any circumstances. I am hopeful that that will be looked into again. The Minister of State said in a written reply to me that he is looking at the events that led to the granting of bail to Winston Silcott.
Retrospective studies are necessary. We have none at the moment, and we need them. Information must be collected centrally. We should look carefully at these two amendments. The public are outraged that potential murderers are allowed out on bail. The judge probably does not know best, but the local police do. If the police object to bail being granted in any case, I would give more credibility to the men on the beat than to a judge, who may be in the Old Bailey, very remote from the case. These two new clauses give the House an opportunity to test the water. I urge that they be considered today.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I shall speak briefly to new clause 17, which appears in my name and those of my hon. Friends.
The Silcott case has given rise to perfectly legitimate public concern about what happened in that case and what might happen in similar instances where people are charged with murder or very serious offences of violence and commit offences while they are on bail. It is possible to give a just and measured response to the public concern that has been expressed.
The first thing is that we should make the scrutiny of bail applications much clearer and more effective. In the past 16 years bail applications in most, if not all, Crown courts have been heard in chambers. There have been many complaints about this, and The Independent has recently been running a campaign to draw special attention to the unjustifiable secrecy in many forms of hearing, including bail applications.
I can think of no good reason why bail hearings should not take place in open court, so that they can be scrutinised

properly, and so that comment can be made upon them. It may be that there are good reasons why the comment cannot be made at the time of, or immediately following, the application, for that might prejudice a fair trial. At the moment there is a great deal of dissatisfaction because one is not able to find out what happened at the hearing in chambers. The Silcott case is an example of that. It is regrettable that the judge had to deal with it in the way that he did. The only way in which he could bring to public attention what had happened was by making the sort of statement that he made. That would not be necessary if bail applications were made in open court.

Mr. Cash: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that on 18 July 1976, when this matter was being considered, the proposal of the Lord Chancellor that the words "unacceptable risk" should be retained in the Bill was defeated by an amendment that was moved by the Government, supported by the hon. Members for Cambridgeshire, North-east (Mr. Freud) and for Stockton, South (Mr. Wrigglesworth), who are members of the hon. Gentleman's alliance? They bear a heavy responsibility for the change in the law that was achieved in Committee, as a result of which the Silcott affair took place.

Mr. Carlile: I was talking about an entirely different point. I gave way to the hon. Gentleman because I thought that his intervention would be relevant. We all learn by our mistakes. I was not a Member of the House in 1976, nor was the hon. Gentleman. We do not know how either of us would have responded to that provision. It is no use the hon. Gentleman wagging his finger in that offensive manner, because he knows what I have just said to be the case.
In an attempt to be helpful, I am suggesting that not only could the scrutiny of these bail applications be made much more effective if they were heard in open court—I hope that that is a proposal to which we shall have a considered response from the Minister—but we could slightly dilute the grounds or the considerations to which the court must have regard under the Bail Act in those cases where the charge is one of murder, attempted murder or a serious offence of personal violence, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act.
Under the Bail Act, the judge is required to grant bail, but only if a number of conditions are satisfied, including the fact that there are not substantial grounds for believing that the accused would commit an offence while on bail. If that word "substantial" were altered to "reasonable", so that not quite as high a test had to be applied by the judge when he was considering whether to grant bail, in a case within the restricted categories that I have mentioned, that would give a sensible extra measure of protection to the public. The extended grounds set out in new clause 17 would meet the concern that is expressed, without going to the unfair and absurd extremes suggested in new clauses 14 and 15.

Mr. Lawrence: It is shocking when someone who is on a serious charge is given bail and then kills. The question is whether we need to do anything about the existing law. Although I see from the report of the Bail Act debated in 1976 that I did not welcome it and thought that it was unnecessary, and I said:
I do not welcome any legislation which will not remedy positive evil or do positive good. We spend too much of our


time churning out legislation which will not achieve anything very much."—[Official Report, 26 May 1976; Vol. 912, c. 546.]
the fact is that maintaining the status quo is the best way to deal with the problem. Therefore, I support new clauses 14, 15 and 22. New clause 17 detracts from the present law.
12.15 am
The existing law gives ample scope to deal with bail in very serious cases, notwithstanding some of the reports in the newspapers at the time of the Silcott case. Not only does schedule 1(1) to the Bail Act set out eight circumstances, with which I need not detain the House, when bail can be refused, but it goes on to say:
In taking the decisions required by paragraph 2"—
the exceptions—
the court shall have regard to such of the following considerations as appear to it to he relevant, that is to say—
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence of default …
(b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the defendant…
(c) the defendant's record as respects the fulfilment of his obligations under previous grants of bail…
(d) except in the case of a defendant whose case is adjourned for inquiries…the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence or having defaulted "
and it adds:
as well as to any others which appear to be relevant.
It seems that the judge in any case of seriousness has complete power to say, "No, this is not a case for bail."
The trouble with depriving someone of bail for murder or any other offence is that the offence of murder may be reduced to manslaughter, or it may be a mercy killing, or it may be the sort of offence where the person does not get sent to prison for long or at all. Think, then, of the iniquity of keeping someone in custody for 12 months because, by law, he must be refused bail when, at the end of the day, he is acquitted or is placed on probation or is given a sentence substantially less than 12 months. For those reasons, astonishingly, I support the Government tonight.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: This debate almost certainly would not be taking place if Keith Blakelock had not been murdered on Broadwater Farm. I went to the farm the following evening and spent a lot of time with the police there. It is the view of many Metropolitan police officers that he did not need to die. It therefore came as a shock to many of them to learn that his killer was a man out on bail.
The Home Secretary was wise to avoid joining in the national furore that arose immediately in the press, and I congratulate him on having paused, reflected and then given a lead in his statement on television.
I hope that we shall hear from the Government tonight, not that they support the proposed new clauses—because in my view they are not appropriate in the circumstances—but that the reflections of the Home Secretary on this issue will bring forward new proposals so that hopefully—nobody can be sure—the kind of problem that we saw with the death of Keith Blakelock will not recur in this country.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) on having given us the opportunity to discuss the working of the Bail Act.
I shall make a few general points before dealing with the questions that have been posed. Leaving aside the tragic case with which we are concerned, the problem with the Bail Act has been the large and increasing number of persons held in custody pending trial.
The figures are really alarming. Between 1945 and 1965 the remand population was about 6 per cent. of the prison population. By 1976 the remand population had risen to 9 per cent. of the prison population, and by 1985 it had risen to 18 per cent. of the prison population. The latest figures are that at the end of January 1987 the prison population was 47,200 and the number of untried prisoners within the prison system was 9,000, or 19 per cent. So the problem in very general terms about the Bail Act 1976 has been the very large number of unconvicted persons who are held in custody.
I should stress that the great majority of those who have been charged with murder or attempted murder are remanded in custody. The figures show that 87 per cent. of those charged with murder and 83 per cent. of those charged with attempted murder are remanded in custody. I feel that generally speaking that is right. However, the fact that Silcott was on bail and that that fact contributed to the death of PC Blakelock is a matter of great concern and worry to us all. Plainly, we have to consider whether it is right to make statutory changes. Equally plainly, it should be possible to make changes to the Act that would reduce the risk of such a tragedy happening again.
I suggest that the Government need first to examine very carefully the working of the Act and also the events surrounding the particular case in order to try as best we can to determine whether what happened points to some defect in the statute, some defect in procedure, or some other error. We propose to go forward urgently intent on scrutinising what happened in an anxious and careful manner. I hope that in the not too distant future—indeed, quite soon—the Government will be able to come forward with their conclusions. If we think that statutory changes are necessary, we will make proposals to the House for consideration.
The new clause moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East would, of course, prevent the granting of bail for those charged with murder or rape. The effect of his new clause would be to put a total and absolute bar upon the granting of bail in those circumstances. That is not a proposal that I would commend to the House. I entirely share the views put forward by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) and I will remind the House very quickly of them.
There is a presumption of innocence. People are to be presumed innocent until they are found guilty. That presumption of innocence argues strongly in favour of not withholding bail. That is true of murder cases as a proposition, although in the great majority of cases it would be right for bail to be withheld.

Mr. Cash: Does my hon. Friend agree with his noble father with regard to the expression that he attempted to insert into the Bill in 1976, that the words "unacceptable risk" were a better choice than the word "probably"? Furthermore, it was, of course, the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Jenkins), who was then Home Secretary, who was responsible for ensuring that the lesser test was applied when the Bill was ultimately enacted,


against the advice of a great number of libertarian Law Lords in the House of Lords, who agreed with my hon. Friend's noble father.

Mr. Hogg: My right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Chancellor may well have been right. I feel sure that what he said was very wise and was uttered after measured thought. I do not want to pluck out of the air today any particular formula. I merely want to say to the House that the Government are concerned about what has happened. We intend to subject the Act and the surrounding events to careful scrutiny and we will come forward with our conclusions.
I was seeking to outline the reasons why, in my view at least, it would not be right to impose a total and automatic ban upon the granting of bail to those charged with murder. I was adopting the points put forward by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton. First, there is the presumption of innocence. Secondly, the fact is that a significant number of persons charged with murder are acquitted. In 1984 a total of 22 per cent. of those charged with murder were acquitted of all offences of homicide. A total of 47 per cent. of those charged with murder were found not guilty of murder but guilty of a lesser offence such as manslaughter. There is another consideration. There will always be a small number of offenders charged with murder where the ultimate charge is one of manslaughter, reflecting an offence such as euthanasia. In those cases the courts may well feel that it is wrong in principle to impose a custodial sentence.
I cannot commend to the court—[Interruption.] It was a Freudian slip. I have always laughed at other barristers to whom it has happened and it serves me right that it has happened to me. Having regard to those serious facts, it would surely be wrong to impose a total and automatic ban.
The same applies, although for slightly different reasons, to the offence of rape. Again, we have to face the fact that about 26 per cent. of those charged with rape are ultimately acquitted. Therefore, I do not commend to the House the arguments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East.
I shall now deal with the arguments put forward by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile). I accept at once that what he has outlined is a defensible position, save that he is removing from the magistrates court, in respect of the three designated classes, an ability to grant bail. I would differ with him on that point. However, as I have said, that is a defensible position. I cannot say that at this moment the House should come to a conclusion because I would not wish to put to the House a conclusive view as of now. The Government's process of scrutiny, inqury and consideration is not complete.

Mr. Roger Gale (Thanet, North): In view of the fact that my hon. Friend has used the words "urgency" and "consideration" several times, can he tell the House when he intends to do something? Do the Government intend to bring forward an amendment in another place?

Mr. Hogg: I cannot answer the question posed by my hon. Friend in the absolute way in which he is asking. He is right to ask the question, but I cannot answer it in the way in which he would like. We are considering whether there is a defect in the Act and whether there are defects

in procedures. We are trying to see whether it is possible, by statutory changes, to prevent such tragedies happening again. When we have come to a view on that, we will tell the House or make it known in some other appropriate way. I cannot promise that it will happen at once, although I hope that our view will become known while the Bill is going through Parliament.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: If my hon. Friend is seriously saying, as I understand him to be saying, that he is going to look at the new clause moved by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), what concerns me is the suggestion in that clause that applications for bail should be heard in open court. Presumably that implies that it is open to publicity. If that is the intention, I find it difficult to see how it can be done. I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, but it must be clear that we cannot risk bail applications prejudging the defendant or influencing the jury in the subsequent trial.

Mr. Budgen: rose—

Mr. Hogg: I will give way to my hon. Friend in a moment.
I entirely agree with the point that my right hon. and learned Friend has raised. I am sorry if I gave the impression that it is likely that the Government will come forward with proposals very similar to those of the hon. and learned Member. That is not the impression that I wish to give. The point that my right hon. and learned Friend makes is right, and it illustrates the great importance of not rushing forward with proposed legislation. I agree with what he says.

Mr. Budgen: Perhaps I can make a point which will, of course, be absolutely obvious to my hon. Friend. The principal disadvantage of having any form of hearing in open court is that the judge who is deciding whether bail shall be granted or not has to know the previous convictions, if any, of the defendant. That is one of the most important considerations in deciding whether he is likely to commit another offence. It is very difficult to see how it could be possible for a judge to give a considered judgment in open court, while disguising the fact that the accused has previous convictions. I am bound to say that on the occasions when I have applied for or opposed bail it has been done in an informal way, and perhaps at the margin mistakes have been made; but a much greater evil would be done it there were a risk that the accused's previous convictions would become known to the public at large.

Mr. Hogg: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Again, he is emphasising how unwise it would be for the Government to rush forward with statutory proposals. What he has said is right and what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle) has said is right.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I am grateful for what the Minister has said. It is obviously said in the spirit of intending to do something about the situation. However, I am concerned about his response to whether bail applications should be heard in open court. Does he not recognise that it is very much a hit-or-miss business now? If a case is put up for plea only or for pre-trial review, the bail applications are all heard in open court in any event; it is


only when there are applications which are purely and simply for bail that they are heard in chambers. It is not sensible to say that they should all be heard in open court so they can be scrutinised, bearing in mind what the right hon. and learned Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle) said, with which I agree entirely, that publicity must be restricted until the trial of the defendant is over.

Mr. Hogg: I do not disagree with what the hon. and learned Gentleman has just said. All I am seeking to do at present is to tell the House that we are seized of the gravity of this matter. We want to see whether there is a defect in the Act or in the procedure and, if so, whether it would be right to come forward with statutory proposals. At the moment, we have not come to a conclusion. The kind of arguments advanced by hon. Members on both sides illustrate the wisdom of looking at this problem carefully and dispassionately and trying to get it right. That is what the Government will seek to do.
I cannot commend the new clause to the House, but I would say that we are treating this matter very seriously and hope in the near future to come forward with our own conclusions.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I welcome the commitment given by my hon. Friend to examine fully the Winston Silcott case and the defects in procedure. I am still concerned about the time limit. I hope that a review of the bail legislation will be undertaken as quickly as possible and that it will be considered more fully in another place. I look forward to the conclusions of my hon. Friend.
Although the Lord Chancellor has been firm and clear and has urged caution in the granting of bail in rape and murder cases, all trials must be speeded up because there are too many murders and rapes. I ask my hon. Friend to update the statistics so that we may know how many people have been convicted of crimes of rape and murder whilst on bail.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Hon. Members: No.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 19

POWER TO SUSPEND YOUTH CUSTODY SENTENCE

`The provision relating to the powers of the courts to suspend either in whole or in part a sentence of imprisonment as set out in the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 (as amended) and in section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 shall apply with like effect to any youth custody sentence.'.—[Mr. Mark Carlisle.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The hour is late and I shall try to be brief. The background to the new clause is that, having come nineteenth in the private Members' ballot this year, I put down a private Member's Bill which would have the same effect as the clause that I now propose. Its purpose is to give power to the courts to suspend a sentence of youth custody in exactly the same way as they have power to suspend a sentence of imprisonment passed on a person over 21.
I do not pretend that the language that I have used in the new clause is perfect, and I am not asking my hon. Friend to say tonight that the Government accept the new

clause, but I hope that I shall have from my hon. Friend an assurance that the Government will consider its purpose.
It has been of considerable concern to members of the judiciary—I refer, if one has to declare an interest at this stage, not only to those who sit in a permanent capacity, but to those who sit as recorders in a part-time capacity—that while they can suspend a sentence of imprisonment imposed on someone over 21, they cannot suspend a sentence of youth custody imposed on someone under 21. A court may often be faced with, say, four defendants, two of whom are over 21 and two of whom are under 21, and for various reasons it may be necessary to impose a custodial sentence on of all of them. The court has power to consider for those over 21 whether it is right that the sentences be suspended wholly or in part, whereas for those under 21 it cannot by law consider suspension of the sentences. This is an illogicality in our penal system that deserves examination. I believe that I am expressing the concern of a great many involved in the criminal courts in raising this point.

Mr. Ashby: Will my right hon. and learned Friend accept that I have spoken to many judges, all of whom say that they would dearly love to see Parliament doing away with this anomaly and that they would like suspended sentences to be available for those under 21?

Mr. Carlisle: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is my experience, after talking to those who sit in a judicial capacity, that they recognise the illogicality in this area.
I hope that I understand why the Government felt it necessary to oppose the new clause and my private Member's Bill and why I suspect they will advise the House not to accept the new clause this evening. The Government say that, because of the philisophy of those matters which the court must take into account when deciding whether it is appropriate to impose any penalty of a custodial nature on a person under 21, it is inappropriate if that penalty is then suspended.
Let me remind my hon. Friend that I do not think that that argument stands up to much investigation. Of course, it is true that under the Criminal Justice Act 1982, and under new clause 2 which the Government have accepted today
Where a person under 21 years of age is convicted or found guilty of an offence, the court may not … pass a youth custody sentence"—
that is the youth custody order with which my new clause is concerned—
unless it is satisfied … that no other method of dealing with him appropriate".
It goes on to set out that that means that
he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties
or because a custodial sentence is necessary for the protection of the public or because the offence
was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified.
I remind my hon. Friend that the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 says, although not set out in the same detail, that no court shall pass a sentence of imprisonment on a person over 21 who has not previously been to prison or had a sentence of imprisonment passed upon him unless the court is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
Whether the person is over 21 or under 21, the court first has to decide whether it is satisfied that there is no


other appropriate method for dealing with him. Those considerations are much the same whether the person is 21 or 20. In fact—my hon. Friend the Minister will confirm this—there is clear authority from the Court of Appeal that no court should consider suspending either wholly or in part a sentence of imprisonment unless, in the absence of the power to suspend, it believes that it would be right to impose a custodial sentence. In other words, before a sentence of imprisonment is suspended, partially or wholly, it must first be decided that the sentence of imprisonment is the right sentence. Therefore, the argument that there is some philosophical difference between those under 21 and those over 21—

Mr. Soley: The right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware of new clause 2, which was accepted by the House. He will have several difficulties if he pursues his new clause. He has spotted one of them, but what does he say of the position of a young person given a suspended sentence who then commits another relatively minor offence? He will be in breach of the suspended sentence but will then be trapped by the new clause, which the right hon. and learned Gentleman, along with his right hon. and hon. Friends, supported.

Mr. Carlisle: I did not speak on the new clause and I was not in the Chamber when it was debated, but as far as I can see it adds little to the existing law under section 1(4) of the Criminal Justice Act. I accept that if one goes for the concept of the right to suspend wholly or in part the sentence of youth custody, which I believe to be right or desirable, the wording of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or the wording of new clause 2, to which the Government were sympathetic today, may have to be changed slightly.
Let me return to the reality of the situation. Let us suppose that a court is trying a group of people who have been convicted of, or have pleaded guilty to, an offence. Some are over 21, and some under 21. Whoever is trying the case must first ask himself what is the appropriate penalty for the offence, and whether as the law requires, he is of the opinion that a custodial sentence is the only appropriate method of dealing with it.
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Let us assume that those people are out of work. In that case, it is ridiculous to suggest that a substantial fine is a realistic alternative. They are not recommended for community service and, for various reasons, they do not appear to be appropriate cases for a probation order. However, they have committed serious offences—let us say breaking and entering—and the court is therefore required to consider a custodial sentence as being the only appropriate method available.
Having reached that conclusion, the court decides that, in view of the background and history of the individuals concerned, it would be right to suspend the sentences. Surely it is wrong that the court should be able to suspend the sentence of the person over 21, but not the youth custody sentence imposed on the person under 21. It was to try to deal with that anomaly, which I know concerns those who sit in our courts, that I tabled the new clause.
My hon. Friend may say that there is a danger that the new clause will lead to a proliferation of youth custody sentences being imposed on those under 21. I shall be quite happy if he says that he will examine the new clause in the

context of the higher courts only. I do not accept the argument that the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) put forward in his intervention. Surely the whole point of a suspended sentence is that if the offender breaches it he is likely to go to prison. The purpose of my new clause is to empower the court, if it decides that youth custody is the only appropriate sentence, to consider whether it should be suspended, as the law requires it to do if the sentence is one of imprisonment.
In answer to the hon. Gentleman's intervention, in the absence of the power to suspend a sentence, the court, having come to the conclusion that a youth custody order is appropriate, cannot consider suspending; it is bound to put the person into custody immediately. If that person is over 21, however, the court has the option of considering whether the threat involved in a suspended sentence is adequate.
I hope that my introduction of the new clause has not been too long.
The point is worthy of consideration. Indeed, it is contained in the Government's document "Custodial Sentences for Young Offenders". I hope that the Government will take into account the views expressed by the judiciary and others, and in another place consider the introduction of such a measure.

Mr. Lawrence: I shall be brief. I support my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle), and I hope that the Government will accept new clause 19, or at least take it away and worry about it and come back with something constructive.
My right hon. and learned Friend argued his case cogently, and I have very little to add. However, I can confirm that, in so far as judges can ever be described as a lobbying body, I was lobbied in the London courts on the last couple of occasions that I have sat as an assistant recorder. They said, "For goodness' sake, do what you can to get the law changed and given a more sensible form."
I refer my hon. Friend the Minister to what the Lord Chief Justice, who I know commands great respect, said in the Court of Appeal in the case, in 1983, of R. v. Dobs and Hitchin. Two young men aged 18 and 19 pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm. Lord Lane said:
The court notes that, unfortunately, it is not possible for terms of youth custody to be suspended either in whole or in part, so consequently the sentencing court is often in a dilemma … For instance, in this case it might very well have been that the Recorder would make up his mind that a term of 12 or possibly even 18 months was appropriate, but in the light of the character, the testimonials and so on, perhaps only six months of that need be served, but that he cannot do. So what is he to do? Either he passes a sentence of 18 months, none of which he is allowed to suspend, which would probably be too long, or he goes to the other extreme, which is the only alternative, and passes an immediate sentence of that length of time which he would have ordered actually to be served in a partially suspended sentence, which would probably be six months. Each of those two is going to be wrong for one reason or another, the former too long, the latter too short. That is the situation which faces a court. One hopes that Parliament will see fit to make it possible before long for the courts to do that which in many cases they would wish and probably wish to do but at the moment that is not possible…What has to be done in this case? The answer is quite plain. In the circumstances which I have described, the only proper course is to pass the lesser of the two sentences.
That is clear, and the view is repeated in other cases. If Lord Lane's view is not more cogent than my words and perhaps those of my right hon. and learned Friend, there is no meaning in the word cogent.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will accept the new clause.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) have put extremely clearly the argument in favour of new clause 19. My right hon. and learned Friend asked us to say whether it is worthy of consideration. It clearly is. My hon. and learned Friend asked me to take it away, worry about it and bring something back. The Government will take it away and worry about it, but I cannot give any undertaking to bring something back.
I recognise that my right hon. and learned Friend and my hon. and learned Friend were expressing the views of the higher judiciary, most notably the Lord Chief Justice.
This is a nicely balanced argument, and it is partly because of that and partly because we recognise the force behind the observations that have just been made that the Government embarked on a consultation process last summer. The great majority of the responses were hostile to what my right hon. and learned Friend has proposed. I shall mention but four—the Magistrates Association, the Law Society, the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders and the National Association of Probation Officers. They were hostile because they feared that the power to suspend would result in more custodial sentences being imposed.
There is some evidence to support that view before and since 1982, but I shall not trouble the House with it. None the less, those who responded were concerned about the possibility of an increase in custodial sentences.
My right hon. and learned Friend has shot my fox in the sense that he has torn to pieces the argument that I intended to advance on verbal gymnastics and the effect of the 1982 legislation, which provides that a custodial sentence can be imposed only if it is believed that that is the only appropriate way of dealing with the offender. I shall not trouble the House with that argument, but there is one more consideration that I would urge upon it. Anomalies will arise in either direction, but there will certainly be an anomaly if we accept the new clause, because it extends only to youth custody orders and does not embrace detention centre orders. Let us suppose that the elder of two young persons was sentenced to a youth custody order, part of which was suspended, and, though he was the ringleader, he served a lesser period than the younger offender who was sentenced to a detention centre order which could not be suspended. I accept, however, that these are debating points.
I return to where I started. The argument has been well advanced, but the Government's present position is that it is a proposal that we would not wish to support, for the reasons that I have set out. Anxiety is felt by many that the proposal would result in an increase in the number of custodial sentences that the courts impose, but it would be silly of me not to say to my right hon. and learned Friend and hon. and learned Friend that their arguments have been adduced with such clarity and eloquence that it is at least right that we should worry about the problem further. I do not want to give my right hon. and learned Friend the understanding, however, that I am giving a commitment to return to the House with revised legislation. I am not doing that.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: I remember only too well that, when I occupied the position of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State, I was put up on various occasions to argue against the amendment that was regularly moved to remove the then restriction on sending people under 21 years of age to prison for periods shorter than nine months or longer than three years. I tried always to argue against it with the eloquence with which my hon. Friend has argued his case this evening, but about eight years later in 1982 the sense behind the removal of the restriction was accepted by the House. I suspect that in a similar period the House will come to accept that sentences of youth custody should be suspended like sentences of imprisonment.
I am happy to have made the point and to have heard the Minister say that at least the Government are considering the merits of my argument. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 20

RIGHT OF CROWN TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCES

'(1) Where a person has been convicted of an offence on indictment the prosecution may appeal to the court of appeal in any case where the sentence is manifestly inadequate.

(2) An appeal lies under this section only with the leave of the court of appeal.

(3) The Court of Appeal in dealing with an appeal against sentence under this section may, if they consider that the sentence is manifestly inadequate and that the defendant should be sentenced differently:
(a) quash any sentence or order which is the subject of the appeal; and
(b) in place of it pass such sentence or make such order as is appropriate for the case and which the Court below had power to pass or make when dealing with him for the offence.—[Mr. Hind.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Kenneth Hind: I beg to move, That the clause he read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 60, in page 19, line 17, leave out Clause 29.
No. 61, in clause 29, page 19, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert
`concern, he shall refer the case to the Court of Appeal to obtain a review of the sentence in question'.
Government amendment No. 62.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Will we have the opportunity to divide, if we so wish, on amendments Nos. 60 and 61 as well as on the new clause?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: That will be decided when that stage is reached.

Mr. Hind: It will be clear to anyone who reads the Amendment Paper carefully that amendment No. 60 is dependent upon the new clause in that it deletes clause 29, which the new clause is designed to replace. The new clause seeks to impose standards of sentencing upon the courts. It is geared to the guidelines that have been provided consistently by the Court of Appeal and by directions from the Lord Chief Justice, which have been passed on to judges at sentencing conferences.
At present, anybody who receives an excessive sentence can appeal to the Court of Appeal to have his sentence


reduced so that it conforms with the guidelines. The same opportunity is not afforded to victims of crime when the accused is given a manifestly lenient sentence. Neither the prosecution nor the victim can draw the attention of the Court of Appeal to that lenient sentence and ask for it to be increased. That was made abundantly clear in the Ealing vicarage rape case. The attention of the public was drawn to the leniency of the sentence that was passed on one of the accused. The guidelines were clearly not adhered to in that case, but there was no remedy.
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The clause extends to the victims of crime the same privilege as is extended to defendants. If a judge continues to give lenient sentences, those sentences cannot be reviewed. New clause 20 deals with that problem. It stresses that the sentence must be manifestly inadequate and that it does not meet the guidelines, before there can be an appeal to the Court of Appeal.
For the first time, a more important role is provided for prosecution counsel. Having called upon a police officer to read out the antecedents, counsel will no longer be able to close his brief and say, "My part in this case is over." He will be obliged to advise the Crown prosecutor of the adequacy or otherwise of the sentence that has been passed. Some people fear that for the first time the prosecution will be involved in the passing of the sentence. It will not be involved in that process; nor will it have to say what sentence it thinks should be passed. It will make sure that the guidelines are complied with and if, in all the circumstances, the sentence is manifestly too lenient, it will have to say so.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Is my hon. Friend able to advise me, as a non-lawyer, whether subsection (3)(b) of his excellent new clause would include the power to ask that a criminal bankruptcy order be made if the trial judge omitted to make such an order?

Mr. Hind: Yes.
The social inquiry report is a problem. If the prosecutor is not satisfied with the sentence that is passed, he can ask at the end of the case to see the social inquiry report. I stress that he can do that at the end of the case. It is the property of the court. Only convention has prevented the prosecution from having sight of the social inquiry report that is prepared for the benefit of the court.
Once the prosecutor decides that the sentence is manifestly inadequate, he will advise the Crown prosecuting solicitor, who will then submit grounds of appeal to a single judge of the Court of Appeal. If the single judge thinks that it is an appropriate case to go before the Court of Appeal, there will be a full hearing. Under new clause 20 the Court of Appeal would have the power to increase the sentence on the accused if, in all the circumstances, it was seen to be manifestly inadequate.
In a courtroom there are a number of factors that we must consider. The state is there not only to represent the interests of justice and to prosecute the case, but to make sure that justice is seen to be done. In those circumstances, it is important to allay much of the dissatisfaction of the general public by ensuring that sentences are seen to be fair and balanced and that both sides of the courtroom—the defence and prosecution, the state's representatives and the victim's representatives—have the same treatment

and equality. In that way we will develop consistency in sentencing and we will ensure that justice is seen to be done on a consistent basis.

Mr. Cash: My hon. Friend's name is the only one attached to the new clause, but I am sure that other hon. Members would want to congratulate him on bringing forward this very important matter.

Mr. Hind: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend.
One of the reasons why I introduced the new clause is that I believe that weaknesses exist in clause 29 as it stands. I commend my right hon. and hon. Friends, the Ministers in the Home Office, for accepting that there is a need to review lenient sentences. My advice to them in the circumstances is that clause 29 does not go far enough. It could be strengthened by the adoption of new clause 20.
I have certain reservations about clause 29. It involves the Attorney-General in a political role that he has not had before. This will mean that should a sentence be highlighted in the tabloid press, hon. Members will receive hundreds of letters asking them to urge the Attorney-General to refer the case to the Court of Appeal. That is an entirely new role for the Attorney-General, and that is a road down which we do not want to travel. It will ultimately lead to questions in the House about specific cases at Question Time when the Attorney-General answers questions. I respectfully suggest that that is the wrong way for us to proceed.
My next point is more fundamental. If an accused person receives a manifestly inadequate sentence, that will leave the victims and, in the case of murder, the deceased's relatives, with a feeling of deep dissatisfaction. They would then press for the case to be taken to the Court of Appeal, and they will hear the Lord Chief Justice of England say that he is very sorry that the sentence passed on the accused was totally inadequate, but there is nothing that he can do about it. That will bring the law into disrepute. It will rattle some of the faith that the public have in the law. I can see that it will result in TV crews on the steps of the courts in the Strand with the victims in tears saying, "How can they do this to me? This is a massive injustice." Clearly, the result will be that the tabloid press will take the matter up and it will become the talk of the day.
Pressure will be placed on the House to achieve the result that new clause 20 sets out to achieve. If that is the position that my right hon. Friend and hon. Friends are seeking they can achieve it in the way that I have just described, or they can achieve it by adopting new clause 20.
I have proposed new clause 20. If the Government do not accept it, I am prepared to put up with clause 29 in the short term. I am sure that many of my colleagues know that in a short time we shall be back here to put on to the statute book a clause similar to new clause 20.

Mr. Alex Carlile: There are three possible positions on this issue. One, which is perfectly logical, has been put forward by the hon. Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind). I do not agree with it, but at least it has the appeal of logic. The other logical position is the one that I would adopt, which is set out in amendment No. 60 and involves the removal of clause 29. The prosecution should not and need not become involved in appeals against sentence to the Court of Appeal. The problems, such as they are, can he dealt with by handing down further guidelines from the Court of Appeal and possibly by strengthening the


Judicial Studies Board, as proposed by the Government in their White Paper. I do not understand why they have changed their mind.
The third position totally lacks any kind of logic. It is the one for which the Government have gone. It is a hostage to fortune, because it requires the Attorney-General to make some political decisions on issues which would be unwelcome to any Attorney-General. It asks that there should be a reference to the Court of Appeal in certain cases. One can envisage the Court of Appeal saying, "The sentence should be doubled, but we cannot do anything about it because that is the law that Parliament has provided." It is absolute nonsense. I hope that we are given the opportunity to vote on amendment No. 60, because that is how the law should be. We should not have been troubled with this provision.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: My name is shared by four hon. Members; one spells it differently, but I totally agree with every word uttered by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile).
I shall speak only on amendment No. 60, but we cannot let the Bill proceed without those of us who feel strongly about this matter saying that clause 29 is nonsense, for the reasons given by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery. The purpose of clause 29 is to deal with the occasional case of considerable notoriety in which it appears that a court has given a sentence which the public thinks is inadequate. It passes my understanding how one can believe that the public's concern will be assuaged by that case being referred to the Court of Appeal for it to rap the judge over the knuckles and say, "Your sentence was wrong, but we shall not do anything about it."
I go a little further than the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery. One must be realistic and take the cases involved. The hon. and learned Gentleman talked about the case of a person sentenced to imprisonment. Let us say that the Attorney-General takes the view that the sentence is totally inadequate and he refers the case to the Court of Appeal. That court says, "Quite right. It should not have been three years. It should have been eight." But the man serves only three years. How much more so does this affect the person who is given a non-custodial sentence and whose case is referred to the Court of Appeal? The Court of Appeal says, "Quite right. That man should not have been given a non-custodial sentence. He should have been imprisoned for five years. But we shall not imprison him. He can still walk freely around the streets in front of you all." I cannot believe that a reference of that nature can possibly assuage public anxiety about the sentence or see how in any way the Court of Appeal saying that the sentence is inadequate can meet that anxiety.
The provision is wholly unnecessary. If a sentence causes a great deal of concern, in reality the Court of Appeal takes an appropriate opportunity in another case to express guidelines for future sentences. That does not require the charade of referring individual cases to it which it cannot change.
An individual case will not be filed under the name of the individual concerned which, again, is ludicrous. Is it seriously suggested that a case which attracted a great deal of publicity should be given a reference such that the public will not link it to the case that made the front page of the tabloids the previous month? The public will be

aware of the case and their anxiety will not be assuaged when the court says that the sentence is inadequate but will do nothing about it.
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As my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire. West (Mr. Hind) and the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery have said, the Attorney-General is placed in an impossible role. He is responsible and answerable to the House. If he has a power by statute, he can be questioned about it. Under clause 29, if anybody anywhere considers any sentence to be in any way inadequate, he can write to his Member of Parliament who will he entitled to write, and justified in writing to the Attorney-General to ask why he has not referred that case to the Court of Appeal. The Attorney-General will have to face a barrage of letters and will be answerable from the Dispatch Box for his decisions whether to refer a case to the Court of Appeal. We are in grave danger of drawing the Executive into sentencing.
I have spoken for longer than I should have done. I do not know whether it is right to divide the House at this hour, but, to the disappointment of the Government, a similar proposal was thrown out in another place when it appeared in another guise in another Bill and I hope that their Lordships will take a similar view on this occasion.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: I am grateful to Mr. Speaker for revising his provisional selection of amendments and new clauses to include this group.
I shall explain briefly why I much prefer the phrasing of new clause 20 to amendment No. 61. Under amendment No. 61, the power of the Court of Appeal is limited to sentencing. The greatest of the injustices that can fall on an individual victim as opposed to society at large is if the trial court fails to make a compensation or criminal bankruptcy order. My hon. Friend has confirmed that the drafting of new clause 20 would enable such a compensation order or criminal bankruptcy order to be made. Amendment No. 61, on my reading of it, would not enable such orders to he made because that is not technically a sentence. If new clause 20 is pressed to a Division, I shall support it. I would not support amendment No. 61, unless the new clause were defeated.

Mr. Gale: While the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) in Committee was expounding the case for yet another quango, my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) was making—just as eloquently as he has done tonight—the case for his new clause.
The Government have taken on board the disquiet. caused by certain sentencing practices and have endeavoured to deal with that in clause 21. All the arguments that were voiced against clause 29 in Committee were given a sympathetic hearing by Ministers who are working on the Bill. Those arguments are valid.
Having gone part of the way to recognising the public diquiet, I hope that the Government will take on board the views expressed in the House tonight, which reflect the points that were made in Committee. I hope that this clause will be accepted here or in another place.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls: Behind new clause 20 there are two concerns felt by the public. The first is that we are in the middle of an unprecedented crime wave. The second—recently summed up by The Times—is that in some way the villains are getting away with it.
We are not in the middle of an unprecedented crime wave. Last year, the sociology department at Leicester university produced a study entitled "Violent Disorders in 20th Century Britain", which showed that the average Briton's chance of being murdered was 25 per cent. higher in 1860 than in 1980, and that the rate of violent disturbances in the early years of this century was five to seven times the present rate.
That concern is more illusory than real, but the public believe that in some way the villains are getting away with it. The public have seen many cases reported in the newspapers where vastly over-lenient sentences have apparently been imposed. The key word is "apparently". If people believe that over-lenient sentences can be imposed, their respect for the law will be undermined. We must address that problem.

Mr. Chris Smith: The hon. Gentleman seems to base his rather odd statement that we are not in the middle of an unprecedented crime wave on the fact that violent disorder in the streets is less now than it was in the 19th century. Does he not realise that all the evidence from the crime studies that have been conducted over the last few years shows that the crimes of greatest concern to the people of this country are assault on the street, robbery, burglary, and sexual offences against women, not violent disorder or street rowdyism? Those crimes are vastly on the increase.

Mr. Nicholls: The hon. Gentleman has revealed the inadequacy of his argument in referring to the last few year. I am fully aware of the rising crime rate over the last few years and over the last 30 years. The hon. Gentleman will find that the rate of violent disturbance—a composite concept that the sociology department at Leicester university put together to get a much greater over-view of what happened in the early years of this century—which has increased over the last 30 years, is only a fraction, 20 per cent., of what it was in the early years of this century. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman will find that an inconvenient argument, when he is trying to convince everybody that we are in the middle of an unprecedented crime wave, but it happens to be the truth.
To deal with the sense that people have that over-lenient sentences are being imposed, there has to be some recognition by the House that that matter will be dealt with. The argument, against the prosecution having a right of appeal do not hold any water. The prosecution has a role, and in Crown court, when recorders are about to pass sentence, they will often ask the prosecutor,"In this case, Mr. So-and-so, what powers do I have?"
It is true that the prosecution should never advocate a particular sentence, and the bar's code of conduct makes that clear. However, nobody who supports new clause 20 suggests that prosecuting counsel should advocate a sentence, in the sense that he should use all his powers of oratory to get an appropriate sentence. The prosecution has an interest, in the same way as the defence and society have an interest, in making sure that the sentence is right. I cannot see that the prosecution's role is compromised by making sure that the relevant considerations go before the court. That can be done in a way that falls far short of active advocacy.
Another point that is sometimes put is that it would be unfair on the individual judge if he were to be taken to the

Court of Appeal and pilloried because of one error in a decision. There would be protection for many judges if their cases could be taken to the Court of Appeal in the way that new clause 20 contemplates. Often it is clear to a lawyer reading a report of a case that there must have been more to it than meets the eye. Some of us have been involved in cases about which we have read in the newspapers, and, without being inaccurate, such reports have given a wrong impression of what transpired. It would be useful if the public could be satisfied that a case that looked over-lenient had gone to the Court of Appeal and been reviewed. The public would be reassured when they could say, "Well, it looked to us as if this were an over-lenient sentence, but perhaps it is not."
Clause 29 has two things in its favour. The first is the eloquence of my hon. Friend the Minister in putting forward the case in Committee. That is about the best thing that it has going for it. The second is that it is at least the thin end of the wedge. I will not repeat the arguments that have already been made. However, when the public finally realise that a particular case has gone to the Court of Appeal, that a statement has been made that an over-lenient sentence has been given, and then the villain has got away scot-free, they will be distressed. My hon Friend the Minister fairly conceded in Committee that if this approach does not work, the only avenue that will be left is that contemplated in new clause 20.
If I thought that my hon. Friend the Minister had come to the House, after a Damascene conversion, and was prepared to go along with new clause 20, I could welcome that. I do not see any point in forcing a Division on new clause 20 when, in all likelihood, it would probably fail. If the way in which I and my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) have put the case shows that sooner rather than later the Government will be forced to accept the inevitable, I would find that a welcome development.

Mr. Lawrence: I am grateful to Mr. Speaker for selecting these amendments at a late hour, because if that had not happened we would not have been able to debate this important matter. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) will withdraw his new clause and allow the House to vote on amendment No. 60, which will enable us to delete clause 29. I support all those who have spoken against clause 29. I do not support my hon. Friends who want to see new clause 20 or amendments Nos. 61 or 62 passed.
Clause 29 is another nonsense, introduced by the Government to show, in a sort of gung ho fashion, that they are doing something about law and order. I repeat that is not necessary because it is patently obvious to anybody with the slightest interest in law and order that the Government have introduced an endless catalogue of measures—[Interruption.]—and if Opposition Members do not accept that, let them read the speech that I made in the debate last Friday, when I dealt with many aspects of Government policy in this sphere, and even then I did not cover the entire catalogue of law and order measures that we have taken. The Government have no need to introduce nonsensical provisions, in the humble belief that they have not done enough to satisfy the people, when they have done more than any other Administration in history to deal with law and order.
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Nearly everyone at the Bar and, I suspect, nearly everyone on the Bench, believes that clause 29 is a load of nonsense. Why have the Government introduced it? It is a hollow pretence and it reminds me of an advertisement for the Today newspaper which I see displayed as I drive to the House each day. It portrays three funny-looking judges and says something about the short and curlies having us in their grip. It is meant to hold the judiciary up to ridicule and make them figures of fun.
There is no need for Today to spend money on expensive advertising to do that. People need only read clause 29. That will hold the judiciary up to ridicule and contempt when the public learn that when a matter is referred to the Court of Appeal for assessment as to whether a sentence should be higher, the Court of Appeal will be able only to say, "Yes, it is a terribly low sentence, but we cannot do anything about it."
The people who will get the kicking are the members of the Government, because the public will ask, "What are the Government doing? This measure sends matters to the Court of Appeal, which cannot do anything about them. What a load of idiots we have governing the country."—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I assure Opposition Members that that would be a totally wrong conclusion. Anyway, it will not happen, because clause 29 will not remain in the Bill, either because we will vote it out tonight, or, because their Lordships will do with it what they did with it on the last occasion, and remove it from the Bill.
If clause 29 were left in, it would represent a hollow sham which would reduce the respect in which the judges are held. Why should an intelligent Government introduce such an absurd measure? The answer given is that they want the Court of Appeal to lay down guidelines, which is a sensible suggestion. The Court of Appeal should say that in rape, drug, DHSS and other cases the courts should take account of certain parameters when sentencing.
The trouble is that nobody in the Home Office, nor, it seems, in the Government, is aware that we already have those guidelines and that the Lord Chief Justice in every important case lays down guidelines. I have them with me. I hold a book which every judge should have before him when he decides what sentence to pass in a criminal case. I shall refer only to rape, which is one of the most important and worrying matters about which people are saying that sentences are inadequate. In R.v. Billam in 1986 the Lord Chief Justice laid down guidelines, and I shall refer only to the heads of paragraphs:
There are … many reported decisions of the Court which give an indication of what current practice ought to he and it may be useful to summarise their general effect.
For rape committed by an adult without any aggravating or mitigating features, a figure of five years should be taken as the starting point in a contested case.
The Lord Chief Justice goes on to deal with the situation if two men are involved and the situation where the victim is living with the person who has committed rape. He says in the next paragraph:
At the top of the scale comes the defendant who has carried out what might be described as a campaign of rape, committing the crime upon a number of women or girls. He represents a more than ordinary danger and a sentence of fifteen years or more may be appropriate.
Where the defendant's behaviour has manifested perverted or psychopathic tendencies or gross personality disorder … a life sentence will not be inappropriate.
The crime should in any event be treated as aggravated by any of the following factors,

and he lists eight factors.
Those are the guidelines and they are there for every judge in a criminal case to see. They are there to be followed. There is no point in referring these matters to the Court of Appeal to establish guidelines, when they are there already.

Mr. Simon Hughes: Will the hon. Gentleman explain, because as he read that out the Minister of State was saying, "We all know that" and his advice to the Home Office and other Departments must be that that is the case, what is the justification for the Government's acting against what is a fact and must be their own advice? What is his explanation for this ridiculous Government position?

Mr. Lawrence: The hon. Gentleman will no doubt ask my hon. Friend that when he replies and I am sure that he will get a better and more defensive reply than he will get from me.

Mr. Nicholls: My hon. and learned Friend has read out what the guidelines might be in a case such as rape. What would he do about cases where the judges do not follow the guidelines?

Mr. Lawrence: I am afraid that not much can be done if the judges refuse to follow the guidelines. It is up to the Lord Chief Justice to breathe a word in their ears and say that if they go on behaving in that extraordinary way and do not follow the guidelines they are not fit to sit as judges.
I am afraid that it is simply not possible to be sure that., if the Court of Appeal says that the appropriate senence in a particular case was 10 years and not five, the next judge who has to consider it will take any notice of that. If he is not taking any notice of the existing guidelines, he is not going to take any notice of the next lot of guidelines.

Mr. Hind: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that the proposition that he is putting forward as the status quo can in no way deal with the judge who consistently passes lenient sentences, which both clause 29 and new clause 20 tackle and his position does not?

Mr. Lawrence: I can tell my hon. Friend, for what it is worth—he is a practitioner a t the Bar, as I am—that very often the cases that cause a great deal of concern in the press have been misreported. If they went to the Court of Appeal it would say that the judge was perfectly right to impose that sentence. Too often the public are concerned because a matter has been inadequately reported. I have very often been engaged in cases where the members of the press are there at the opening of the case, they are not there throughout the case, they are there when the verdict is returned, and then they splurge all over the headlines some rubbish that has absolutely nothing to do with the case.
I have a feeling—and this is another problem—that some of the cases will be referred to the Court of Appeal and the judges there will say that the sentence was perfectly adequate and was the appropriate sentence in the circumstances. So it will not always happen that judges who impose lenient sentence will be in the wrong. If they go on and on doing so, they will very soon find that they are not asked by the Lord Chief Justice to sit and will shortly be removed from office. So there is a way of dealing with it.
There is no magic way of making sure that if the Court of Appeal says in a certain case that the appropriate


sentence is this and not that, in future, in different circumstances, with a different defendant, at a different time, in a different place and with different facts, the same sentence will be given. That idea is wholly illusory. It will not happen.
There are two positions that can be adopted. Either we say, that is a shame, therefore we will give them the power to change the sentence, or we say—that is a sham, we will get rid of the clause and leave the status quo. I am in favour of the latter step. I am opposed to the new clauses, which would give the Court of Appeal additional powers fundamentally because it would place the person sentenced into a form of double jeopardy which would be contrary to the history and practice of our courts. We have to remember that our courts are not geared to finding the truth. Our courts are geared, under the confrontationary system that we have, to see whether the prosecution can establish guilt. That is a very different matter, and once one starts dismantling parts of the existing system, one will have to dismantle many other things that hang on to it.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: My hon. and learned Friend is a lawyer and I am not, but surely double jeopardy is about innocence or guilt; it is not about sentencing. New clause 20 and amendment No. 61 are about corecting errors of sentence. There is no double jeopardy involved.

Mr. Lawrence: I beg to differ. I think that there is a sort of double jeopardy over whether a man is convicted or acquitted, and there is another sort of double jeopardy over whether a man is put on probation or gets five years or 10 years.
There are all sorts of circumstances in which it is grossly unfair to try a man again. If one puts a man up in the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal has not seen the judge, has not spoken to him or heard the circumstances in which he gave the sentence, other than a brief outline, and it has not seen the defendant or the witnesses, it is not in a position to judge anything. The Court of Appeal will be deprived of everything that happened at the trial and the defendant will be assessed by some judges who are sitting on high saying, "We think that the sentence is wrong." It is an inherently unjust system. That is one reason why I oppose it.
If my hon. Friends do not accept the first reason, there is another reason why I oppose it, which is also very important. It would require the interference of the prosecution in the process of sentencing, which is diametrically different from the system that we have followed in the past. In the first situation posed by clause 29, it would be the Attorney-General's life which would be made a misery in this place as hon. Members from both sides of the House, whose names it is not necessary for me to mention, would take up his time asking why the case of Bloggs and Bloggs has not been referred to the Court of Appeal. In the new clause 20 situation, in every case where the sentence was less than a victim had thought, the Court of Appeal would have to look at all the papers. How long would it take to get to the Court of Appeal if it had to look at hundreds of cases where victims were complaining that the sentences were less than they thought were right?

Mr. Gale: The judge should have got it right in the first place.

Mr. Lawrence: The judge may have got it right at the beginning, but it is not easy to persuade a victim or somebody whose daughter has been interfered with and the man has gone to prison for only 10 years instead of life that that was a fair sentence.
I am afraid that it is removed from knowledge, understanding or experience of life to conclude that the situation would be different if the Court of Appeal had the right to make decisions and actually to change things. To involve the prosecution in the process of referring matters to the Court of Appeal is a complete change in our system.
My advice to the Government is the same as it was on new clause 19—leave well alone. If they do not, their enthusiasm will do far more harm than good.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I wish to speak to amendment No. 61 which is in my name and that of two hon. Friends. I should first thank Mr. Speaker for putting the amendment back on the Order Paper today.
My amendment will ensure that cases of public concern—I stress "public" concern—shall be referred by the Attorney-General in his quasi-legal, quasi-political capacity to the Court of Appeal to obtain a review of the sentence in question. I do not believe that the floodgates will be opened by the amendment. There will be occasional cases that will be considered outrageous, insufficient, exceedingly lenient and sentences that should be looked at again.
We have to ask ourselves whether sentences today are adequate. What about the deterrent element in our sentencing? Indeed, what about deterrence per se? Clause 29, with which I have great sympathy as far as it goes—although I wish to amend it—establishes a precedent for subsequent cases. The whole of English law is based on precedent and I cannot understand why my hon. Friends are so opposed to precedent, the fact that cases can be looked at again. After all, in some cases all that will be achieved will be good sentencing practice, good sentencing guidelines, presented to this House.
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My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) was critical of the guidelines. He said that we already had them. But let us be frank, few judges accurately follow them. And in some other cases, which my hon. and learned Friend mentioned, there is nothing wrong in getting a second opinion. I think that that is particularly important. What is wrong with its being referred to the Court of Appeal anyway? If we get a second opinion, at least there is a double chance.
Following the Ealing vicarage rape case, which resulted in lenient sentences given by Mr. Justice Leonard of three and five years respectively for the two vicious rapes, nothing was done to satisfy the public's demand for tougher sentences rather than the outrageously soft sentences that will not deter rapists. We must accept that rape is on the increase, and I am particularly concerned to see stiffer sentences for rape. There should be a natural right—whether it is new clause 20 of my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) or my own amendment No. 61—there should be a mechanism for appeal within the Criminal Justice Bill, to redress the balance which gives an unfair advantage to the defence, who could appeal against any sentence if they felt that it was too high, whereas the prosecution could not appeal against a sentence that they felt was too low.
My amendment, I believe, would have given the Attorney-General the automatic right to send any case that he considered to be a matter of public concern to the Court of Appeal for review, when the sentence was a matter of public outcry. This facility could still be supported by the Home Office, whether today or in another place. We do not really need clause 29 in its current form because the public believe that sentences in specific cases will be overturned; yet that is patently wrong and the public must be made to realise quickly that it cannot happen in that way.
Lord Justice Lane prescribed certain guidelines for rape sentences in the case of R. v. Billam of 21 February 1986. It seems to me that his guidelines are being ignored in most cases, as he recommended a term of five years to be taken as a starting point in contested rape cases, and a minimum of eight years when a rape is committed by two or more men. Mr. Justice Leonard felt in the Ealing case that the victim did not suffer, as he put it, "so great a trauma". However, it occurred after the most revolting acts committed on her person. Can he really judge how a young woman suffers—particularly as, I understand, the lady in that case is now receiving psychiatric treatment.
I have undertaken a full survey of rape sentences, looking at the guidelines, and the actual time spent under sentence. I can reveal that in 1985 the average sentence given for rape was three and a half years and the average time actually spent in prison was only 20 months. So much for judges listening to the Lord Chief Justice and the public at large. If we are to stamp out rape or at least reduce it substantially, we must have this right to appeal against excessively lenient sentences. It could even be that we should bring in a minimum sentence of 25 years, without remission, for rape. Rape is not just a sick crime, it is almost as bad as murder.
Let us look at a random study of prison statistics, which shows what sentences have been, and examine the length of sentence in years. If someone is sentenced to three years he spends only 16 months in prison; for seven years it is 46 months; for ten years it is 72 months; and for 15 years it is 109 months. Surely we must give out sentences which mean exactly what they say? We must stop the lenient sentences, so that we halt this massive increase in crime both in London and elsewhere, where sexual offences have risen by 6 per cent. in England and Wales and 7 per cent. in London, and where violence against people has gone up by 3 per cent. in England and Wales. If we could, therefore, have these minimum sentences, and if we could have this right to appeal, we would ensure that a sentence meant precisely what it said.
Crime is on the increase and we have to stop the rot. I raised this matter with my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General in a letter of 11 March in which I expressed the concern not just of myself but of other hon. Friends about the inadequate sentences being given out in cases of rape and in other cases. My right hon. and learned Friend made it clear that he was content with the scope for the provision made in clause 29. I make that point because hon. Members on both sides of the House have been saying that the Attorney-General probably would not like the role that he will have under clause 29 as it stands. He made it clear that he is content with the clause as drafted. However, he did not support any extension of the power which I am asking for in my amendment and which is sought too by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West.
The Court of Appeal must have the opportunity to overturn a light sentence. We have a rotten situation, with many crimes being committed. There have been some very inadequate sentences in recent months. They have been highlighted not just by the tabloids but by the sensible newspapers. We must get the right of appeal back on to the statute book, if not tonight then in another place. For that reason, I urge hon. Members to support amendent No. 61.

Mr. Bermingham: Once again the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) seems to have missed the point of our criminal justice system. That is becoming less surprising as the night goes on, because as time passes we learn about the prejudice and the courting of popularity that seems to be taking place on the Government Benches, with some notable and honourable exceptions. The whole principle of our sentencing system is that judges listen to all that is said by the prosecution and by the defence. The whole purpose behind our system is to try to achieve the best sentence possible, bearing in mind all the circumstances.
The one thing we must never have is for the prosecution to have any interest in sentencing. As those hon. Members on both sides of the House who have had the privilege of prosecuting know only too well, a prosecutor must never have an interest in the outcome. He must present the facts impartially, without prejudice or fear. For him to be asked at a later stage to become involved in whether a sentence is right or wrong is to fly in the face of thousands of years of history.
When the hon. Member for Leicester, East talks about the idea of a moral majority, as he did earlier, I become alarmed, because we are allowing emotion to enter into what must be a totally dispassionate exercise. Hon. Members know my views well. What worries me about clause 29 is that we are beginning that dreadful and dangerous process of allowing the prosecution in the form of the Attorney-General to be enticed into entering the whole question of sentencing.
I would not wish to be an Attorney-General—I think that will never happen, in any event—but I would not wish to see any Attorney-General subjected to the pressures that might come from Crown prosecutors who were themselves the subject of pressure, perhaps from clerks in a court or perhaps from police officers, who felt that things were unfair or wrong. In the end the matter might be pushed up the chain to the Attorney. Reality tells us that that would happen. Regardless of what the hon. Member for Leicester, East or others say about the matter—if hon. Members who talked on the subject had a little knowledge of it, it would help enormously—reality says that, because of pressure, prejudice and perhaps ignorance, even the popular press on occasions takes something out of context and begin to pressurise and comment, and so we begin a path.
The art of justice is that those who judge come to the task fresh and impartial. Our system has always been a simple one. It is for the Crown to prove its case and for the defence to prove nothing. It is for the judge to sentence on conviction having heard all the facts and all that has been said for the defendant. Clause 29 seeks to introduce a completely new theory—that somehow the outsider, the person who has not been involved, has not seen the reports or heard the evidence or arguments, can come from afar and say, "This is wrong."
From time to time judges and magistrates are clearly wrong. That is human nature. But are we to take the bad examples and use them as the means of criticising a system that has stood the test of time? The bulk of sentencing in Britain is right. Are we to take the exception, hype it up and use it for political advantage on some occasions as, I regret to say, some hon. Members seek to do? Are we to use it to scream from the rooftops that our judiciary is wrong? Should we not stand back for a little while and simply say that by and large Britain gets it right? Yes, there will be sentences that are wrong. Some may be too severe and those can be corrected, and some may be too lenient and can lead to the Lord Chief Justice, the Court of Appeal or somebody else, issuing guidelines to advise and correct.
If we begin to go down the road of appealing against sentences on behalf of the prosecution, as has been said earlier tonight, we open up a completely new ball game. We destroy a system that has stood the test of time and we begin to allow the popular press, the publicity-hungry politician on occasions to seek to— [Interruption.] I hear what the Minister has just said. I regret it. It does not do him justice.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: Nor does the hon. Gentleman's speech.

Mr. Bermingham: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and much of what he says in this place does not do him justice.
Justice is a precious little bird and it can so easily be crushed on the altar of expediency. It can be crushed by people who seek to use it as a means of political advantage or political popularity. Let us not do that in the House tonight. Let us stand by a system that has stood the test of time and let us support the amendment that crushes clause 29.

Mr. Soley: I can be brief, not least because the right hon. and learned Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle) made the case not only against the new clause but against clause 29. My real anger about the debate stems from the way in which it has arisen. We had a long debate in Committee on an amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind), who has also tabled the new clause. He felt so strongly about his amendment that he did not even put it to the vote, and he will act in the same way again tonight. In other words, the debate is purely decorative. We have had it, just as the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) said, precisely because some hon. Members want to show that they are doing something about the crisis in law and order.
I shall not go over that debate again, but there is one matter on which I disagreed with the hon. and learned Member for Burton. We all know that the crime rate has gone up faster under this Government than any other, Labour or Tory, and the clear-up rate has fallen more dramatically under this Government than any other, Labour or Tory, precisely because of the policies that that have ripped apart Britain's social fabric and made it difficult for communities to rebuild, re-identify and develop the natural crime prevention facilities that exist in any well-structured community.
The problem exists in all Western societies, and has done for 30 years. The Government are charged with

making a bad situation worse. In doing that, they try to turn to the decorative bits: we have had several this afternoon and this evening. This afternoon, we discussed bringing back the cane and the birch, and whipping—yes, whipping—10 and 14-year-olds for using offensive language. The present debate is designed to show that there is some muscle in the Government's law and order policies, when there is none.
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The hon. Member for Lancashire, West would receive more commendations if he pushed the matter to a vote. But he will not— just as he did not in Standing Committee—because he knows that, as the right hon. and learned Member for Warrington, South and the hon. and learned Member for Burton have demonstrated, the new clause is nonsense. I do no intend to repeat everything that was said by the right hon. and Learned Member for Warrington, South, but he was entirely right. The new clause would drag the Attorney-General into an impossible position. He would be questioned on case after case, and asked why he had not referred those cases.
As a couple of Conservative Members pointed out, when cases were referred to the Court of Appeal and it chose not to increase the sentence, the outcry that was heard before would be heard again; the position would be worse than before. The hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) does not seem to understand—and, by God, his remarks have caused a lot of trouble in this country; he should exercise more responsibility in what he says— that the reporting of crime is notoriously inaccurate. His hon. Friends have referred to that.
Not long ago, we saw some disgraceful reporting in the newspapers, which stated on their front pages that a young man had been given a life sentence for sticking a glass in a publican's face. But it was not even alleged in court that he had committed such an offence. The life sentence had been imposed for an event that took place five or six hours earlier, at a football match. No one was hurt; the young man had kicked out and sworn at a policeman. But the headlines in the British press stated that he had received a life sentence for "glassing" a publican, which the charge did not even mention.
The hon. Member for Leicester, East must take some responsibility for helping to whip up that hysteria. If the reporting of cases were more accurate—as the hon. and learned Member for Burton and the right hon. and learned Member for Warrington, South have said—we would have a little more confidence in the way that those cases were argued later in the courts. As it is, we can feel no such confidence. We must accept that the mood of hysteria encouraged by debates of this kind undermines the very aspects of our society that we are trying to protect. It undermines the whole concept of justice.
I consider that there is a case for a sentencing council, and that the Government have missed an opportunity to provide for such a council. It would not be the answer to all the problems; but, as hon. Members on both sides of the House have said, there will be cases in which inappropriate sentences are imposed. The Ealing rape case is an example. The advantage of a sentencing council is that, as the hon. and learned Member for Burton pointed out—he quoted from a book—it would provide a useful guideline, and would make sensible debates on sentencing


possible. We could escape from the highly emotive cases on which the hon. Member for Leicester, East prefers to focus his attention.
There is some discrepancy in sentencing, in terms of both the types of offence involved and the geographical location. The geographical difference is almost more important than anything else. The same offences, with the same background, may attract very different sentences in different parts of the country.
That is not my central point. It is not too late to lose clause 29. It is nonsense, and the other place rightly will not like it. New clause 20 is an insult to those who have bothered to attend the debate, because the hon. Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) never intended to put it to the vote here or in Committee. Trying so desperately to get the matter debated and pretending that it is vital to justice and then not putting it to a vote is not convincing behaviour. If the hon. Gentleman and those who support him want to prove me wrong, they will have an opportunity to do so in a moment.

Mr. Mellor: Everyone has had such fun in this debate that I wonder whether my presence is wholly necessary. I am unavoidably here and cast in the role of Aunt Sally, so I shall try to don the mantle with as good a grace as I can muster at 2.6 am.
One thing is absolutely clear. Whatever the Government had chosen to do would have been controversial and much derided by many of the voices that have spoken out in the debate. If we had chosen to do nothing, we would have been condemned by the public for failing to deal with a manifest gap in our procedures, and we would have been condemned by many hon. Members for having fallen below the level of events and legitimate expectation.
By proposing clause 29, which I believe to be a principled response to the problem, we are criticised by those who say that we should not do anything and by those who say that it is a milk-and-water measure and that it would be far better to have the red meat of a full-bloooded prosecution right of appeal.
If we had chosen a full-blooded prosecution right of appeal, it is perfectly clear that many would have rejected it. Many have said so in terms—the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham), the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), there was a guilty plea by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), and at best there was cautious rapture from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle).
As to the last suggestion that we heard, the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) is very well-meaning and I do not wish to be nasty to him at 2.7 am, but the idea that a sentencing council gets into the target, let alone hits the bull's-eye of the problem is a delusion. He deludes himself if he thinks that it is a remotely relevant proposal. The kindest thing that one can say about a sentencing council is that it involves a lot of other great and good people in the functions of the judiciary laying down the very guidelines that certain judges are flouting. We would be in exactly the same situation with a sentencing council. If the hon. Member for Hammersmith wants to have quiet nights and to keep his blood pressure down, he must pray that he is never on this side of the Chamber, but remains where he is where he can get away with speeches such as he treated us to tonight.
All of the fair-minded people who are gathered together in the House at 2.8 am will agree that the Government would have been criticised whatever they had done. We must ask whether we have taken an appropriate course. I do not think that doing nothing is a viable option. It is only those who are cloaked in Temple complacency or the irresponsibility of Opposition who can suggest that doing nothing is a viable option.
In 1985 we brought forward a proposal which was roundly rejected in another place, but at least one of those who was prominent in rejecting it, Lord Denning, now regrets the grounds on which he rejected it and proposes to reject it from the other side of the fairway. We are all entitled to change our mind. We responded in 1985 to legitimate public concern about a small minority of sentences for serious offences that were widely publicised and felt by the public, rightly or wrongly, to be objectionably low, with the result that public confidence in the criminal justice system was adversely affected.
After the clause was rejected by the other place, we debated the issue in Committee after the Bill had arrived in this place. I said something that appears to have borne the test of time more than most of the remarks that I make in this place. I said that the other place had rejected the remedy but had not abolished the problem, which would continue to recur. I argued that every few months there would be a case that would cause widespread public disquiet to the extent that the noise would be heard even through ermine earmuffs, and that we would find ourselves in precisely the same situation one year or two years later. I said that the public would not be denied having their legitimate concerns considered within this place. A number of celebrated cases have emerged and there has been great public furore, and legitimately so.
But what has happened? The furore has died away, but what constructive result has emerged from it? What guarantee do we have for those who felt that the way in which cases were dealt with wrongly originally could be rectified? Even more fundamentally, what prospect is there under present arrangements that similar facts recurring in another court would be treated differently by the judge hearing the case? The answer is that we have the worst of both worlds. We do not have the remedy of re-sentencing, for which one or two were crying out, to deal with cases of this sort, and we have no guarantee that change would be made if the case were to be considered again.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton treated us to a mettlesome stallion of a speech that could have been delivered by an Old Baileyite in an end-of-thepier show. As for his plea in mitigation on behalf of the Government, I found myself as the client sitting in the dock trembling, as I know so many of his clients have done at the Old Bailey. I felt rather like one of the many who have been sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment after a judge has listened to one of my hon. and learned Friend's eloquent speeches. I might not have had much of a case., but a better defence could have been advanced than that which was put forward, which was rather along the lines., "While we were all idiots, we were well-meaning idiots and. did our best, and really we did quite a lot."
The fundamental flaw in my hon. and learned Friend's position was revealed when he read out the guidelines which were laid down in R. v. Billam. I shall quote one instance where the guidelines did not seem to have been followed, and it can be said that none of us was the wiser or even marginally better informed some months after the


sentence was passed. The case arose at the Old Bailey in the summer when a man abducted a girl from the highway, pushed her into a shed, had forcible sexual intercourse with her and transmitted to her a venereal disease. He appeared at the Old Bailey, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.
Many people wanted to know— I use that careful formulation because Ministers are not supposed to have opinions on these matters—how that fitted in with the guidelines in Billam. The general understanding of the guidelines was that even if it was appropriate to reduce the sentence for a plea of guilty, the transmission of venereal disease from the rapist to the unfortunate victim was an aggravating feature, and the Lord Chief Justice's suggestion was that the starting point for the sentence in such a case was eight years.
What are we to say six months after all the harroosh has died away? Is the transmission of venereal disease to a victim an aggravating feature, or is it not? Sadly, such an event is not so rare and we ought to know the answer to that question. But we do not know the answer. If a similar case were to occur tomorrow, or the day after, or next month, precisely the same sentence might be passed, and it would be greeted with precisely the same outcry as greeted the sentence that was passed last summer.
2.15 am
The Government's proposals would address that point. The Lord Chief Justice, if he chose to do so, would be able to take up that point in another case. The Court of Appeal would be directly faced with the issue if the matter proceeded on the Attorney-General's reference. The guidelines are not equally robust in every case. It cannot be thought to be mischievous and ludicrous that I should suggest to the House that it would be helpful if the Court of Appeal were to adjudicate.
A further point relates to the equally controversial Ealing vicarage case. Objection seemed to be taken to the apportionment rather than to the length of the sentences. There could have been no appeal on the basis that the sentences were lenient. In total length they were almost certainly not lenient. However, a matter of principle was raised that would be covered by clause 29; whether it is appropriate for a judge to divide one event into two or three bits, or whether he should pass sentence on the gravest offence and then pass concurrent sentences on the rest. The perfectly legitimate harroosh over the Ealing vicarage case has faded away, and none of us is any the wiser about how a court should deal with future cases of that kind. We can only hope that some judges read the newspapers.

Mr. Lawrence: Is my hon. Friend saying that the only justification for referring cases to the Court of Appeal for further consideration would be a technical matter that appeared to be in doubt? That is very different from what is thought to be the effect of clause 29.

Mr. Mellor: My hon. and learned Friend is leading counsel, whereas I, a humble junior, hung up my wig the best part of six years ago. Clause 29 says:
If it appears to the Attorney-General that a sentence passed by the Crown Court on a trial on indictment raises a question of public importance"—

I pause to say that both of the matters that I have laid before the House are surely matters of public importance—
he may, with the leave of the Court of Appeal, refer the case to them to obtain their opinion on the principles which should be observed in sentencing in similar cases in the future.
In other words, it is not a witch-hunt against the judge, or even an inquest into what happened. It provides an opportunity to use as a starting point a particular case that has shaken public confidence in the criminal justice system and gives to the Court of Appeal the opportunity to issue specific guidance, if it so wishes—it would be a matter for the Court of Appeal—that would allow the courts to make a better fist of dealing with a similar case if it arose next week. Surely, that provision is not worthy of some of the epithets that have been heaped upon it during this debate.
I am sad that among those ranged against me tonight is my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warrington, South, whom I respect more than many others of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I take very seriously the strictures that he has heaped upon the Government. I am very sorry that on this occasion I cannot agree with him; almost invariably we agree. I shall therefore, put a previous conviction to him in the hope that he will see some merit in what I have said.
Looking through my right hon. and learned Friend's antecedents, I discover that for some time he was incarcerated in the Home Office and that in 1972 he introduced a Criminal Justice Bill that contained a provision that could be called the twin of this provision. It dealt with the right of the Attorney-General to appeal if a judge had misdirected himself and thereby committed an error in law that led to an acquittal which, under the rules, could not be appealed against. If the judge had misdirected the jury so that the jury had convicted, there could have been an appeal on a point of law. However, on the assumption that the defendant walked out of the court a free man, but the feeling was that the judge had got it wrong, the opportunity for appeal should be taken for future guidance—I stress for future guidance—so that other courts should get it right. The case could then proceed on the Attorney-General's reference.
It is worth noting that the Attorney-General's notice would specifically not affect and has never affected the result of the case. Even if it has been determined subsequently that the individual was wrongly acquitted because the judge got the law wrong, that individual is not re-indicted. That cannot be very much different from the point that public confidence would be shaken if the public discovered that, notwithstanding the Court of Appeal saying that a sentence had apparently been wrong, the defendant was not re-sentenced. If a defendant has been wrongly acquitted, and is held to have been so, because the point of law taken by the judge is found by the Court of Appeal to be spurious, nevertheless, that individual continues to go free. It was because of the success of that proposal, which has not led to howls of derision for the Attorney-General or the Government and which has worked perfectly amiably for 15 years, that we saw fit to attach this modest proposal to the Bill to include sentencing, not just decisions on points of law.

Mr. Mark Carlisle: I have listened with great interest to the cogent defence that my hon. Friend the Minister has advanced for clause 29. Surely he would agree that there is a substantial difference between the power to refer a


point of law, which, once settled, can be used in other cases, and the power to refer a sentence which must always very much depend on the individual case of the person whom the judge is sentencing. That does not create the same effect. Perhaps I was somewhat unfair earlier. I accept that in the words used in clause 29 the Government have deliberately decided to narrow the original proposal that was defeated in another place through the use of the words:
a sentence … raises a question of public importance.
I still believe, for the reasons that I have given, that it will not assuage public concern. I suggest that there is a distinction between referring matters of law and referring individual sentences.

Mr. Mellor: I accept my right hon. and learned Friend's sincerity on that point. However, there is no doubt that clause 29 is more carefully phrased, with the benefit of hindsight, than the earlier provision. I repeat that clause 29 states that the Attorney-General may
refer the case to them to obtain their opinion on the principles which should he observed in sentencing in similar cases in future.
In other words, he will take the opportunity raised by a particular sentence. More often than not the argument against a sentence is not that it is just wrong in a vacuum, but that it is wrong in the context of a specific point. That is certainly true about the allegation of the transmission of a veneral disease.
We are entitled to look to the future. I submit that it should not be held against us if we choose to stay our hand and not weave into the proposal the kind of double-jeopardy arrangement that would otherwise exist if defendants were to be re-sentenced.
To my mind the principal and most compelling defence of clause 29 is that we cannot continue to tolerate a position in which an outcry ebbs away without anything positive emerging from that outcry because in the end that outcry has nowhere positive to go.

Mr. Soley: I think that the Minister shares my concern—he did in Committee—about decisions being made in the heightened atmosphere of some of the cases that we have mentioned. Does he envisage that while the process is taking place, the discussion of the case will remain sub judice, or will the sub judice rule not apply as the case no longer refers to a particular person?

Mr. Mellor: I do not think that the sub judice rule need be as tight as when a jury is considering a case. It would not differ from the rule that applies now when cases go to appeal, bearing in mind that they are dealt with by professional judges, not lay people. There could be some discussion on that.

Mr. Soley: Will that Minister clarify that a little? Is he saying that there could be discussion in the press about the merits of the sentence?

Mr. Mellor: The rules that apply to normal appeals would apply here. Some limited discussion—more than is permitted before a case goes before a jury—would be allowed. We would have to accept the guidance of the court, because in matters of contempt, that would be within its remit, not ours.
I hope that I have established at the very least that doing nothing is not an option and that the idea of doing nothing comes only from those whose experiences in the

Temple blind them to what the public think about this. They put themselves as I have said, in the position of the doctors in Hilaire Belloc's famous poem:
They answered, as they took their fees,
'There is no cure for this disease'.
I cannot possibly support that proposition, and I am saddened that one or two experienced hon. Members should have done so.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Is clause 29(2) meant to be exhaustive merely to give examples of what is covered by the word "sentence"? I am specifically anxious to know. if this is meant to be exhaustive, why it does not include an order for criminal bankruptcy or compensation, which is a form of redress, the absence of which can rightly cause public outrage and a private sense of gross injustice?

Mr. Mellor: Criminal bankruptcy is being abolished in the Bill. Compensation is not technically part of a sentence. Whether it should be is an interesting point, arid I should like to reflect on that.
I shall now deal with those who say not that we should do nothing but that we should have a full prosecution right of appeal. I fully understand why my hon. Friends advance that case, but that would be an unjustifiably overelaborate response to the particular problems that we face. About 89,000 Crown court sentences were passed last year. It is hard to think of more than a handful that excited much public opprobrium. The problem is not that too few people are sent to prison or that they are sent to prison for too short a period overall— that is demonstrable in figures with which I shall not 'weary the House—but the one or two celebrated cases which raise public anguish, especially those crimes of serious sexual violence or other crimes of violence which become news on the principle that they are unusual. The dog biting the man is not newsworthy; the man biting the dog is. We must address that point.
I attach importance to the point raised by a number of hon. Members, that it would change the character of the prosecution. My hon. Friend the Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind) was not particularly convincing when he said that the new clause would not have that much of an impact on the prosecution. The prosecution would need to have its own sentencing policy. It would have to be clear in every given case how the sentence fitted in with its own guidelines. That would he objectionable. If the prosecution had to delve into social inquiry reports, that would also he objectionable. But unless it did so, how could it decide whether the judge had sentenced properly, when he is entitled to take account of matters contained in social inquiry reports in determining the extent of the mitigation. I said in Committee that if we found this proposal did not work, the question of a prosecution right of appeal would have to be high on the agenda. I repeat that as a consolation to my hon. Friends.
I hope that I have not outstayed my welcome, but this was a stimulating debate. Someone had to speak for poor, benighted clause 29. I believe that there is a far better case for it than some of my hon. Friends advanced.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Before I call the hon. Member for Lancashire, West (Mr. Hind), I should like to deal with the point raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Warrington, South (Mr. Carlisle). Mr. Speaker selected new clause 20 for debate and the House may divide on it. The amendments were taken with it, so there will be no vote on the amendments.

Mr. Hind: I am grateful for the fact that we have had this debate. I hope that hon. Members who participated in it do not share the view of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) that it has been theatrical and a waste of time, but agree that we have achieved something. The hon. Gentleman tabled, but has not moved, eight clauses, so the pot is calling the kettle black.
2.30 am
It would be churlish of me and my colleagues who support new clause 20 not to admit that half a cake is better than none. If my hon. Friend the Minister will reconsider the matter, and as we want to see appeals brought forward, clause 29 is better than nothing. Perhaps it is now up to those in the other place, led by Lord Denning and Lord Chief Justice Lane, who expressed his view in a speech at the Mansion House, to debate the matter further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21

ALTERATION OF NAMES OF PETTY SESSIONS AREAS OUTSIDE INNER LONDON AREA

'The following sections shall be inserted after section 24 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979—

"Alteration of names of petty sessions areas outside inner London area

24A.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this and the next following section, a magistrates' courts committee for an area mentioned in section 19(2) above other than the City of London may at any time submit to the Secretary of State a draft order altering the name of the petty sessions area for which they are the committee or, if they are the committee for more than one petty sessions area, the name of any of those areas.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this and the next following section, where such a commitee submit a draft order to the Secretary of State under this section, he may by statutory instrument make the order either in the terms of the draft or with such modifications as he thinks fit.

(3) Any order under this section may contain transitional and other consequential provisions.

Procedure relating to s.24A

24B.—(1) Before submitting to the Secretary of State a draft order under section 24A of this Act, a magistrates' courts committee—

(a) shall consult the council of the non-metropolitan county, metropolitan district or outer London borough concerned and the magistrates of the petty sessions area to which their proposals relate; and
(b) after complying with paragraph (a) above, shall send a copy of their proposals to every interested authority and take into consideration any objections made in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time.

(2) A magistrates' courts committee submitting to the Secretary of State a draft order under section 24A of this Act shall comply with such requirements (if any) as to notice as may be prescribed; and the Secretary of State, before making an order under that section otherwise than in accordance with a draft submitted to him by the magistrates' courts-committee, shall send a copy of his proposals to the committee, to the council of the non-metropolitan county, metropolitan disrict or outer London borough concerned and, if a non-metropolitan county is concerned, to every interested authority.

(3) Before making any order under section 24A of this Act the Secretary of State shall take into

consideration any objections made in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time, and may cause a local inquiry to be held.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

(a) "interested authority", in relation to any order or draft order concerning a non-metropolitan county, means the council of any district in the county which is wholly or partly included in the area to which the order or draft order relates; and
(b) an order shall be deemed to he made in accordance with a draft order if either it is made in terms of the draft order or the departures from the draft order do not, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, effect important alterations in the draft order.".'—[Mr. Merlyn Rees.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 95, in Title, line 9, after 'cases' insert 'the alteration of names of petty sessions areas.'.

Mr. Rees: I have not stayed up so late for about 25 years, and I did not realise that such things still went on. In moving the new clause I am secure in the knowledge of success, so it is worth it. In suggesting this measure I have been aided and abetted by my wife, who is the chairman of the Harrow bench, which came into being a year ago. I am grateful to the staff of the Home Office for providing the new clause and to the Ministers for allowing that. I am secure in the support of the hon. Members for Harrow, West (Sir J. Page) and for Harrow, East (Mr. Dykes) who have an interest in the matter. Of course, the clerk of the court, Mr. Gordon Cropper, has played an important part.
The new clause and consequential amendment are concerned not only with Harrow, because other petty sessional areas will want to make changes. My main aim is to allow the new Harrow bench, which is a year old today, to call itself Harrow Gore. About 25 and 30 years ago I was the parliamentary candidate for Harrow, and having failed on those occasions it is good to do something for that area. I went to school there, my children grew up there, I met my wife there and I have an affinity to the area.
For the benefit of other areas which want to take similar steps, the new clause inserts after section 24 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979 new sections 24A and 24B. Despite all the efforts of the bench, it was not previously possible to make the changes, for reasons which are self-evident. The new clause aims to confer such a power and to make relevant subsidiary provisions.
The new sections set out the procedures that will have to be followed. Under new section 24A the Committee may submit a draft order to the Secretary of State. Under new section 24A(2) the Secretary of State may make the order— he is not required to do so— or make modifications. The rest of the new clause is technical, and there is an amendment to the short title of the Bill.
Why all the trouble so that Harrow can call itself Harrow Gore? The Gore area of Middlesex— the old hundred— is 600 years old. It describes a triangular piece of land where the Moot court was originally. The site is still known and is at the meeting place of Harrow, Kingsbury, Stanmore and Wembley. Out of that came the petty sessional area of Gore. Why lose it? It was an interesting court. Sir William Gilbert, of Gilbert and Sullivan, was chairman at the turn of the century.
Miss Audrey Chamberlain has written a history of the court. She points out that when Lord Hailsham referred to the Wealdstone court in his book "The Door where in I went", he mentioned that there was a chairman who was reported to have said to a motorist,
In this case the bench consider there is a doubt. We do not intend to give you the benefit of it.
Things have improved since those days, and not just because Sir William Gilbert used Gore as the title of his light opera "Ruddigore". When that opera was recently revived in London, the Daily Telegraph said that the spirit of Gilbert and Sullivan was alive and well and once more abroad. In some small way the spirit of Gilbert and Sullivan is abroad in this House tonight, in that we are bothering about something so small.
It is deeper than that. Over the last 20 years local government reform has swept aside areas and changed names without a thought to the history of localities. The Boundary Commission reported to the House and came up with names and areas that were plain daft. It is important that courts outside London are allowed in some small way— as they are in other areas— to maintain history and remember the past.
It is easy to refer to suburbia as subtopia. It is easy to be sardonic with Macaulay who said:
An acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia.
I do not do it for that reason. In the 1920s and 1930s those areas of Middlesex were covered with houses. Old areas were virtually obliterated out to the area of Watford. Those areas grew grass for the horses of London. In 1902 Laurence Housman wrote:
Hendon, and further out afield
Low water-meads are in his ken,
And lonely pools by Harrow Weald".
This is not possible any more, but I like and lived in that area. It is a good area, which happens to have the wrong political views. Gilbert is sitting up there in the elysian fields that are something like Stanmore Common and Harrow Weald Common. When I say, "Long live Gore," I imagine Gilbert is saying, "Ruddigore." I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his brevity. I am sure that he, having had to wait so long, has learnt a great deal tonight—as I have—about what the lawyers mean when they use the term "brief".

Mr. Mellor: The right hon. Gentleman is a well-respected and well-liked Member of this House. With great pleasure I say that we happily accept his new clause. I am sorry that he has had to wait so long to propose it.
Certainly, the great value of the magistracy is that it can respond to and reflect local feelings and traditions. Perhaps on nothing do these run higher than on the names of the areas. I am glad to accept this. My last word of commendation to the right hon. Gentleman is that, as Gilbert himself would have said, "He is an Englishman."

Mrs. Golding: No, he is Welsh.

Mr. Simon Hughes: I do not want to trespass on the linguistic and legalistic difficulties into which the Minister has got himself. However, I wish briefly to support the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees), and thank him for doing something to right a

wrong. I speak with some specific knowledge having, before coming to the House, practised in the court of which he spoke.
The right hon. Gentleman is a constituent of mine, so I am willing to ask that the import and tenor of what he is asking for a specific court be taken on by the Government in other respects. The borough in which both he and I live, the London borough of Southwark, has, for example, no county court by the name of Southwark. There is a Lambeth county court, which could easily be called the Lambeth and Southwark county court, so that people have an association with a court that is theirs. Some of the magistrates courts in inner London, and not just those in outer London, now do not naturally describe to people the area to which they relate. Courts are an important part of the fabric of the community, and the definitions of the boundaries of those are important.
I hope that the Government will take seriously on board the expressed wish of a former Home Secretary that we do not so carve up our geography that we also lose our history and give people an ever-decreasing sense of identity. What better way of doing that than making our court names once again consistent with their history and their geography? That would help both the identity of the court and the identity of the citizens whom the courts are there to serve.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

DISCLOSURE OF PROCEEDS OF OFFENCES

'(1) If any bank or financial institution, or any other body suspects that any proceeds of drug trafficking or gold bullion smuggling are or have been under its control or in passage through its banking or financial system, it may disclose the circumstances to the Chief Officer of Police for the area, or to any constable in his stead, and may follow any directions which he may give.

(2) In disclosing information or following the directions of the police, in accordance with subsection (1) above, any institution shall have statutory protection and shall not be liable to any person for breach of contract, confidence or duty in that respect.'.—[Mr. Alex Carlile.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Alex Carlile: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I move this new clause because of certain evidence that is now in the public domain concerning large-scale gold bullion smuggling. This clause is not well drafted, and I apologise for that. I will deal with the matter quickly, because I hear messages of sympathy from the Minister, and I do not want to lose his sympathy by prolixity. I recognise that drugs are provided for adequately in section 24 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, which I supported.
Johnson Matthey Bankers specifically gave rise to this new clause. That bank lost a great deal of money as a result of large-scale smuggling of gold bullion. Considerable international efforts are being made to track down those responsible, and the proceeds of the smuggling. The money resulting from the smuggling of gold bullion has been laundered through both domestic banks and banks abroad. They include those in the City of London and others in the Isle of Man and in Florida.
A matter for major concern is that some of the banks have strong suspicions that the money represented both the proceeds of gold bullion smuggling and also fraud of a sister bank, JMB. The banks concerned, it would appear, would have liked to disclose their suspicions to the police. However, the case of Tournier v. the National Provincial bank of England, which was decided in 1924, does not make it easy for the banks to know what their duty is, and where their responsibilities lie. There are those who say that Tournier's case imposes on banks an obligation of secrecy. Whether that is so is in doubt, as can be seen from the difference between Lords Denning and Boardman in the debate in the other place in Committee on the Drug Trafficking Offences Act.
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The object of the new clause is to permit banks to disclose such information as they have which gives rise to suspicion in the bank's mind, and yet to protect banks from any possible consequences such as breach of contract arising from that disclosure.
For gold bullion smuggling, there is no requirement for as severe provisions as are clearly required for drug trafficking offences, and as are provided under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act. Nevertheless, something is required.
It is my considered view that the banks would welcome the clause because it would represent a form of mutual aid in the banking system, which would also increase the public reputation of the banks.

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) for raising this point, and I am sympathetic to it. I wish to discuss the issue with the banks and other institutions which would be affected by a wider form of voluntary disclosure provision. I take the hon. and learned Gentleman's points and will report back to him in due course on how we have got on, and I hope to do that in time for any matter which might arise thereby to be inserted in the other place.

Mr. Carlile: I am grateful to the Minister for that rapid and helpful response. I look forward to seeing what he has to propose at a later stage. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1

THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE

Mr. Hogg: I beg to move amendment No. I, in: page 2, line 8, at end insert
'for England and Wales and Northern Ireland'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be convenient to discuss at the same time the following Government amendments: Nos. 6, 7, 4, 8 to 12, 20, 21, 23, 26 to 29, 34, 81, 83 to 85, 87 to 90, 93.

Mr. Hogg: Almost all these amendments have been put down in response to points raised in Committee, mostly by the official Opposition.

Mr. Chris Smith: In Committee the Government responded most constructively to a considerable number of points that were made by Government Back Benchers and particularly by Opposition Members. We are grateful

for that constructive approach, which was a good example of a Standing Committee doing the work which Parliament wishes Standing Committees to do. It is with considerable pleasure therefore that we see so many of the points which we made now enshrined in these amendments. We are happy to give them a fair wind through the House tonight.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 2, in page 2, line 13, leave out
'carry out in conjunction with the police investigations into'
and insert 'investigate'.

No. 3, in page 2, line 15, at end insert—
'(3A) The Director may, if he thinks fit, conduct any such investigation in conjunction either with the police or with any other person who is, in the opinion of the Director, a proper person to be concerned in it'.

No. 5, in page 2, line 22, leave out 'this section' and insert 'subsection (4) above'.

No. 6, in page 2, line 23, leave out 'a barrister or solicitor' and insert—

'(a) a barrister in England and Wales or Nothern Ireland;
(b) a solicitor of the Supreme Court; or
(c) a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland'.

No. 7, in page 2, line 29, after 'designated', insert
'who is a barrister in England and Wales or a solicitor of the Supreme Court'.

No. 4, in page 2, line 31, after 'Crown Court', insert 'in England and Wales'.

No. 8, in page 2, line 37, after 'designated', insert
'who are barristers in England and Wales or solicitors of the Supreme Court'.

No. 9, in page 2, line 38 after 'Crown Court', insert 'in England and Wales'.

No. 10, in page 2, line 39 [Clause 1], at end insert—
'(10A) Any member so designated who is a barrister in Northern Ireland or a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland shall have—

(a) in any court the rights of audience enjoyed by solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland and in the Crown Court in Northern Ireland, such additional rights of sudience as may be given by virtue of subsection (10C) below; and
(b) in the Crown Court in Northern Ireland, the rights of audience enjoyed by barristers employed by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.

(10B) Subject to subsection (10C) below, the reference in subsection (10A)(a) to rights of audience enjoyed by solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland is a reference to such rights enjoyed in the Crown Court in Northern Ireland as restricted by any direction given by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland under section 50 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978.
(10C) For the purpose of giving any member so designated who is a barrister in Northern Ireland or a solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland additional rights of audience in the Crown Court in Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may direct that any direction given by him under the said section 50 shall not apply to such members.'.

No. 11, in page 2, line 42, leave out from 'proceedings' to end of line 44 and insert
'include references to the proceedings being discontinued and to the taking of any steps (including the bringing of appeals and making of representations in respect of applications for bail) which may be taken in relation to them.'.

No. 12, in page 2, line 44, at end insert—
'(13) In the application of this section (including that Schedule) to Northern Ireland references to the Attorney General are to be construed as references to him in his capacity as Attorney General for Northern Ireland.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 2

DIRECTOR'S INVESTIGATION POWERS

Amendments made: No. 12A, in page 2, line 45, at end insert
',but only for the purposes of an investigation under section 1 above,'.

No. 13, in page 3, line 4, leave out 'to' and insert 'and'

No. 14, in page 3, line 37, at end insert—
'(5A) Unless it is not practicable in the circumstances, a constable executing a warrant issued under subsection (4) above shall be accompanied by an appropriate person.
(5B) In subsection (5A) above "appropriate person" means—

(a) a member of the Serious Fraud Office; or
(b) some person who is not a member of that Office but whom the Director has authorised to accompany the constable'.

No. 15, in page 3, line 38, leave out 'compliance with' and insert 'response to'.

No. 16, in page 3, line 39, leave out
'not be used in evidence against him'

and insert
'only be used in evidence against him on a prosecution for an offence under subsection ( 10A) below'.

No. 17, in page 3, line 44, at end insert—
'(7A) A person shall not under this section be required to disclose information or produce a document in respect of which he owes an obligation of confidence by virtue of carrying on any banking business unless—

(a) the person to whom the obligation of confidence is owed consents to the disclosure or production; or
(b) the Director has authorised the making of the requirement or, if it is impracticable for him to act personally, a member of the Serious Fraud Office designated by him for the purposes of this subsection has done so.'.

No. 18, in page 3, line 46, leave out 'person' and insert
'competent investigator (other than a constable)'.

No. 19, in page 4, line 8, at end insert—
'(10A) A person who, in purported compliance with a requirement under this section,—

(a) makes a statement which he knows to be false or misleading in a material particular; or
(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular, shall be guilty of an offence.

(10B) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (10A) above shall—

(a) on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine or to both; and
(b) on summary conviction, he liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 3

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

Amendments made: No. 20, in page 4, line 42 leave out 'and'.

No. 21, in page 4, line 45 at end insert
and—
(c) to the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland for the purposes of any prosecution of an offence relating to inland revenue,'.

No. 22, in page 5, line 6, leave out
'(including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act).

No. 23, in page 5, line 12, at end insert', Northern Ireland'.

No. 24, in page 5, line 13, at end insert

'and may only be disclosed by such a member if he is designated by the Director for the purposes of this subsection.

No. 25, in page 5, line 23, after 'Office', insert
'designated by the Director for the purposes of this subsection'.

No. 26, in page 5, line 24, after `department', insert
'or Northern Ireland department'.

No. 27, in page 5, line 25, at end insert
(including the Crown in right of Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland)'.

No. 28, in page 5, line 26, leave out 'and'.

No. 29, in page 5, line 28, after 'Wales', insert Northern Ireland'.

No. 30, in page 5, line 28, at end insert '; and
(d) for the purposes of assisting any public or other authority for the time being designated for the purposes of this paragraph by an order made by the Secretary of State to discharge any functions which are specified in the order;'.

No. 31, in page 5, line 32, at end insert
'or Part XV of the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;'.

No. 32, in page 5, line 33, leave out 'the' and insert 'an'

No. 33, in page 5, line 33 [Clause 3], at end insert—
'(ba) an Official Assignee;
(bb) a person appointed to carry out an investigation under section 55 of the Building Societies Act 1986;
(bc) a body administering a compensation scheme uner section 54 of the Financial Services Act 1986;
(bd) an inspector appointed under section 94 of that Act;
(be) a person exercising powers by virtue of section 106 of tha Act;
(bf) an inspector appointed under section 177 of that Act or any corresponding enactment having effect in Northern Ireland;
(bg) an inspector appointed under section 38 of the Banking Act 1987;
(bh) a person exercising powers by virtue of section 44(2) of the Insurance Companies Act 1982;'.

No. 34, in page 5, line 38, leave out 'Great Britain.' and insert 'the United Kingdom'.

No. 35, in page 5, line 39, leave out paragraph (a), (b) or (c) above and insert 'any of the foregoing paragraphs'.

No. 36, in page 5, line 40, at end insert—
'(6A) An order under subsection (5)(d) above may impose conditions subject to which, and otherwise restrict the circumstances in which, information may be disclosed under that paragraph.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg]

Clause 5

NOTICES OF TRANSFER—PROCEDURE

Amendments made: No. 37, in page 7, line 8, al beginning insert
'If the conditions specified in subsection (4A) below are satisfied,'.

No. 38, in page 7, line 12, at end insert—
'(4A) The conditions mentioned in subsection (4) above are—

(a) that the person charged has given his written consent to the powers conferred by subsection (3) above being exercised without his being brought before the court; and
(b) that the court is satisfied that, when he gave his consent, he knew that the notice of transfer had been issued.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 6

DISMISSAL OF TRANSFERRED CHARGE

Amendments made: No. 39, in page 7, line 43 at beginning insert 'Subject to subsection (3A) below,'.

No. 40, in page 7, line 47, at end insert—


'(3A) The judge may order a person who has made a written statement which it is proposed to adduce in evidence to supplement that statement by oral evidence.
(3B) If—

(a) the judge makes an order under subsection (3A) above; and
(b) the written statement is submitted to the court, the statement shall not be admitted as evidence unless—
(i) the person who made it gives oral evidence; or
(ii) the judge gives leave for it to be admitted without his doing so.'.

No. 41, in page 8, line 4 leave out
'in pursuance of leave granted under subsection (2) above' and insert 'under this section'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 9

THE PREPARATORY HEARING

Amendment made: No. 42, in page 10, line 16, at end insert—
'(10A) Subject to rules of court made under section 53(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (power by rules to distribute business of Court of Appeal between its civil and criminal divisions), the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under subsection (10) above shall be exercised by the criminal division of the court; and the reference in that subsection to the Court of Appeal shall be construed as a reference to that division.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 10

PROVISIONS RELATING TO LATER STAGES OF TRIAL

Amendment made: No. 43, in page 10, line 29, at beginning insert
'Unless the judge, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, gives leave,'.

No. 44, in page 10, line 35, leave out 'or the leave of the judge'.

No. 45, in page 10, line 36, after 'regard', insert 'in all cases'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 11

RESTRICTIONS ON REPORTING, APPLICATIONS for DISMISSAL AND PREPARATORY HEARINGS

Amendments made: No. 46, in page 10, line 43, after 'broadcast', insert
'or include a cable programme'.

No. 47, in page 11, line 12, leave out 'or broadcast' and insert
'broadcast or included in a cable programme'.

No. 48, in page 11, line 13, leave out 'or broadcast' and insert
'broadcast or include in a cable programme'.

No. 49, in page 11, line 23, leave out 'or broadcast' and insert
'broadcast or include in a cable programme'.

No. 50, in page 11, line 27, leave out 'or broadcast' and insert
'broadcast or included in a cable programme'.

No. 51, in page 11, line 31, after 'names', insert 'ages, home'.

No. 52, in page 11, line 31, leave out
'the parties and witnesses and the ages of.

No. 53, in page 11, line 32, at end insert—
'(bb) any relevant business information;'.

No. 54, in page 11, line 40, at end insert—

'(8A) The following is relevant business information for the purposes of subsection (8) above—
(a) any address used by the accused for carrying on a business on his own account;
(b) the name of any business which he was carrying on on his own account at any relevant time;
(c) the name of any firm in which he was a partner at any relevant time or by which he was engaged at any such time;
(d) the address of any such firm;
(e) the name of any company of which he was a director at any relevant time or by which he was otherwise engaged at any such time;
(f) the address of the registered or principal office of any such company; and
(g) any working address of the accused in his capacity as a person engaged by any such company.

(8B) The addresses that may be published or broadcast or included in a cable programme under subsection (8) above are addresses—
(a) at any relevant time; and
(b) at the time of their publication, broadcast or inclusion in a cable programme.
(8C) In this section—
engaged" means engaged under a contract of service or a contract for services, and
relevant time" means a time when events giving rise to the charges to which the proceedings relate occurred.'

No. 55, in page 11. line 41, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
'(9) If a report is published, broadcast or included in a cable programme in contravention of this section, the following persons, that is to say—

(a) in the case of a publication of a written report as part of a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, editor or publisher of the newspaper or periodical;
(b) in the case of a publication of a written report otherwise than as part of a newspaper or periodical, the person who publishes it;
(c) in the case of a broadcast of a report, any body corporate which transmits or provides the programme in which the report is broadcast and any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of the editor or a newspaper or periodical;
(d) in the case of an inclusion of a report in a cable programme. any body corporate which sends or provides the programme and any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper,
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.

(10) roceedings for an offence under this section shall not, in England and Wales, be instituted otherwise than by or with the consent of the Attorney General.

(11) Subsection (1) above shall be in addition to, and not in derogation from, the provisions of any other enactment with respect to the publication of reports of court proceedings.

(12) In this section—

"broadcast" means broadcast by wireless telegraphy sounds or visual images intended for general reception;

"cable programme" means a programme included in a
cable programme service;

"publish", in relation to a report, means publish the report, either by itself or as part of a newspaper or periodical, for distribution to the public.'.— [Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 15

PRINCIPLES TO BE FOLLOWED BY COURT

Amendments made: No. 56, in page 12, line 41, leave out from 'court' to second `to' in line 42.

No. 96, in page 13, line 4, at beginning insert
'any likelihood of unfairness to the accused, or if there is more than one, any of them—

(i) resulting from the admission of the statement, having regard in particular to'.

No. 97, in page 13, line 6, at end insert
`or

(ii) resulting from its exclusion.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 16

STATEMENTS IN DOCUMENTS THAT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS OR INVESTIGATIONS

Amendments made: No. 98, in page 13, line 7, after `statement', insert
'which is admissible in criminal proceedings by virtue of section 13 or 14 above'.

No. 99, in page 13, line 7, at end insert 'the court to'

No. 124, in page 13, line 8, leave out 'or 19' and insert ',19 or 20'.

No. 100, in page 13, line 15, leave our from 'justice' to second 'to' in line 16 and insert
'and in considering whether its admission would be in the interests of justice, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances and in particular?—

(i).'

No. 101, in page 13, line 18, leave out from 'likelihood' to 'if' in line 19 and insert
'of unfairness to the accused or, if there is more than one, any of them, resulting from its admission'.

No. 102, in page 13, line 20, at end insert 'or from its exclusion'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

clause 19

EXPERT REPORTS

Amendments made: No. 103, in page 14, line 38, [Clause 19]. at end insert—

'(2A) For the purpose of determining whether to give leave, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances and in particular—

(a) to the contents of the report;
 (b) to the reasons why it is proposed that the person making the report shall not give oral evidence; and
 (c) to any likelihood of unfairness to the accused or, if there is more than one, any of them, resulting from the admission of the report if the person making it does not attend to give oral evidence, or from its exclusion.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 21

EVIDENCE THROUGH VIDEO LINKS

Amendment No. 104, in page 15, line 23, at end insert—
'(3A) A statement made on oath by a witness outside the United Kingdom and given in evidence through a live vieo link by virture of this section shall be treated for the purposes of section 1 of the Perjury Act 1911 as having been made in the proceedings in which it is given as evidence.
(3B) Without prejudice to its generality, any power to make Crown Court Rules or Criminal Appeal Rules shall include power to make such provision as appears to the authority exercising the power to be necessary or expendient for the purposes of subsection (3A) above.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 27

POWER OF CROWN COURT TO DEAL WITH SUMMARY OFFENCE WHERE PERSON COMMITTED FOR EITHER WAY OFFENCE

Amendments made: No. 58, in page 18, line 17, after 'of', insert 'such'.

No. 59, in page 18, line 20, after second 'or, insert 'such'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 29

REFERENCE OF SENTENCING QUESTIONS TO COURT OF APPEAL

Amendments made: No. 62, in page 19, line 21, at end insert—
'(A) Subject to rules of court made under section 53(l) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under this section shall be exercised by the criminal division of the court; and references in this section to the Court of Appeal shall be construed as references to that division.'.—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 40

PROCEDURE FOR ISSUE OF CERTAIN WARRANTS OF COMMITMENT IN ABSENCE OF OFFENDER

Amendments made: No. 154, in page 23, leave out line 11 and insert 'In subsection (4)'.

No. 155, in page 23, line 12, leave out
'(warrants of commitment' and insert '(restriction on power to impose imprisonment'.

No. 156, in page 23, line 13, at end insert
'in paragraph (b)(ii) of subsection (4), for the words "all other methods of enforcing payment of the sum" there shall be substituted the words "the methods of enforcing payment of the sum specified in subsection (4A) below".
(1A) The following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
(4A) The methods of enforcing payment mentioned in subsection (4)(b)(ii) are—

(a) a warrant of distress under section 76 above;
(b) an application to the High Court or county court for enforcement under section 87 below;
(c) an order under section 88 below;
(d) an attachment of earnings order; and
(e) if the offender is under the age of 21, an order under section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (attendance centre orders).".

(2) The following subsections shall be inserted after subsection (5) of that section—.'.

No. 149, in page 23, line 20, leave out from beginning to 'it' in line 21 and insert—
'(5B) At such a hearing the court shall consider such information about the offenders means as is available to it, unless'.

No. 150, in page 23, line 27, leave out from 'time' to first 'and' in line 28.

No. 151, in page 23, line 33, at end insert—
'(5CA) Except as mentioned in subsection (5CB) below, the time stated in a notice under subsection (5A) above shall not be earlier than 21 days after the issue of the notice.
(5CB) Where a magistrates' court issues a notice under subsection (5A) above at the same time at exercising the power conferred by section 77(2) above, the time stated in the notice may be any day following the end of the period for which the issue of the warrant of commitment has been postponed.'.

No. 152, in page 24, line 2 leave out "at a hearing under section 82(5) above" and insert 'from "at" to "conviction"'.

No. 153, in page 24, line 4, at end insert
'if the court thinks it just to do so having regard to any change in his circumstances since the conviction, remit the whole or any part of the fine or vary any condition on which the issue of the warrant of commitment relating to it was postponed under section 77 above.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 42

FIXED PENALTY NOTICES

Amendments made:

No. 63, in page 24 line 48, leave out from 'police' to end of line 49.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 51

CASES IN WHICH RESTRAINT ORDERS AND CHARGING ORDERS MAY BE MADE.

Amendments made:
No. 64, in page 32, line 46, leave out subsection (5).—[Mr. Douglas Hogg.]

Clause 77

THE COMPENSATION SCHEME

Amendments made: No. 127, in page 50, line 48, after 'constituting' insert '(i)'.

No. 128, in page 50, line 48, at end insert
'or
(ii) an offence specified in subsection (3A) below; or'.

No. 129, in page 51, line 8, after '(2)', insert '(a)(i)'.

No. 130, in page 51, line 8, leave out from 'any' to `requiring' in line 10 and insert 'offence—
(a)'.

No. 131, in page 51, line 14, at end insert
`or
(b) whose commission requires the death of or personal injury to any individual where the state of mind of the person committing the offence consisted of recklessness as to whether he caused death or personal injury.
(3A) The offences mentioned in subsection (2)(a)(ii) above are—'.
No. 132, in page 51, line 14, at end insert—
'(a) rape;
(aa) an offence which falls to be charged as arson;'.

No. 133, in page 51, line 17, after `disorder)', insert 'or 3 (affray)'

No. 158, in page 52, line 21, leave out
'Subject to subsection (10) below,'.

No. 65, in line 23, after 'sustained', insert—

(a) is not a child; and
(b) '.

No. 125, in line 26, at end insert—
'(a) the Board are satisfied in relation to the person responsible for causing the injury or, where more than one person is responsible for causing it, each of the persons responsible who was living in the same household as the person injured when the injury was sustained—

(i) that he has been prosecuted in connection with the injury; or
(ii) that there is a sifficient reason why he has not been so prosecuted; and

(b) the Board are satisfied—

(i) that the person injured has ceased to live, and does not intend to live again, in the same household as the person responsible for causing the injury or, where more than one

person is responsible for causing it, any of the persons responsible who was living in the same household as the person injured when the injury was sustained; or
(ii) if the person injured has not so ceased to live, that he is prevented by circumstances from doing so.'

No. 126, in line 27, leave out subsection (10).

No. 134, in line 39, leave out
'consisting of the impairment of any person's mental condition'.

No. 135, in line 41, leave out 'that person' and insert
'the person who sustained it'.

No. 136, in line 42, leave out 'the injury' and insert 'it'.

No. 137, in line 46, at end insert—
'(12) Where any criminal injury caused by shock consists of harm to a person's mental condition, it shall only be a qualifying injury for the purposes of the Part of this Act if it ammounts to a psychiatric illness.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 79

POWERS TO WITHHOLD AND REDUCE COMPENSATION

Amendments made: No. 66, in page 53, line 49, at end insert—
'(4) Where an injury which is a criminal injury by virtue of section 77(2)(a) above is sustained by a person who, when the injury is sustained—

(a) is a child; and
(b) is living in the same household as the person or, if more than one, any of the persons, responsible for causing it,

the Board shall consider whether, in all the circumstances, it is in the child's interest to make an award of compensation to him and shall not make an award unless they are satisfied that it is in his interest.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 80

RIGHT OF APPEAL BY WAY OF CASE STATED

Amendments made: No. 139, in page 54, line 6, leave out 'twenty-one' and insert 'twenty-eight'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 81

SMALL AWARDS AND AWARDS TO MINORS

Amendments made: No. 67, in page 54, line 30, leave out subsection (3).—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 82

REIMBURSEMENT AND RECOVERY

Amendments made: No. 142, in page 55, line 8, after 'him', insert
`or receives any such payment after the making of the award'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 83

REIMBURSEMENT AND RECOVERY IN SCOTLAND

Amendments made: No. 159, in page 55, line 29, leave out '(a)'.

No. 160, in line 29, leave out from 'heard' to end of line 30 and insert—
'(2A) In considering whether to make an order under subsection (1) above, the sheriff shall have regard to the financial position of the offender and to such other matters (not including the question whether he was properly convicted) as the sheriff considers relevant.'.

No. 161, in line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—


'(3) The Board shall only make an application for an order under subsection (1) above if they have reason to believe that the offender is able to pay the whole or a substantial part of the award.
(3A) Subsections (5) and (6) of section 82 of this Act shall
have effect in relation to Scotland.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 85

PART VI—INTERPRETATION

Amendments made: No. 68, in page 56, line 7, at end insert
child" means a person under the age of 18 years;'.

No. 138, in line 16, leave out 'impairment of' and insert 'harm to'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 94

ORDERS IN COUNCIL. AS TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXTRADITION BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND FOREIGN STATES

Amendments made: No. 115, in page 59, line 40, at end insert—
'(5) An Order in Council under this section which does not provide that a person may only be returned to the foreign state requesting his return if the court before which he is brought under section 98 below is satisfied that the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial if the extradition crime had taken place within the jurisdiction of the court shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 95

EXTRADITION REQUEST AND AUTHORITY TO PROCEED

Amendments made: No. 116, in page 60, line 27, leave out `any offence' and insert
'an offence other than an offence excluded by subsection (4A) below, which is'.

No. 117, in line 29, at beginning insert
'subject to subsection (4B) below,'.

No. 118, in line 30, at end insert—
'(4a) The offences excluded from paragraph (b) of subsection (4) above are offences in relation to which an order for the return of the person concerned could not lawfully be made in accordance with the provisions of this part of this Act.
(4B) the Secretary of State may not give consent under paragraph (c) of that subsection in respect of an offence in relation to which it appears to him that an order for the return of the person concerned could not lawfully be made, or would not in fact be made, in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 98

PROCEEDINGS FOR COMMITTAL

Mr. Richard Ottaway: I beg to move amendment No. 69, in page 62, line 12, leave out 'the foreign state' and insert
'(a) the United States of America or (b) any state which is a party to the European Convention on Extradition'.
The effect of this amendment is to restrict the abolition of the prima facie rule for extradition to requests from western Europe and the United States. I have been concerned about the abolition of the prima facie rule under this piece of legislation. It is a large step to take and it could have a great impact on human rights. I am not sure that it is entirely justified.
The prima facie rule consists of two parts. One is the rule which is the evidence of the crime, and the second is the rule by which the evidence is introduced, and I am not convinced that the evidence rule, which we are abolishing, is to blame for the present state of affairs; I think it is more to do with the rules of evidence.
It is a grave step to grant a request for extradition on a lower standard of proof than that required for committal in this country. So it is vital for us to have confidence in the country that is requesting extradition.
I recognise the Home Secretary's enthusiasm to try to combat international terrorism and I appreciate that we must improve the extradition climate. The Minister knows my views about this. We have discussed the matter in the past and in a letter he wrote to me on 1 August 1986 he intimated that, in effect, this legislation would not be used in countries other than those in western Europe and the United States.
The only purpose of this amendment is formally to put this on the record rather than to leave it lying around in correspondence with Back Benchers.

Mr. Mellor: My hon. Friend has perfectly properly raised this matter and it is certainly our intention to enter into arrangements whereby only the prima facie requirement would be dispensed with in respect of countries which share our standards of justice. In the main that would be Western European countries and the United States. We do not, on the face of the statute, rule out there being other countries outside that grouping with which we might wish to enter into those arrangements. It is quite right, though, that there needs to be a safeguard. The safeguard, I hope my hon. Friend might agree, is provided by Government amendment No. 115, which will he approved this evening, which gives the House the power to veto a non-prima facie treaty by means of annulment of the Order in Council embodying its terms. That would be the basis that any objections could be raised and aired publicly in the House if it were left that we were overstepping the mark in designating a country which was not appropriate for the abolition of the rule.
I hope that on that basis my hon. Friend might withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Ottaway: I am obliged to my hon. Friend for that reply. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 108

PERSONS RETURNED TO UNITED KINGDOM BY FOREIGN STATE NOT TRIABLE FOR PREVIOUS OFFENCE

Amendments made: No. 119, in page 67, line 20, at end insert—
'(aa) any offence disclosed by the facts on which his return to the United Kingdom is granted. or'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 113

APPLICATION TO SERVICE COURTS ETC. OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO EVIDENCE

Amendments made: No. 106, in page 69, line 6, after 'or";', insert—
'(aa) with the substitution in subsection (3B), for the words "Crown Court Rules"—

(i) in relation to courts-martial, of the words "Rules of Procedure"; and


(ii) in relation to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, the words "rules under section 49 of the Courts-Martial Appeals Act 1968.", and
(iii) in relation to Standing Civilian Courts, of the words "an order under paragraph 12 of Schedule 3 to the Armed Forces Act 1976.".'.

No. 105, in line 6, leave out 'and'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 117

REMANDS OF SUSPECTED DRUG OFFENDERS TO CUSTOMS DETENTION

Amendments made: No. 70, in page 71, line 3, at end insert
'"child" means a person under the age of 14;'.

No. 71, in page 71, leave out lines 4 and 5.

No. 72, in page 71, line 7, at end insert
'and "young person" means a person who has attained the age of 14 and is under the age of 17.'.

No. 73, in line 7, at end insert—
'(5) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland—

(a) for the words from the beginning of subsection (1) above to "1976" there shall be substituted the words "subject to subsection (3) below,";
(b) the reference in section 1 to the Criminal Law Act 1977 in subsection (2)(c) above shall be construed as a reference to Article 9 of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983; and
(c) the reference in subsection (2)(d) above to section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 shall be construed as a reference to Article 3 of that Order.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 119

GROUNDLESS APPEALS

Amendments made: No. 74, in page 71, line 16, leave out from 'registrar' to 'that' in line 17.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 120

ANONYMITY IN RAPE ETC. CASES

Amendments made: No. 75, in page 71, line 29, leave out first 'subsection' and insert 'subsections'.

No. 76, in line 36, leave out 'photograph' and insert 'still or moving picture'.

No. 77, in page 72, line 5, at end insert—
'(1A) In subsection (1) above "picture" includes a likeness however produced.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 125

NORTHERN IRELAND

Amendments made: No. 78, in page 73, line 23, leave out
'section 30 or 31 above'
and insert
'any provision of this Act to which this section applies'.

No. 79, in line 28, at end insert—
'(2) The provisions of this Act to which this section applies are—

sections 4 to 16;
section 17 (including Schedule 2);
sections 18 to 22;
section 30;
section 31.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 128

COMMENCEMENT

Amendments made: No. 80, in page 73, line 45, at end insert—
'(1A) An order under subsection (1) above may make such transitional provision as appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient in connection with any provision thereby brought into force other than a provision mentioned in subsection (2) below.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 129

EXTENT

Amendments made: No. 81, in page 75, leave out line 21 and insert
'section 1 (including Schedule 1); and sections 2 and 3;'.

No. 108, in line 15, at end inset—
'(12A) In subsection (11) above "modifications" includes additions, omissions and Amendments .'.

No. 82, in line 16, leave out subsection (13)—[Mr. Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 1

THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE

Amendments made: No. 83, in page 77, line 24, at end insert—
'(2) In this paragraph references to the Director of Public Prosecutions include references to the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.'.

No. 84, in line 25, after 'proceedings', insert 'in England and Wales'.

No. 85, in line 27, at end insert—
'(2) Where the Director has the conduct of any criminal proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland shall not in relation to those proceedings be required to exercise any function under Article 5 of the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1972.'.

No. 86, in line 29, after '1', insert '(4)'.

No. 87, in line 31, after 'proceedings', insert 'in England and Wales'.

No. 88, in line 37, at end insert—
'(lA) Where the Director or any designated official gives notice that he has instituted, or is conducting, any criminal proceedings in Northern Ireland—

(a) to a resident magistrate or a justice of the peace in Northern Ireland;
(b) to a clerk of petty sessions in Northern Ireland, the person to whom the notice is given shall?

(i) at the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner; or
(ii) in a particular case, at the time and in the manner directed by the Attorney General,


send him every recognizance, complaint, certificate, deposition, document and thing connected with those proceedings which that person is required by law to deliver to the appropriate officer of the Crown Court.'.

No. 89, in line 39, leave out 'sub-paragraph (1) above,' and insert 'this paragraph'.

No. 90, in page 77, line 43, leave out 'sub-paragraph (1) above,' and insert 'this paragraph'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 7

CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION

Amendments made: No. 91, in page 93, line 9, at end insert 'in respect of interest or'.

No. 140, in page 96, line 4, leave out
'the amount of that payment'


and insert
'so much (if any) of that payment as the Board are satisfied that the claimant has received before they make the award'.

No. 141, in page 96, line 5, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3).—[Mr. Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 9

AMENDMENTS OF BACKING OF WARRANTS (REPUBLIC OF IRELAND) ACT 1965 AND FUGITIVE OFFENDERS ACT 1967

Amendments made: No. 120, in page 104, line 28, leave out 'and'.

No. 121, in page 104, line 32, leave out 'any lesser offence' and insert
'a lesser offence, other than an offence excluded by subsection (3A) below, which is'.

No. 122, in page 104, line 33, at end insert
'and
(d) at the beginning of paragraph (c), there shall be inserted the words "subject to subsection (3B) below,".'.

No. 123, in page 114, line 33, at end insert—
'(5) The following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—
(3A) The offences excluded from paragraph (b) of subsection (3) above are offences in relation to which an order for the return of the person concerned could not lawfully be made.
(3B) The Secretary of State may not give consent under paragraph (c) of that subsection in respect of an offence in relation to which it appears to him that an order for the return of the person concerned could not lawfully be made, or would not in fact be made.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 12

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Amendments made: No. 109, in page 111, line 22, at end insert—
'18A. In section 30(1) of that Act (suspension of restitution orders pending appeal), the words "made on a conviction on indictment" shall cease to have effect.'.

No. 92, in page 111, line 26, at end insert—
'19A. At the end of subsection (I) of section 33 of that Act (right of appeal to House of Lords) there shall be added the words "or section 9 (preparatory hearings) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987".'.

No. 93, in page 112, line 10, at end insert—

'Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (S.I., 1972, No. 538 (N.I.))

24A. In Article 5(3) of the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (which makes provision, amongst other things, for the functions of the Director of Public Prosecution in Northern Ireland in relation to the conduct of criminal proceedings) after the word "Director" there shall be inserted the words ", subject to any provision contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1987".'.

No. 110, in page 112, line 11, at end insert—
'24A. In subsection (I) of section 34A of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (power of Crown Court to order search of persons before it)—

(a) in paragraph (c), the words "other than an order under section 35 of this Act;" shall cease to have effect; and
(b) the following paragraph shall be inserted after that paragraph—
"(cc) the Crown Court makes an order against a person under section 35 of this Act;".'.

No. 111, in line 12, leave out
'the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973' and insert 'that Act'

No. 112, in line 26, leave out paragraph 26.

No. 94, in page 114, line 45, leave out paragraph 45.

No. 107, in line 49, at end insert—
'45A. In section 128(3A) of that Act (remand in custody without accused being brought before court) after the word "above" there shall be inserted the words "unless the case is one to which section 128A below applies,".—[Mr. Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 13

REPEALS

Amendments made: No. 113, in page 122, line 24, at end insert—
'In section 30, the words "made on a conviction on indictment".'.

No. 114, in line 34, at end insert—
'In section 34A(1)(c), the words "other than an order under section 35 of this Act".'.—[Mr Mellor.]

Orders of the Day — Title

Amendments made: No. 95, in line 9, after 'cases' insert `the alteration of names of petty sessions areas.'.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

Further consideration of the Bill adjourned.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

Bill, as amended in the Standing Committee, to be further considered this day.

Sixth Form Education (Derbyshire)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Garel-Jones]

Mr. Patrick McLoughlin: I am exceedingly grateful for getting this Adjournment debate. I must admit that, having learned today that the last time an Adjournment took place at this time was 3 February, I do not know whether to feel honoured or somewhat sorry for the people in my constituency who stay up late listening to "Today in Parliament" to try to catch what is happening in this Chamber and to hear the debate which we are about to have.
I should like to draw the attention of the House and of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State to the plans of Derbyshire. county council to reorganise secondary education in the Derby area. However, tonight I shall be making my main points in relation to Ecclesbourne comprehensive school, which is in my constituency.
I wish to pay a particular tribute to the work that has been done by the action committee in the school, led by Mrs. Pauline Latham, who has put a lot of work and effort into putting the case over both to me and to the county council.
It is almost a year since my election. In my maiden speech, I made reference to the excellent schools in my constituency. I talked also about the threat to the sixth form at Ecclesbourne school. Unfortunately, that threat has now become a reality and the county council is proposing to close the sixth form, a sixth form which I shall show is of proven worth.
It is of proven worth not because the headmaster says so and not because the teachers say so. It is of proven worth because the parents and pupils say so.
It is true that post-16 education in Derbyshire is fairly poor, but that is certainly not the case, nor is it true, for Ecclesbourne school, where 55 per cent. of the fifth form stay on to go into the sixth form, whereas the average for Derby schools is usually only 18 per cent. The percentages of pupils in that school obtaining the higher grades in 0- level subjects— that is, grades A, B, and C—were: in English language, in 1986, 97, and in English literature, 80. The number of pupils enrolled in that school in September was 181. I believe that those are figures of which any school could and should be proud.
The figures to which I have just referred show why the parents want the school to continue and give it so much support. If one was driving through the area of Duffield in my constituency before the county council ripped all the posters down for which it seemed to find money available, one would have seen posters putting the case for saving Ecclesbourne school. If one was to walk in that village now one would see people wearing "Save Ecclesbourne" badges because it has become an issue of local concern and local campaigning.
Part of the authority's case is that falling school rolls require the removal of surplus places. That is true for Derby in general, but it is certainly not true for Ecclesbourne, where numbers are stable. Indeed, in 1977 the headmaster was asked to estimate what the school roll would be over the next 10 years. His estimate was that the number in the school in 1986 would be 1,205. The local education authority's estimate was 893. The number on

the roll in 1986 was 1,204. Therefore, the headmaster, nine years before, was one out in his prediction. That shows that the parents are certainly happy with the school.
The authority also argues that sixth forms are not viable. On the authority's own figures, the sixth form is viable at Ecclesbourne for as long as predictions can be made. The authority tries also to suggest that tertiary colleges are somehow better than sixth forms. I have found no evidence for that claim. I believe that it is a false argument because the choice is between sixth forms and tertiary education and not between sixth forms or tertiary education. That choice is removed.
The parents in my constituency rightly object to tertiary colleges being forced upon them and changing a system that has proven results for a system that might be better. I do not believe that we should go from a system that is proven to a system that is unproven. That is a wild jump in the dark and we should not put our children at risk.
As I have said, Ecclesbourne is a school of proven worth. In its curriculum breadth, the school offers A-levels in 18 subjects and could offer more if there were a demand. It also provides 11 one-year courses for sixth formers, spanning the academic to the pre-vocational.
Ecclesbourne has a concern for low achievers and, on average, improvements over a 24-month period in reading ages of the first years needing help with basic skills. I offer the following quotation from a father's letter to the headmaster. It was quoted by the headmaster in his 1985
speech day report. It is a good endorsement of the school.The father wrote:
He came to Ecclesbourne School seven years ago with a number of educational problems which resulted in a person with really no self-confidence and poor prospects. Indeed, his Primary teacher in her final assessment confessed him to be `a mess'. Now, as you may be aware, educationally he is in possession of 8 '0' levels and 3 'A' levels and he has embarked this term on a Further Education course. But even more importantly, he is now a happy, self-confident, well-adjusted person, knowing where he wants to go.
What more can we ask of our schools?
There can be no doubt about the importance of a sixth form in a school and the school boasts the widest possible range of extra-curricular activities in which the sixth form plays a major role in organising.
There is a case for choice. Sixth forms are different from tertiaries. Sixth forms have high expectations in performance and behaviour. They make demands as well as offering choices. I believe also that sixth forms are a powerful and beneficial influence on the rest of the school.
There is no doubt that they attract better teachers. Sixth forms provide examples for younger pupils who also want to benefit from their activities as organisers.
Ecclesbourne's sixth form offers a valuable alternative to a tertiary college. Its students are set demanding yet realistic personal targets. Their progress and development are carefully monitored. The curriculum is carefully matched to the needs of their locality. It cannot even be claimed by the county council to be a financially viable alternative, as the local education authority admits that it will cost an additional £2·35 million to accommodate the extra pupils from Ecclesbourne and another school, John Port. The annual operating costs will also increase by £650,000, and no details are given of changeover or disruption costs.

Mr. Richard Ryder: Where are the Opposition?

Mr. McLoughlin: Unfortunately, they are in control of Derbyshire county council, and that is our problem. Bearing in mind the answer which my hon. Friend, through the Secretary of State, gave to my question, he will know that out of Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire is the highest rated county.

Mr. David Lightbown: Get rid of Bookbinder.

Mr. McLoughlin: One thing on which it spends less per head than those other authorities is education, and I would like to see its education spending brought into line with that of other counties. I would rather see the money spent on education that on some of the other crazy schemes that the county council suggests. I want to see the money used in a positive way, improving opportunities for children in schools, not destroying them which is what the county council seems so intent on doing.
For every child in primary school in Derbyshire £780 is spent, while in Nottinghamshire it is £840, For every child in secondary school in Derbyshire £1,125 is spent, while in Nottinghamshire it is £1,220. But one does not improve educational opportunities by destroying what is good and proven.
The last area to which I wish to turn my attention is that of the governing body. This is a short debate and I know that some of my hon. Friends would like to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. They have given me unswerving support in this campaign, especially my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Mr. Oppenheim) and my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Knight). I have said that my first speech in the House was on the Education Bill. I was extremely pleased to be appointed to that Standing Committee. As my hon. Friend will know, it changed the way in which governing bodies are appointed.
At the moment, the governing body of Ecclesbourne school has failed to give its total support to the campaign to save the school. Of the present governing body, 12 members are appointed by Derbyshire county council, two by Amber Valley district council and one by Derby city council. Seven are elected and 15 appointed by the county and district councils. One of the members said at a public meeting which I attended that although he would not like to see the sixth form closed it seemed that "we"—the governing body—"should support the council." After all, he said,
they are socialists and we are socialists.
I honestly believed that the duty of a governing body was to represent the best interests of the school, and certainly not the best interests of the local education authority. I am exceptionally glad that we have changed the law to ensure that we remove such politically biased people so that they no longer have a majority on school governing bodies. That legislation cannot come into effect in Derbyshire fast enough for the good of our schools.
The present governing body at Ecclesbourne obviously does not speak for the school that it is supposed to represent but rather its comrades in arms at county hall. This is a disgusting approach for a governing body to take, and one which should be condemned by the Labour Front Bench. Unfortunately, none of them is here. I very much doubt whether they will condemn it; indeed, they cannot condemn it this evening. The parents have only one hope of ensuring that these proposals are stopped. It is a hope to which this Government should he able to respond with

ease because not only does the school provide good education but the parents are happy and satisfied with it and it is large enough to contain its own sixth form.
Sixth forms play a valuable role and I am reluctant to see them replaced by impersonal tertiary colleges. The tertiary college system should be the last resort of any local education authority. Before tertiary education goes ahead, the education authority should have considered carefully the arrangements for consortium education so that the sixth form pupil remains at the school at which he h as spent his whole school life and is not removed to a big, impersonal tertiary college at the end of his school days. We should look to tertiary colleges as a last resort and not try to jump for them as a first resort, as Derbyshire county council is doing in the proposal currently before the Secretary of State.
The parents can only look to this Government and to the Secretary of State as a believer in the individual and as a believer in parental choice, not Socialist dogma, to overturn the decision and reject the case for tertiary education for Ecclesbourne school. There can be no doubt about the commitment of my constituents to that school, as anyone who has been around this place today will know, having listened to the short speeches of hon. Members in other debates.
My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will not be able to answer one way or the other tonight. As the Member for the constituency I have placed on record a very strong concern on the subject. As Adjournment debates are not the easiest to answer, it would be wrong of me not to express to my hon. Friend my grateful thanks for his decision last week on a primary school in my constituency. When he informs me of the decision on the sixth form proposals of Derbyshire county council, I can only ask that his letter reads like the letter that he sent me last week when he said that the Secretary of State, under the powers vested in him, rejected the proposal of Derbyshire county council. It is only a Conservative Government that can reject such proposals; I trust that it will be a Conservative Government who do reject it.

Mr. Greg Knight: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member For Derbyshire, West (M r. McLoughlin) on bringing to the attention of the House an extremely important matter. I support him unreservedly. May I say in passing that my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, South (Mrs. Currie), who unfortunately cannot be here, is also concerned about several aspects of Derbyshire county council's proposals for education within the county? She wishes to be associated with my hon. Friend's remarks.
This is an extremely important matter to anyone who has ties with the county of Derbyshire. We are entitled to ask why there is not one single member of the Labour party present for the debate. Why has not one member of the alliance bothered to stay to listen to my hon. Friend? That is a disgrace, and the matter should not go unobserved by the House. It will not go unobserved by the people of Derbyshire.
My hon. Friend properly concentrated on the position at Ecclesbourne school, but many other schools in Derbyshire will be affected by the county council's proposals. I accept immediately that some sixth forms need to close because of falling rolls. For example, there


is no case for keeping open the sixth forms at Littleover school and Parkfields school, in my view, because of falling rolls there.
However, in addition to supporting my hon. Friend's comments on Ecclesbourne school I want to tell the Minister that other schools in Derbyshire have viable sixth forms of proven worth and should not be closed. I mention, en passant, Spondon school and Woodlands school, both in my constituency. If a sixth form is viable, surely it should be kept open so that parents and pupils have the right to choose.
I find amazing not only the absence of Opposition Members but also the astonishing silence of some of those from Derbyshire whom one would have expected to support the views of the parents and pupils. I am referring to local councillors and local-authority-appointed school governors. Why have we in Derbyshire not heard from them? Why have they kept quiet on this issue?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing me to intervene briefly in his debate. I am not saying that every aspect of the Derbyshire plan is wrong, but I am saying that the proposals for Ecclesbourne, Spondon and Woodlands schools—are wrong. The plan is destructive and it should be rejected.

Mr. Phillip Oppenheim: I support the retention of the sixth form at Ecclesbourne school. Ecclesbourne school is not in my constituency, but it is on its border and several parents who live in Amber Valley send their children to Ecclesbourne school.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. McLoughlin) for allowing me to take part in the debate. As the hour is late, or early, depending which way one looks at it, I do not propose to speak for long, especially as most of the relevant points have been ably made by my hon. Friend, whom I fully and wholeheartedly support in his campaign for the retention of the sixth form at Ecclesbourne.
I want briefly to pay tribute to the action group, ably led by Pauline Latham and ably backed by many concerned parents. The most worrying aspect of the county council's proposal to close Ecclesbourne's sixth form is the way in which Derbyshire county council is blatantly and shamefacedly politicising education. I say that it is politicising education because the only reason for proposing to close the sixth form at Ecclesbourne is a political one.
There simply is no educational reason for closing the sixth form in Ecclesbourne. It is a good sixth form. There is no financial reason for closing the sixth form, because it would be cheaper to retain it. There is no democratic reason for closing it, because the parents and the people in the area are almost unanimously in favour of its retention.
The truth is that this is a blatantly political decision by the county council which wants to close the sixth form

because it thinks that it would be elitist to keep it open. "Elitism" is the word which the county council bandies around to cover anything which it happens not to like.
How can it be elitist for a sixth form as good as Ecclesbourne to survive? Surely it is just the opposite, because it is good sixth forms such as the Ecclesbourne school sixth form which give children who do not necessaily have a privileged background an opportunity to succeed in our society.
Derbyshire county council's proposals to close Eccelesbourne's sixth form are undemocratic, in that they take no account of the wishes of local parents. They are bad for education, financially idiotic and understandable only in the context of the type of manic Socialist dogma into which Derbyshire county council—unfortunately—so often delves.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Bob Dunn): I begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. McLoughlin) on his success in obtaining an Adjournment debate on the proposals of Derbyshire county council to reorganise sixth form education. I also place on record the congratulations of Conservative Members on the way in which my hon. Friend has conducted himself and represented the interests of his constituents since his election.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising an issue that is of immediate concern to him, and to other hon. Members who represent Derbyshire. They have spoken about the proposals of Derbyshire county council to reorganise sixth form education in the county by providing 16-plus education at tertiary colleges, and to close sixth forms in secondary schools. Those proposals have already been published in the city of Derby and its surrounding area.
My hon. Friends will appreciate that it is impossible for me to prejudge the issues, and that I am therefore unable to say anything about the future of the sixth forms that are the subject of our debate. I can, however, assure them that I have listened carefully to what has been said tonight, and that the points that they have made will be taken into account along with the representations that we have received, and any others that we may receive, before my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State makes his decision on the proposals.
Finally, I must state, without prejudice to this or any future case, that the Government are determined to preserve quality in education wherever and whenever it is found, and to work for its continued improvement. As my hon. Friends know, I have made that point on numerous occasions but I gladly make it again tonight, and hope that I shall do so many times in the future.
I thank my hon. Friends who have spoken so well. We will listen carefully to what they have to say, and I shall ensure that all the views that have been expressed come to the attenton of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seventeen minutes past Three o'clock am.